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Power Shifts in International Law: Structural
Realignment and Substantive Pluralism
William W. Burke-White*
For most of the past sixty years, the United States and Europe have led, independently and collectively,
the international legal system. Yet, the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs) over the
past decade has caused a profound transformation of global politics. This paper examines the implications
of this redistribution of power for international law. While international lawyers have long debated the
ability of law to constrain state behavior, this paper shifts the debate from the power of law to the role of
power within international law. It first advances a structural argument that the diffusion, disaggrega-
tion, and issue-specific asymmetries in the distribution of power are giving rise to a multi-hub structure for
international law, distinct from past structures such as bipolarity and multipolarity. This multi-hub
structure increases pluralism within the international legal system. It also creates downward pressure on
international legal processes to migrate from the global level toward a number of flexible, issue-specific
subsystems. The paper then proceeds to demonstrate that the anticipated pluralism is emerging at three
substantive tension points as some rising powers articulate distinct preferences with respect to sovereignty,
legitimacy, and the role of the state in economic development. At each of these tension points, rising powers
are reasserting the preeminence of the state in international law, leading to a gradual turning away from
the individualization of international law championed by the United States and Europe back toward the
Westphalian origins of the international legal system. Notwithstanding this turn, the United States
stands to benefit from the new multi-hub structure of international law.
On September 25, 2009, in an overcrowded conference room at the David
L. Lawrence Convention Center in Pittsburgh, the leaders of the Group of
20 (“G20”) declared the informal group of states to be the “premier forum
for . . . international economic cooperation,” effectively replacing the more
intimate, transatlantic-led G7/8.1 Less than two months later, at 7 p.m. on
December 18, 2009, President Obama walked into a room in the Bella Con-
ference Center in Copenhagen, anticipating a bilateral meeting with Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao. Instead he found himself arriving late, or perhaps
without invitation, at an ongoing multilateral meeting with Premier Wen,
Brazilian President Lula, Indian Prime Minister Singh, and South African
* Richard Perry Professor and Inaugural Director, Perry World House at the University of Penn-
sylvania and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author wishes to thank Bill
Alford, Shyam Balganesh, Gabriella Blum, Michael Boyle, Christopher Brummer, Jacqes deLisle, Maggie
Gardner, Jack Goldsmith, Noah Feldman, Andrew Moravcsik, Sonia Rolland, Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Thomas Wright, Mark Wu, and the participants in workshops at the University of Pennsylvania, North-
eastern Law School, and Fordham Law School for valuable discussion and feedback on prior drafts. The
author thanks the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, where he served as Visiting Profes-
sor while conducting aspects of this research, as well as all the interviewees in Russia, India, China, and
Brazil. For research assistance, the author thanks Yukti Choudhary, David Donatti, Kamola Kobildja-
nova, Ursina Menn, Duy-Lam Nguyen, Anya Richter, Laura Sinisterra Paez, Dean Rosenberg, Kristin
Teager, and Kenta Tsuda.
1. G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit para. 19 (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.g20.u
toronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html.
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President Zuma.2 It was only in this setting, away from the remaining 188
states participating in the negotiation, that any deal—even one as thin as
the Copenhagen Climate Accord—could be reached.3
These two moments are emblematic of the rapid and profound redistribu-
tion of power in the international system. China has risen.4 Brazil, India,
and Russia are following.5 Numerous other states, from Turkey to Mexico,
Indonesia to South Africa, are quickly transitioning from secondary or even
tertiary status to meaningful global actors.6 The relative power of the
United States is declining. The era in which the United States and Europe
together could steer the international legal system has passed. Much has
been written about how this power shift will influence international politics.
Yet, international lawyers have rarely examined how this changing distribu-
tion of power will alter the processes and substance of international law.7
Where they have done so, they have generally assumed that the decline of
American hegemony and the rise of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and
China) will have a uniform and largely detrimental effect on international
law.8 The reality, however, is far more nuanced, and quite possibly more
positive.
The reluctance of international lawyers to grapple with this redistribution
of power may stem from the uneasy relationship that has long existed be-
tween power and international law.9 Classical international lawyers saw their
role as one of scientific inquiry into what the law was, denying any role for
power. As Vattel wrote in 1760, “[p]ower or weakness does not in this
respect produce any difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is
2. For a transcript of the White House briefing outlining these events, see Joe Romm, White House
Tells Amazing Inside Story of How the Copenhagen Accord Was Reached, ClimateProgress (Dec. 20, 2009),
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2009/12/20/205232/white-house-tells-amazing-inside-story-of-how-
the-copenhagen-accord-was-reached/.
3. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Climate Change Con-
ference, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7–19, 2009, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on its 15th Session, held in
Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December, 2009, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010).
4. See generally Noah Feldman, Cool War: The Future of Global Competition (2013); Aaron
Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia
(2011).
5. See Harold James, The Rise of the BRICs and the New Logic in International Politics, Int’l Econ.,
Summer 2008, at 41.
6. See generally Jim O’Neill, The Growth Map: Economic Opportunity in the BRICs and
Beyond (2011).
7. On the lack of scholarship in this space, see Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony:
Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 369, 372 (2005). For a
review of scholarship on power, see generally Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan Zasloff, Power and Interna-
tional Law, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 64 (2006).
8. See, e.g., Eric Posner & John C. Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, 7 Chi. J. Int’l L. 1, 15
(2006) (“The history of the first Cold War, the current American and Chinese attitudes toward interna-
tional law, and the current state of international institutions all point to . . . the weakness of these
institutions for managing a superpower conflict.”).
9. See Oscar Schachter, The Role of Power in International Law, 93 Amer. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 200,
200 (1999) (describing “power as antithetical to law”).
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. . . .”10 In the mid-20th century, political realists such as Carr and Morgen-
thau launched an attack on international law, fundamentally shaping inter-
national lawyers’ relationships with power ever since.11 They argued that law
was merely an epiphenomenon of power.12 International law only exists,
they claimed, due to “identical or complementary interests of states, backed
by power.”13
If classical international lawyers were right that “[p]ower or weakness
does not . . . produce any difference,” the present power redistribution
should have no impact on international law.14 In contrast, if Morgenthau
were correct that “prospective beneficiaries” of a redistribution of power
will “try to bring about a corresponding change of the legal rules, whereas
the beneficiaries of the legal status quo will resist any change of the old
order,” the result would be, in his words, “a competitive contest for power”
whereby “change in the existing legal order will be decided, not through a
legal procedure provided for by this same legal order, but through a confla-
gration of conflicting social forces which challenge the legal order as a
whole.”15
Yet the reality may be more complex than either of these positions allows.
Classical international lawyers ignored the fact that power does influence
state behavior and, hence, international law. Morgenthau, like most classical
realists, offered an over-determined view of power. His critique assumed
that states seek to maximize power as a primary value.16 In fact, states want
far more than power and have a varied set of preferences that shape their
behaviors. These preferences matter critically because what states want and
how badly they want it determine their willingness to use some portion of
their power to achieve an objective.17 Due to the recognition that they can
advance their interests through the existing system of international law, ris-
ing powers are not attempting to wholly destroy the edifice of international
law nor even rejecting international law per se. Rather, they are seeking to
10. Emmerich de Vattel, The Law Of Nations Or The Principles Of Natural Law Applied
To The Conduct And The Affairs Of Nations And of Sovereigns § 18 (Charles G. Fenwick
Trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758).
11. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual
Agenda, 87 Am. J. Int’l L. 205, 206 (1993) (“Much of the theoretical scholarship in both international
law and international relations can be understood as either a response to or a refinement of this [realist]
challenge.”).
12. See, e.g., Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction
to the Study of International Relations (1964); Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism,
and International Law, 34 Am. J. Int’l L. 260 (1940).
13. Morgenthau, supra note 12, at 275.
14. Vattel, supra note 10, at § 18.
15. Morgenthau, supra note 12, at 275–76.
16. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
5 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 5th ed. 1978). Morgenthau recognized that such capacity could change over
time. Cf. id.
17. See generally Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,
51 Int’l Org. 513 (1997).
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adjust the system from within and to make contemporary international law
more compatible with their own preferences.
As many international lawyers have sought to prove Morgenthau right or
wrong by examining the ability of international law to have a causal influ-
ence on state behavior, they have focused their inquiry on the power of law
to constrain state behavior.18 This paper shifts the debate to a related but
distinct question—the role of power within law. It opens an inquiry into
how changes in the distribution of power influence the processes and sub-
stance of international law. This debate is much more rarely engaged but is
particularly important in light of today’s changing distribution of power.19
The perennial debate has been about whether law can constrain power. The
question here is how power and changes in the distribution of power shape
the law. If law is merely a reflection of state power, rather than a constraint
on that power, then it should equally be, in substance, what powerful states
want it to be.20
The United States and Europe,21 independently and collectively, have had
extraordinary influence on both the processes and substance of international
law over the past sixty years. During this unique transatlantic moment,
while they have not always agreed with one another, they have often been
18. The constraint of power by international law has been the focus of international law and interna-
tional relations scholarship. For reviews, see Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International
Law and International Relations (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) [hereinafter
Interdisciplinary Perspectives]; William W. Burke-White, International Law and International Rela-
tions: Two Generations of Interdisciplinary Scholarship and a Second Term Agenda (2012) (unpublished working
paper) (on file with author); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor & Yonatan Lupu, Political Science
Research on International Law: The State of the Field, 106 Am. J. Int’l L. 47 (2012). For recent examples of
literature arguing that law does (or does not) have the ability to influence state behavior independent of
power, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law  (2006); Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54
Duke L.J. 621 (2004); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L.J.
1935 (2002); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 Cal. L.
Rev. 3 (2005); John C. Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, Peace Through Law? The Failure of a Noble Experiment,
106 Mich. L. Rev. 923 (2008); John C. Yoo & Will Trachman, Less Than Bargained For: The Use of Force
and the Declining Relevance of the United Nations, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 379 (2004).
19. A few scholars have addressed this question directly. See Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International
Law, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 843 (2001). For a response, see Jose E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law
Revisited, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 873 (2003). Nico Krisch has undertaken the only recent treatment, though
it is largely historical. See generally Krisch, supra note 7. The collapse of the Soviet Union spurred a strand
of scholarship on the role of hegemony in international law. The 2000 meeting of the American Society
of International Law was devoted to the role of the “single superpower.” See Johan van der Vyver et al.,
The Single Superpower and the Future of International Law, 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 64 (2000). The
Chicago Journal of International Law devoted its first issue to the topic of American hegemony and interna-
tional law. See Symposium, American Hegemony and International Law, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 1 (2000).
20. For an articulation of this view, see Krish, supra note 7, at 382 (“Most predominant states have
been active forces behind the development of international law, and they have made extensive use of the
international legal order to stabilize and improve their position.”).
21. Europe is treated as a unitary actor in this paper because of the growing role played by Europe’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy after the Lisbon Treaty and due to the fact that, within interna-
tional law, the positions of European states are often aligned. See generally Kateryna Koehler, European
Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Strengthening the EU as an International Actor, 4 Caucasian Rev. Int’l Aff. 57
(2010).
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able to collectively lead the creation, interpretation, and enforcement of in-
ternational legal rules. In so doing, they have embedded their particular
preferences into the substance of international law.22 Present power redistri-
butions have brought an end to that transatlantic moment. The question
then is how changes in the distribution of power are influencing and alter-
ing both the processes and substance of international law. This paper an-
swers that question with both a structural and a substantive claim.
Structurally, it argues that international law is transitioning into a new
structure, termed here a multi-hub system. The multi-hub system both fos-
ters pluralism and pushes many of the processes of international law toward
a number of separate, but flexible, subsystems. Substantively, the paper ar-
gues that rising powers are not rejecting international law as Morgenthau
predicted, but are instead articulating distinct preferences within the ex-
isting system that challenge aspects of the transatlantic vision of interna-
tional law, often through a reassertion of the role of the state. These new
preferences increase the diversity of ideas in international law, fostering
what is here termed substantive pluralism.23
From the end of World War II until the fall of the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics (“USSR”), the international political order was bipolar, with
the United States and the USSR acting as conflicting, counterbalancing
poles.24 For the past two decades that order has been unipolar, with the
United States as the sole global hegemon.25 Today, a new power structure of
international law is emerging with three basic characteristics.26 First, power
is diffuse—a relatively large number of states are amassing significant
power. Second, power is disaggregated—different states have relative advan-
tages in different types of power (military power, economic power, and soft
power) that have variable effectiveness in different areas of law. Third, power
is asymmetrically distributed—many states have or can develop significant
22. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, Reflections on Transatlantic Approaches to International Law, 17 Duke
J. Comp. & Int’l L. 513 (2007); Daniel Bethlehem, A Transatlantic View of International Law and Lawyers:
Cooperation and Conflict in Hard Times, 103 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 455 (2009).
23. For an expanded discussion of international legal pluralism, see William W. Burke-White, Inter-
national Legal Pluralism, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 963 (2004). This concept of pluralism, which focuses on
the range of norms being contested and articulated in the legal system, is somewhat distinct from tradi-
tional legal pluralism. Cf. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & Soc’y Rev. 869 (1988).
24. See, e.g., Richard Ned Lebow, The Long Peace, The End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism, 48
Int’l Org. 249 (1994); John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,
15 Int’l Sec. 5 (1990); Kenneth Waltz, The Stability of a Bipolar World, 93 Daedalus 881, 888
(1964).
25. See Robert Jervis, Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective, 61 World Pol. 188, 190 (2009). Some
have argued that Europe represents a second pole in the current political order. See Andrew Moravcsik,
Europe: Rising Superpower in a Bipolar World, in Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for
Global Governance 151 (Alan S. Alexandroff & Andrew F. Cooper eds., 2010).
26. This project focuses on changes in the distribution of power among states. Another simultaneous
shift of power from states to private actors, including individuals, corporations, and NGOs, is beyond the
scope of this study. See generally Jessica Matthews, Power Shift, 76 Foreign Aff. 50 (1997); Oscar
Schachter, The Decline of the Nation State and Its Implications for International Law, 35 Colum. J. Trans-
nat’l L. 7 (1998).
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power advantages over others in the system on an issue-specific basis. These
three characteristics produce a system that is not unipolar, bipolar, or multi-
polar, but rather multi-hub.27
The distinction between a multipolar system and the multi-hub structure
of international law is not just semantic. In a multipolar system, such as the
Concert of Europe, a fixed group of Great Powers or poles engage in rivalry
and balancing, dominating a far larger group of weaker, subordinate states.28
In contrast, in the newly emerging multi-hub structure a growing number
of states play issue-specific leadership roles in a more flexible and fluid sys-
tem. In the right circumstances, many different states can act as hubs, lead-
ing international legal processes or articulating preferences that attract
followers and alter substantive norms. In other circumstances, those same
states may follow the lead of others. Whereas in a classical multipolar sys-
tem, the status of a pole usually turned on its ability to coerce followers, in
the multi-hub structure, with a wide range of states capable of assuming
leadership in a flexible system, the ability of a hub to attract followers will
often be as or more important than its ability to coerce them. The multi-hub
system thereby empowers states that are not hubs in a particular instance
with choices as to which of a number of hubs to follow on any given issue or
even to build the issue-specific power necessary to assume leadership
themselves.
The emergence of this multi-hub system has two significant structural
implications for international law. First, it promotes international legal plu-
ralism as hubs assume leadership and advance alternate norms within and
among a number of flexible subsystems in a kind of variable geometry. As
hubs seek to gain followers, they have opportunity and incentives to articu-
late distinct preferences for the evolution of the substance of international
law that reflect their own interests and may be attractive to potential
followers.
Second, this new structure pushes and pulls international legal
processes—such as rulemaking, interpretation, and enforcement—from the
global level of the system toward these separate, flexible subsystems. Due to
both the increasing number of relevant states and the diffusion of power
among them, it is becoming increasingly difficult to successfully conclude
international legal processes that are truly global in scope. In contrast, due
to asymmetric power distributions that facilitate leadership by hubs, legal
processes that are confined within particular subsystems are becoming com-
paratively more successful. The result is a gradual, but discernable, shift in
27. For the initial use of the term “hub” in this context, see Arnold Wolfers, Discord and
Collaboration: Essays on International Politics 210 (1962) (“If one visualizes the alliance sys-
tem in the form of a wheel, one may say that . . . the United States is located at the hub of the wheel.”).
28. For this distinction, see Glenn H. Snyder & Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations:
Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises 419 (1977). For
a discussion of the operation of a traditional multipolar system, see generally Henry Kissinger, A
World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–22 (1973).
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rulemaking, interpretation, and enforcement from the global level toward
particular subsystems. Whether any individual international legal process in
fact moves toward such subsystems will turn on an issue-specific calculation
of the marginal costs and benefits of global processes over their more readily
available subsystemic alternatives. The overall vector of change, however, is
toward these separate subsystems.
Substantively, this paper argues that the pluralism anticipated in the
multi-hub structure is emerging at three critical tension points in the inter-
national legal system. At these tension points one or more hubs articulates
and advances preferences that conflict with the norms previously embedded
in international law, largely by the United States and Europe. While an
analysis of power alone can illuminate changes to the structure of the inter-
national legal system, understanding current and future substantive change
at these tension points requires an analysis of the preferences of rising pow-
ers.29 State preferences determine when and whether states will use some
portion of their power to seek particular results through international law.30
Examination of those preferences shows that rising powers are not re-
jecting international law through the kind of “competitive contest for
power” Morgenthau predicted.31 Instead, they are embracing the system,
while seeking change within it. Consideration of the preferences of China,
India, Brazil, and Russia—four states with exceptionally rapid economic
growth rates—shows how rising powers are already influencing interna-
tional legal norms.32 First, sovereignty: for Russia and China, sovereignty is
a more absolute concept than the more permeable vision of sovereignty that
had been advanced during the transatlantic moment. Second, legitimacy:
Brazil and India evaluate legitimacy based on participation and process, in
contrast with a U.S. approach that prioritizes effectiveness. Third, the role of
the state in economic development: Brazil, India, and China all have a far
more state-centric approach to economic development than the liberal devel-
opment agenda advanced by the United States and Europe and embedded in
many rules of international economic law.
As these states articulate unique preferences in international law they be-
come hubs of the system. To the degree other states follow, pluralism in-
creases and substantive tensions develop. Contestation is occurring within
international law as states selectively accept and reject rules made by new
hubs, joining or exiting their respective subsystems on particular issues.
Given downward structural pressures toward pluralism and subsystem-level
29. See generally Moravcsik, supra note 17.
30. This approach builds particularly on the ideas of International Legal Process scholarship that
recognized the complex interplay between substance and processes. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, Thomas
Ehrlich & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Legal Process: Materials for an Intro-
ductory Course xiii-xv (1968).
31. See Morgenthau, supra note 12, at 275.
32. The depth of the consideration of preferences here is constrained by space. Ultimately, a book-
length treatment is necessary.
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processes, distinct preferences and different rules may be advanced and de-
velop within separate subsystems. Some of these preferences may, at times,
lead to change in the global rules constructed during the past half century.
At other times, they may result in fragmentation based on the contestation
of preferences and even normative visions among hubs and across various
subsystems.
The preferences being advanced by rising powers at these three tension
points all relate to different visions of the role of the state in the interna-
tional legal system. The United States and Europe have promoted a funda-
mentally Lockean conception of international law that emphasizes the role
and rights of individuals, often at the expense of the power of the state.33
Many rising powers’ preferences for sovereignty, legitimacy, and economic
development, in contrast, reassert the role and significance of the state.
While it is premature to predict the ultimate resolution of these tensions,
the substance of international law may be shifting back toward its Westpha-
lian origins, with states reassuming the more central role in international
law that they enjoyed in the past.
While the emergence of this multi-hub structure may have troubling im-
plications for some legal regimes—human rights, for example—on the
whole the impact of present power shifts is likely to be more positive than is
often assumed. Even from the perspective of Washington, these develop-
ments may be beneficial. The decline of hegemony may mean that Washing-
ton’s particular preferences may not prevail on every specific issue. But,
perhaps surprisingly, the United States stands to benefit from emerging plu-
ralism. The United States has long sought flexibility within the interna-
tional legal system. By embracing pluralism among the multiple,
competing preferences of different subsystems, the United States will be
able to maintain the freedom it enjoyed as hegemon, even as its hegemony
declines. The United States remains comparatively well-placed to build co-
alitions of different subsystems that advance its interests. Building such co-
alitions in the multi-hub structure will be far easier for the United States
than it was to generate the kind of global consensus often necessary during
the period of U.S. hegemony. The multi-hub structure, in short, can serve
U.S. interests.
It is important to note the limited goals of this project. The purpose here
is neither to make absolute claims about changes to international legal pro-
cess nor specific predictions about future legal rules. Rather, the goal is to
consider the role of power within international law, to identify the structural
characteristics of a multi-hub legal system, and to consider the substantive
tension points at which international law is likely to adapt. This framework
33. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 31, 40
(1995). See also Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2029, 2034 (2003) (“[T]he interna-
tional community has become a party to the social contract between citizens and their government.”).
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should facilitate future issue-specific analysis of the likely evolution of both
the process and substance of a wide range of specific legal regimes.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief account of the role
of power within international law, based on the causes of state behavior and
the nature of power. Part II argues that the diffusion, disaggregation, and
asymmetric distributions of power are giving rise to a multi-hub system
that is distinct from traditional unipolar and multipolar orders. Part III
makes a structural claim that the multi-hub system is fostering pluralism
among the preferences of hubs in the system and moving many legal
processes into flexible subsystems built by and around these hubs. Part IV
makes a substantive claim that select rising powers are articulating different
preferences about sovereignty, legitimacy, and economic development that
generate tensions in the international legal system and, collectively, reassert
the role of the state. Finally, the conclusion ties together these structural and
substantive developments, speculating on the direction of future evolution,
and suggesting the potential benefits of the multi-hub system for the
United States.
I. Power, Preferences, and International Law
The claim that power matters within international law is not new. Before
proceeding to an examination of present changes to the distribution of
power and their implications for international law, it is necessary to set out
the relationship between power and preferences that underlies this study.
This Part does so by first providing a brief theoretical account of state be-
havior and then examining the nature of power today.
A. The Theoretical Model
The critique of international law leveled by the mid-century political
realists was based on theoretical assumptions about the causes of state behav-
ior, according to which states simply seek to maximize their power against a
background condition of anarchy. In that model, law was an epiphenomenon
of power.34 In contrast, other theoretical approaches, such as institutional-
ism, recognize more space for international law to influence state behavior
through the provision of information or cooperation around common inter-
ests.35 This article, however, moves beyond traditional debates about the
ability of power to constrain law.
34. See Morgenthau, supra note 12, at 269 (arguing that international law “needs . . . to be seen
within the sociological context of economic interests, social tensions, and aspirations for power, which are
the motivating forces in the international field . . . .”).
35. See generally Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Polit-
ics in Transition (1977); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (1984); Stephen Krasner,
Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999).
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This section provides a theoretical model to explain the relationship be-
tween preferences and power that explains how the preferences of newly
powerful states influence and alter international legal norms. To do so, it
draws on a range of existing political science theories—including realism,
institutionalism, and liberalism—that emphasize different assumptions
about the behavior of states in the international system. The overall ap-
proach taken here is largely based on liberal political science theory.36 Lib-
eral theory’s “fundamental premise” is that preferences matter. What states
want determines—within externally imposed material constraints—what
they do.37 Recognizing the role of preferences and the distinct preferences of
rising powers facilitates analysis of how they will use their new power to
advance their interests within the international legal system.
Liberal theories of political science are based on three fundamental as-
sumptions. First, the actors in the international system are states, individu-
als, and international organizations, all of which promote their own,
differentiated interests. Second, states represent some subset of domestic so-
ciety, “on the basis of whose interests . . . [governments] define state prefer-
ences.”38 Finally, “the configuration of interdependent state preferences
determines state behavior.”39 In short, liberal theory assumes that “what
states want is the primary determinant of what they do.”40 Liberal theory’s
emphasis on preferences critically differentiates this approach from that of
the classical realists.
While preferences matter greatly in this analytic framework, the underly-
ing origin of those preferences is not essential to this argument. Whether
state preferences flow from the interests of domestic actors, alternative nor-
mative visions, or even changes in the power distribution itself is an inter-
esting question, but one that need not be resolved here.41 It is the
articulation of these preferences in international law, not their origins, that
is important to this analysis.
Liberal theory may seem an unusual starting point for an examination of
the impact of the redistribution of power on the international legal system.
After all, “liberals causally privilege variation in the configuration of state
preferences, while treating configurations of capabilities and information as
36. See Michael Doyle, The Ways of War and Peace (1997); Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal Theories
of International Law, in Interdisciplinary Perspectives 83, supra note 18; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A
Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 240 (2000).
37. Moravcsik, supra note 17, at 516 (“[T]he relationship between states and the surrounding domes-
tic and transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state behavior by influencing
the social purposes underlying state preferences . . . .”).
38. Id. at 518.
39. Id. at 520.
40. Id. at 521.
41. See generally Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999) (on
norms as the source of state behavior); Alastair Iain Johnston, Is China a Status Quo Power?, 27 Int’l Sec.
5 (2003) (on Chinese preference change with growing power); Moravcsik, supra note 17 (on domestic
interests as the source of preferences).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-1\HLI101.txt unknown Seq: 11 27-APR-15 10:30
2015 / Power Shifts In International Law 11
if they were . . . fixed constraints.”42 Yet, liberal theory recognizes that
power distributions and system-structure may constrain, facilitate, or other-
wise shape the actions states take in pursuit of their preferences.43 Specifi-
cally, relative power sets a ceiling on the resources states can deploy to
advance their preferences in any given circumstance.44
An analysis of the consequences of present power shifts for international
law cannot be monocausal, looking only to power or preferences. Liberal
theory allows such a multicausal approach. Ultimately, “[i]f foreign poli-
cymaking is a process of constrained choice by purposive states . . . a combi-
nation of preferences and constraints shapes state behavior.”45 This article
takes such a multicausal approach, beginning with examination of shifts in
the distribution of capabilities in Part II and the implications of those shifts
for the structure of international law in Part III.46 It then turns, in Part IV,
to the preferences states are advancing in international law within the con-
straints imposed by the new power distribution.47 Fundamentally, it is the
“policy interdependence” among these preferences as constrained by the dis-
tribution of power that will determine the evolution of international law.48
B. Power Within International Law
Within this multicausal framework, the starting point for this inquiry is
ongoing shifts in the distribution of power in the international system. Ex-
amining the impact of those changes requires clarifying what is meant by
power and how power is converted into international legal influence.
Whereas the understanding of power in most realist scholarship is narrow
and focused on coercive ability,49 power is better understood more broadly as
42. Moravcsik, supra note 17, at 520.
43. See id. at 542.
44. See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 152 (1947).
45. Moravcsik, supra note 17, at 542 (emphasis omitted).
46. To a large degree, those shifts in the distribution of capabilities are analyzed through theories that
prioritize the role of power and institutions. For power-based analysis, see Robert Gilpin, War and
Change in World Politics (1981); Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (1987); John J.
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of
International Politics (1979); Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics
(2008). For an institutionalist approach, see Keohane & Nye, supra note 35.
47. Properly liberal theory would reverse the ordering of analysis because it assumes that preferences
are analytically prior to capabilities. The liberal approach assumes that “[s]tates first define preferences
. . . then they debate, bargain, or fight to particular agreements—a second stage explained by realist and
institutionalist (as well as liberal) theories of strategic interaction.” Moravcsik, supra note 17, at 544. To
simplify analysis, the approach taken here examines material constraints before turning to preferences. It
is, therefore, more consistent with Keohane’s view that “liberalism makes sense as an explanatory theory
within the constraints pointed out by . . . realism.” Robert O. Keohane, International Liberalism Reconsid-
ered, in The Economic Limits to Modern Politics 192 (John Dunn ed., 1992).
48. See Moravcsik, supra note 17, at 520 (defining “policy interdependence”).
49. See generally Waltz, supra note 46.
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the “capacity to do things and in social situations to affect others to get the
outcomes we want.”50
This definition recognizes that power is differentiated, and comes in
many forms including—to use Joseph Nye’s typology—military, economic,
and soft power.51 Military power, essentially the force that a state’s military
can exert, was traditionally prioritized in realist approaches.52 Economic
power53 flows from imperfect symmetries in the interdependence of states’
economies through, for example, trade, the use of a reserve currency, the
deployment of economic sanctions, foreign investment flows, or the delivery
of foreign aid.54 Soft power, often the “pull” of cultural affinity, language
commonality, and positive reputation, gives states “the ability to affect
others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and
eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”55 These
three forms of power are simultaneously independent and interdependent.56
Issue linkages may facilitate the cross-application of different forms of power
to otherwise distinct legal regimes.57  Yet, each form of power has indepen-
dent relevance to the overall redistribution of power.58
In order to apply power, states must convert raw capability—whether
military, economic, or soft—into influence. As Nye explains, while material
resources are important, “[p]ower conversion—getting from resources to be-
havioral outcomes—is a crucial intervening variable” between power itself
and the ability to achieve particular outcomes.59 Distinct forms of power
50. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power 6 (2012). See also Kenneth E. Boulding, Three
Faces of Power (1989).
51. Nye, supra note 50, at 25, 51, 81.
52. See generally Robert Art & Kenneth Waltz, The Use of Force: Military Power and
International Politics (1983); Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and De-
feat in Modern Battle 191 (2006).
53. Nye, supra note 50, at 55 (“[M]ost cases of economic interdependence also involve a potential
power relationship.”). See also Charles P. Kindelberger, Power and Money: The Economics of
International Politics and the Politics of International Economics 56 (1970).
54. See R. Harrison Wagner, Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence, 42 Int’l
Org. 461 (1988) (on the power that arises from economic interdependence). See generally Nye, supra note
50, at 51–80.
55. See generally Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means To Success in World Politics
(2004). For a critique, see Leslie H. Gelb, Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue Ameri-
can Foreign Policy 69 (2010).
56. See Robert Zoellick, The Currency of Power, Foreign Policy (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www
.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/08/the_currency_of_power (noting that military and economic
power are interdependent, but that the United States is only skilled in the deployment of military
power).
57. See, e.g., Ernst B. Haas, Why Collaborate: Issue Linkages and International Regimes, 32 World Pol.
357 (1980). For specific application within the WTO context, see Jose E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage
Machine, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 146 (2002).
58. The broad definition of power here is particularly appropriate for international law. In other areas,
such as global military conflict, narrow definitions may be more appropriate. Definitional distinctions
separate this study from those that suggest the emergence of a bipolar system based on converging
military capability. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 4.
59. Nye, supra note 50, at 8. See also Kenneth Dowding, Power, Capability, and Ableness: The Fallacy of
the Vehicle Fallacy, 7 Contemp. Pol. Theory 238 (2008).
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convert into international legal influence with different degrees of effective-
ness. While “power and the striving for power are crucial variables in the
formation and application of international law,”60 the unique attributes of
the international legal system constrain the conversion of some types of
power into legal influence.
Power can be converted into influence by “commanding change,” “con-
trolling agendas,” and “establishing preferences.”61 There is considerable
issue-specific variation in the effectiveness with which military, economic,
and soft power serve these functions within international law. While mili-
tary power remains relevant in international law,62 the general prohibition
on the use of force under the U.N. Charter63 and the inherent constraints on
the application of military force to many questions of international law limit
its effectiveness.64 Military power may have direct bearing in limited cir-
cumstances, such as enforcement of Chapter VII Security Council Resolu-
tions, or where states may decide to violate Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
It may have more indirect bearing within legal regimes relating to humani-
tarian law or arms control, for example. Outside of these issues, however,
constraints on the use of military force and the obsolescence of major war
means that today military power converts poorly into more general legal
influence.65
In contrast with military power, economic power has growing applicabil-
ity within international law. Across the wide range of subfields of interna-
tional economic law, including trade, investment, and monetary law,
economic power may directly correlate with international legal influence.
Unlike military power, the use of economic power—ranging from vote buy-
ing to foreign assistance, from trade preferences to economic sanctions—is
generally consistent with the norms of the international legal system and far
less costly to the imposing state.66 As Secretary of State Clinton concluded
in 2011, today “power is more often measured and exercised in economic
60. Schachter, supra note 9, at 205.
61. Nye, supra note 50, at 11.
62. See Schachter, supra note 9, at 201 (“[P]ower used coercively . . . is capable of imposing . . .
hardship and deprivation . . . .”).
63. U.N. Charter art. 2.
64. On the limitations of military power, see Suzanne Nossel, Smart Power: Reclaiming Liberal Interna-
tionalism, 83 Foreign Aff. 131 (2004).
65. On constraints, see Joseph Nye, Limits of American Power, 117 Pol. Sci. Q. 545, 549 (2002)
(“Today the foundations of power have been moving away from the emphasis on military force . . . .”). See
generally John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (1989).
While there are historical examples in which military power has been cross-applied to repayment of
sovereign debt, reprisals are more limited today. See James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1991:
Political Applications of Limited Naval Force (1994); Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July
2–Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), art. 50 (prohibiting the
use of force as a countermeasure).
66. See Nye, supra note 50, at 51–62 (on economic power). For an example of economic power ap-
plied, see Natalie J. Lockwood, International Vote Buying, 54 Harv. Int’l. L.J. 97 (2013).
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terms.”67 The application of economic power remains issue- and context-
specific, based on the particular relationships among the states in question.
Outcomes “will often depend on the context of each market and its asym-
metries of vulnerability.”68
Soft power may be most readily convertible into legal influence, despite
definitional and measurement challenges.69 The “pull” of soft power, such
as the desire to cooperate with like-minded states, the affinity for particular
cultures, or the shared sense of benevolent goals, operates legitimately
within the international legal system and applies across a wide range of is-
sues. The causal pathways through which soft power operates—the “ability
to attract . . . [which] often leads to acquiescence”—are highly salient to
international legal processes such as treaty negotiation, rule interpretation,
and even compliance.70 Like other forms of power, the application of soft
power is issue specific. On certain issues, soft power may have outcome-
determinative pull, yet in others, where vital economic relations are at stake
or military force under consideration, soft power may have lower salience.
This differential effectiveness with which different types of power convert
to legal influence is significant to the impact of present power shifts on the
future of international law. It suggests that the changing structure of inter-
national law is based on relative shifts in all three forms of power, which
have not been equally affected. It further suggests the need for issue-specific
examination of power relations among states based on the relative effective-
ness of different types of power within specific international legal regimes.71
Finally, variation in the convertibility of these types of power is fundamental
to the fluid, flexible nature of the multi-hub system. Where a state has a
comparative power advantage with respect to the most relevant and convert-
ible form of power for a particular legal issue, it may be able to lead a
specific international legal process, even if it does not have an absolute
power advantage.
II. Power Shifts and the Emergence of a Multi-Hub System
The “unipolar moment” of the past two decades72 is quickly giving way
to a new power structure in the international political system, the exact
67. Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Economic Club of New York: Economic
Statecraft (Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175
552.htm.
68. Nye, supra note 50, at 80.
69. See Schachter, supra note 9, at 201 (“[p]ower also enters into international law. . .  through non-
coercive measures—the use of benefits and rewards . . . that . . . bear on state interests and affect conduct
that can be pertinent to legal rules and processes.”).
70. Nye, supra note 50, at 6.
71. For a discussion of the issue-specific nature of regimes, see Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, The
Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7 Perspectives on Pol. 13 (2009).
72. Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 70 Foreign Aff. 23 (1990–91). For an introduction
to unipolarity, see Jervis, supra note 25, at 191. For the debate over the durability of this order, see
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contours of which remain much debated. Some suggest that the rise of
China is leading to a bipolar order, marked by great power rivalry.73 Others
contend that a multipolar system is emerging with rising powers such as
India and Brazil joining the United States and China in great power status.74
Still a third approach suggests that an orderless world is in the making,
without global leadership.75 Finally, there are those who suggest the United
States will continue to lead the international system, albeit with some ac-
commodation of rising powers.76 While the argument of this paper focuses
on the structure of power within international law, it is framed by the more
general changes in the distribution of power in the political and economic
order.
Despite the differences among these projections, there is relative consen-
sus on the general trends of change in the global political order.77 Given the
extensive literature on fundamental economic drivers of power transitions,
just a brief summary is provided here.78 The story of power shifts starts with
China. During the first decade of the 21st century, China experienced ex-
traordinary economic growth. Its Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) ex-
panded from $1.453 trillion in 2002 to $10.355 trillion in 2014.79  The
Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: the Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment, 31
Int’l Sec. 7 (2006); William Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, 24 Int’l Sec. 5, 8 (1999).
73. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 4; C. Fred Bergsten, Letter to the Editor, Two’s Company, 88 For-
eign Aff. 169 (Sept./Oct. 2009).
74. See, e.g., Layne, supra note 72, at 5, 7 (arguing that “the ‘unipolar moment’ . . .  will give way to
multipolarity”); Kenneth Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, 25 Int’l Sec. 5, 34 (2000) (noting
that “sooner or later, usually sooner, the international status of countries has risen in step with their
material resources”). For a view suggesting China has not yet developed the profile of a major global
power, see generally David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (2013).
75. See Charles A. Kupchan, No One’s World: The West, The Rising West, and the Com-
ing Global Turn 5 (2012) (contending the “next world will have no center of gravity”); Ian Bremmer
& Nouriel Roubini, A G-Zero World: The New Economic World Will Produce Conflict, Not Cooperation, 90
Foreign Aff. 2 (Mar./Apr. 2011); Richard N. Haass, The Age of Non-Polarity: What Will Follow US
Dominance, 87 Foreign Aff. 44 (May/June 2008).
76. See G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of
the American World Order (2011); G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West,
Can the Liberal System Survive?, 87 Foreign Aff. 23 (2008); Josef Joffe, The Default Power: The False
Prophesy of America’s Decline, 88 Foreign Aff. 21 (Jan.–Feb. 2009).
77. The differences among these predictions are based on different interpretations of the changes in
economic growth over the past decade, projections about how different states’ growth patterns will evolve
in the years ahead, and assumptions about the ability of the existing international order to accommodate
rising powers.
78. For analysis of these trends, see Kishore Mahbubani, The Great Convergence: Asia, The
West and the Logic of One World (2013); National Intelligence Council, Global Govern-
ance 2025: at a Critical Juncture (2010), available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/
Global__Governance_2025.pdf; Nat’l Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Trans-
formed World (2008) available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%
20Pubs/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf; Nat’l Intelligence Council, Global Trends
2030: Alternative Worlds (2012), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Global-
Trends_2030.pdf;); Ruchir Sharma, Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Mir-
acles (2012); Michael Spence, The Next Convergence: The Future of Economic Growth in
A Multispeed World (2011); O’Neill, supra note 6, at 3.
79. Int’l Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, Oct. 2014, http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx.
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other BRIC countries have also grown rapidly, at times in excess of 10% per
year. From 2002 to 2014, Brazil’s GDP increased from $506 billion to
$2.244 trillion,80 India’s from $522.7 billion to $2.047 trillion,81 and Rus-
sia’s from $345.1 billion to $2.057 trillion.82 One could use any number of
superlatives to describe these shifts. Jim O’Neill, who originally coined the
“BRIC” term for Goldman Sachs,83 puts it starkly:
The aggregate GDP of the BRIC countries has close to quadru-
pled since 2001 . . . . The world economy has doubled in size . . .
and a third of that growth has come from the BRICs. Their com-
bined GDP increase was more than twice that of the United
States and it was equivalent to the creation of another new Japan
plus one Germany, or five United Kingdoms, in the space of a
single decade.84
While the summer of 2013 was a bad one for the BRICs85 and growth
will likely slow to the 7% range,86 the expansion of the BRIC economies to
date is already sufficient to have structural consequences.87
In contrast with the BRICs, the United States and Europe grew far more
slowly between 2002 and 2012, with rates generally in the range of 2–3%.88
During this period, U.S. GDP increased from $10.6 trillion to $15.6 tril-
lion.89 Despite variation at the country level, the economy of the European
Union (“EU”) as a whole grew to $16.64 trillion.90 While this growth is
impressive for mature economies, the much more rapid growth of Brazil,
Russia, India, and China has allowed them to close, in part, the economic
gap with the United States and Europe. In 2002, the U.S. economy was
more than seven times the size of China’s. By 2012, it was just under twice
that of China’s.91 Based on rapid economic growth in the BRICs and rela-
tively slower growth in the United States and EU, a variety of forecasts show
China overtaking the United States as the world’s largest economy in the
next decade.92
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See O’Neill, supra note 6, at 3.
84. Id. at 4–5.
85. Emerging Economies: The Great Deceleration, The Economist, Jul. 27, 2013, available at http://www
.economist.com/news/leaders/21582256-emerging-market-slowdown-not-beginning-bust-it-turning-
point.
86. See Ruchir Sharma, Broken BRICs: Why the Rest Stopped Rising, 91 Foreign Aff. 2 (Nov./Dec.
2012) (noting structural constraints likely limit BRIC growth).
87. See Daniel W. Drezner, The New New World Order, 86 Foreign Aff. 34, 34 (Mar./Apr. 2007)
(“[BRIC] growth is opening the way for a multipolar era in world politics.”).
88. Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 79.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Projections of when China will overtake the United States range from 2016–2041. In 2003,
Goldman Sachs predicted that the Chinese economy would surpass that of the United States in 2041. See
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While debates about the implications of these changes for the interna-
tional political order will continue, three unique characteristics of the distri-
bution of power are emerging with important consequences for the structure
of international law. First, power is becoming more diffuse. Second, power is
disaggregating, in that different states are experiencing relative gains in dif-
ferent forms of power. Finally, power is becoming asymmetrically distrib-
uted on an issue-specific basis. As applied to international law, these three
characteristics give rise to a multi-hub structure, in which a relatively large
number of states can lead international legal processes as hubs of the system.
A. Power Diffusion
A first significant feature of the emerging order is that power is diffusing.
Power is not merely shifting from the United States to China or the BRICs;
it is diffusing across the system to a large number of states.93 Rather than
being concentrated in the hands of one state (a traditional unipolar system)
or a small group of states (a traditional multipolar system),94 in the emerg-
ing structure a relatively large number of states have sufficient power to
influence global affairs and an even larger number have regional influence.
A first element of this power diffusion is the rise of the BRIC economies.
Comparison of the changing size of global economies illustrates this diffu-
sion of economic power to the BRICs. In 2002, China had the world’s sixth
largest economy, behind the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom (“UK”) and France.95 By 2013, it had the second largest,
surpassing all but the United States. During the same period, Brazil ad-
vanced from 13th largest to 7th, surpassing Canada and Italy, and essen-
tially tied with France and the UK.96 India moved from 12th to 10th97 and
Russia advanced from 16th to 9th.98 Table 1 shows these moves and corre-
sponding change in the share of global economic power.
Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050, Goldman Sachs
Global Economics Paper No. 99 (Oct. 1, 2003), http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/
archive-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf. That date has been consistently revised forward. According to a 2013
OECD projection, parity may occur as early as 2016. See Simon Rabinovich, China Forecast to Overtake US
by 2016, Fin. Times, Mar. 22, 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0a3f5794-92b3-11e2-
9593-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3DzGlfxpM.
93. Cf. Edward Mansfield, Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power, 37 Int’l. Stud. Q. 105,
106 (1993) (arguing that “unlike polarity, [concentration] . . . incorporates both the power inequalities
among the major powers and the number of (polar and non-polar) major powers”).
94. See generally Kissinger, supra note 28, at 7.
95. Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 79, at 16.
96. IMF growth predictions suggest that by 2017 Brazil may have the 8th largest economy. Id.
97. Projections show that by 2017 India’s economy may reach $2.675 trillion (7th place). Id.
98. The IMF’s 2017 estimates suggest that Russia will continue to grow at rates sufficient to main-
tain this position. Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 79.
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Table 1: Power Shifts and Diffusion: 2002–2013
2002 2013
Per cent of
Per cent of Global
GDP (tn Global Country (net GDP (tn GDP*
Rank Country USD) GDP* change) USD) (change)
1 U.S. 10.978 32.3 U.S. (—) 16.768 22.5  (-9.8)
2 Japan 3.981 11.7 China (+4) 9.469 12.7 (+8.4)
3 Germany 2.014 5.9 Japan (-1) 4.899 6.6 (-5.1)
4 France 2.014 4.8 Germany (-1) 3.636 4.9 (-1.0)
5 U.K. 1.624 4.8 France (-1) 2.807 3.8 (-2.1)
6 China 1.456 4.3 U.K. (-1) 2.523 3.4 (-1.4)
7 Italy 1.229 3.6 Brazil (+6) 2.246 3.0 (+1.5)
8 Canada .752 2.2 Italy (-1) 2.072 2.8 (-0.8)
9 Mexico .742 2.2 Russia (+7) 2.097 2.8 (+1.8)
10 Spain .688 2.0 India (+2) 1.877 2.5 (+1.0)
11 S. Korea .609 1.8 Canada (-3) 1.827 2.4 (+0.2)
12 India .524 1.5 Australia (+3) 1.506 2.0 (+0.7)
13 Brazil .506 1.5 Spain (-3) 1.359 1.8 (-0.2)
14 Netherlands .466 1.4 Mexico (-5) 1.261 1.7 (-0.5)
15 Australia .423 1.3 S. Korea (-4) 1.305 1.7 (-0.1)
16 Russia .345 1.0 Indonesia (+4) .870 1.2 (+0.6)
17 Taiwan .301 .89 Turkey (+2) .820 1.1 (+4.0)
Although some have framed the rise of China and the other BRICs as a
zero-sum process, in which the United States and Europe are the losers,99 the
United States and Europe have, in fact, retained significant economic
power.100 Moreover, International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) projections sug-
gest steadily increasing growth rates in the developed economies over the
coming years, though never breaking 3.5%.101 Europe as a whole remains
the world’s largest common market economy102 with more than 700 million
people and a GDP of $16.64 trillion, larger than the United States and more
than double the size of China.103 In short, Europe remains at the table.104
99. The National Intelligence Council suggests that by 2025 Europe could be “a hobbled giant . . .
less able to translate its economic clout into global influence.” National Intelligence Council,
Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World 32 (C. Thomas Fingar, ed.) (2008). See also Naazneen
Barma, Ely Ratner & Steven Weber, A World Without the West, 90 Nat’l. Int. 23, 23–24 (2007).
100. For analysis of U.S. primacy as well as domestic challenges to economic growth, see, for example,
Richard N. Haass, Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America’s House in
Order 21–30 (2013).
101. Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 79.
102. See Moravcsik, supra note 25, at 160–62.
103. Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 79.
104. Moravcsik, supra note 25, at 152.
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A key element of the diffusion of power in the emerging system is that
wealth creation reaches far beyond the BRICs through what Fareed Zakaria
terms “the rise of the rest.” He shows that “countries all over the world
[and well beyond the BRICs] have been experiencing rates of economic
growth that were once unthinkable.”105 Using a model based on similar
demographic and productivity trends that led to the original BRIC group-
ing, O’Neill has singled out another group of eleven states (the “N-11”)
that is poised for the next wave of rapid economic growth.106 These include
Mexico, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, South Korea,
Pakistan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, among others.107 Most of these
countries have seen steady, at times exceptional, growth rates since 2010.108
While they may have less political or geostrategic salience than the
BRICs,109 their rise suggests a far more diffuse power distribution and a
much broader range of states with leadership potential. In Kupchan’s words,
“the landscape is one in which power is diffusing and politics
diversifying.”110
B. Power Disaggregation
A second key characteristic of the emerging structure of international law
is the disaggregation of power. Different states hold relative advantages with
respect to different types of power. As discussed above, power comes in
many forms—military, economic, and soft. Historically these different
forms of power were relatively correlated. Changes in a state’s capabilities
with respect to one type of power were linked to changes in other forms of
power.111 While there may have been lags between increased wealth and
adoption of new military technologies, the various forms of power generally
tracked one another.112
In the current redistribution, however, different types of power are shift-
ing independently. The power diffusion described above has largely been
105. See Fareed Zakaria, The Post American World: Release 2.0, at 2 (2012).
106. See Jim O’Neill et al., Goldman Sachs, How Solid Are the BRICs?, Global Economics Paper No.
134 (2005), http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/how-solid.pdf; see also
O’Neill, supra note 6, at ch. 4.
107. Id. Other observers draw the list of new emerging economies somewhat differently. Michael
Spence identifies Botswana, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Oman,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand as countries that began as “developing economies” and have enjoyed
periods of sustained high growth since World War II. See Spence, supra note 78, at ch. 7. Parag Khanna
describes the rise of the “second world,” in which he includes countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, Mexico, Venezuela, Pakistan, Colombia, Egypt, Iran, and Malaysia, among others. See Parag
Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in The New Global Order (2008).
108. Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 79.
109. On this point the author is grateful to Tom Wright of the Brookings Institution.
110. See Kupchan, supra note 75, at 3.
111. For a discussion of such power transitions, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers (1987).
112. For the effects of military power diffusion, see, e.g., Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of
Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics 18–65 (2010).
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driven by changes in the size of states’ economies. In contrast with these
rapid changes in economic power, military power and soft power have
proved far stickier.113 With the exception of China’s military expansion,
there has been very little change in other states’ relative military capabili-
ties. While soft power is shifting somewhat, those shifts are counterbalanc-
ing changes in economic and military power.
Despite China’s significant military growth, the United States and Eu-
rope have retained their extraordinary military superiority.114 The Correlates
of War Composite Index of National Capability (“CINC”) is illustrative,
though it may overemphasize population size.115 CINC data reveals the rela-
tive consistency of U.S. material capability between 1997 and 2007 (approx-
imately 14%),116 but also a sharp increase in China’s material capacity from
14% to 20%.117 Other BRICs saw very little change in material capacity
and relatively slow growth in military spending.118 Even China’s three-fold
increase in military spending between 2002 and 2012 in no way rivals U.S.
global military dominance.119 The United States still outspends all other
states in the world—“six times more than China [and] 11 times more than
113. “Sticky” here refers to persistence even in the face of changing background conditions. See G.
John Ikenberry, Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy, 42 Int’l Org.
219, 223–24 (1988).
114. Barry Posen, Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of US Hegemony, 28 Int’l Sec. 5
(2003); Joachim Hofbauer, et. al., European Defense Trends 2013, CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives
Group Working Paper (Dec. 2012), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/121212_Berteau_Euro
DefenseTrends2012.
115. Correlates of War, National Material Capabilities Dataset (v. 4.0), available at http://www
.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc4.htm. The six indicators used in the dataset are
military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban popula-
tion, and total population. See David J. Singer, Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material
Capabilities of States, 1816–1985, 14 Int’l Interactions 115 (1987).
116. Collectively, the major European powers (Germany, France, UK, Italy, and Spain) have seen
their share of material capacity decline somewhat from 11.9% to 9.1%. Correlates of War, supra note
115.
117. Id.
118. India’s material capacity increased from 6.4% to 7.4% across that decade. Brazil’s capacity re-
mained relatively constant at 2.5%. Russia’s declined from 5.3% to 3.9%. Id. Russia’s military spending
more than doubled from $37 billion in 2002 to $81 billion in 2012. India has increased military spend-
ing from $28.5 billion in 2002 to $49.5 billion in 2012. Brazil has placed little emphasis on military
spending, increasing its budget only from $29.549 billion in 2002 to $36.751 billion in 2012. Stock-
holm Institute of Peace Research (“SIPRI”), Military Expenditures Database, http://www.sipri
.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database (last visited Nov. 2, 2014). This data is based on constant
2011 U.S. dollars.
119. China’s actual military spending is difficult to determine and may be inaccurate. See Sam Perlo-
Freeman et al., Trends in World Military Expenditure 2012, SIPRI Fact Sheet (Apr. 2013), available at
http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1304.pdf. For discussion, see M. Taylar Fravel, China’s Search for
Military Power, 31 Wash. Q. 125, 127 (2008). China’s military spending increased from $52.8 billion to
$159.6 billion over the decade. See Stockholm Institute of Peace Research (SIPRI), supra note 121. Be-
tween 2002 and 2012, the United States also increased its spending, largely due to wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, from $446 billion in 2002 to $671 billion in 2012. U.S. military spending peaked in 2010 at
$720 billion. Id.
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Russia.”120 Despite Europe’s economic troubles, European states have main-
tained robust military spending,121 such that “[n]o region or country save
the United States possesses a portfolio of military capabilities and a willing-
ness to use them comparable to those of Europe . . . .”122 Ultimately, the
relative stability of military power counterbalances, in part, changes in eco-
nomic power.
Soft power too has proved to be a counterbalance. The United States and
Europe are maintaining significant soft power advantages and, among the
BRICs, it is India and Brazil—not China and Russia—that are most suc-
cessfully cultivating soft power. One attempt to quantify soft power, under-
taken by the British Institute for Government, offers a ranking of states by
their soft power that includes (in descending order) the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, Sweden, Japan, Switzerland,
Canada, and the Netherlands.123 Other than Brazil, which ranked 17th in
the study, the BRICs were absent from the top twenty. Similarly, in 2008,
the Chicago Council on World Affairs undertook a study of soft power in
Asia based on survey data of the perceptions of the United States and China
throughout Asia.124 Survey “responses directly called into question the con-
ventional wisdom that China was chipping into, if not over-shadowing U.S.
soft power and showed that the United States continues to wield considera-
ble soft power in the region.”125
One might expect soft power to track, again with a lag, economic power,
since, as a country’s economic wealth increases, its capacity to engage in the
kinds of activities that enhance soft power—building educational systems,
exporting culture, etc.—increases as well.126 Yet, factors beyond economic
wealth are highly salient to soft power, including form of governance, cul-
ture, linguistic commonalities, perceived threat, civil society, and foreign
policy choices.127 These factors have constrained Chinese128 and Russian ef-
120. Laicie Heeley, U.S. Defense Spending vs. Global Defense Spending, Ctr. for Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation (Apr. 24, 2013), http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/securityspending/articles/
2012_topline_global_defense_spending/.
121. European collective military spending was estimated at approximately $280 billion in 2012, still
significantly more than that of China. See Hofbauer, supra note 114.
122. Moravcsik, supra note 25, at 158.
123. Because soft power is based on a wide range of variables and is generally subjective, there is no
uniform methodology for its measurement. The ranking referenced here is based on a combination of
standard of government, diplomatic infrastructure, cultural output, capacity for education, and appeal to
business. See Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II, A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power, Institute for
Government (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publi-
cations/The%20New%20PersuadersII_0.pdf.
124. Christopher Whitney & David Shambaugh, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Soft Power in
Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion (2009), available at http://www.brookings
.edu/~/media/Events/2008/6/17%20east%20asia/0617_east_asia_report.pdf.
125. Id. at 2.
126. See generally Nye, supra note 55.
127. Every country in the Institute for Government’s top-twenty list is a democracy. For a discussion
of the role of governmental forms in soft power, see Nye, supra note 55, at 13–14. See generally Joseph
Nye, What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power, Foreignpolicy.com (Apr. 29, 2013), http://
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forts to build soft power.129 In contrast, Brazil and India have fared better in
their efforts to cultivate soft power, perhaps due to social and governmental
structures more conducive to soft power accumulation.130
Ultimately, the disaggregation of power, whereby different states are
gaining relative advantage in particular—but not all—types of power,
serves an equalizing function in the emerging structure. No one state or
even small group of states can dominate across all issue areas. Haass de-
scribes such a system as a “world dominated not by one or two or even
several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various
kinds of power.”131
C. Issue-Specific Asymmetries in Power Distribution
A third feature of the emerging structure is that power asymmetries are
developing on an issue-specific basis.132  The diffusion of power has not ben-
efited all states equally. The BRICs have gained considerable power; the
United States and Europe have retained significant influence. Yet, the vast
majority of other states—even where they are beginning to experience eco-
nomic growth—remain comparatively weak.133 The result is that the United
States, Europe, or a BRIC will usually have a significant power advantage in
its relationship with almost all other states. Those advantages allow these
states to act as hubs across a range of issues in the international legal sys-
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power.
Smaller states are often able to more effectively develop and deploy soft power because they present less of
a threat to their neighbors. See, e.g., Kevin D. Stringer, Sovereign Lichtenstein: The Soft Power
Projection of A Very Small State (2013).
128. In 2007 Chinese Hu Jintao stated the goal of “enhanc[ing] . . . the soft power of our country . . .
[is] a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength.” See Joseph Nye &
Wang Jisi, The Rose of China’s Soft Power and its implications for the United States, in Power and Re-
straint: A Shared Vision for the US-China Relationship 28 (Richard Rosencrance & Gu
Guoliang eds., 2009). On its ineffectiveness, see Nye, supra note 1300 (“Polls show that opinions of
China’s influence are . . . predominantly negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan
and South Korea.”). Africa may be an exception, though a backlash is developing. See generally China
Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace (Christopher Alden, Daniel Large
& Ricardo Soares de Oliviera eds., 2008).
129. See Russia’s Soft Power Agency is Allocated More Funds, RIA Novosti, July 24, 2013, available at
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20130724/182398836.html. On ineffectiveness, see Fyodor Lukyanov, Why Rus-
sia’s Soft Power is Too Soft, Valdai Discussion Club (July 2, 2013), http://valdaiclub.com/politics/54660
.html.
130. Andrew Hurrell, Brazil and the New Global Order, 109 Cur. Hist. 60 (Jan. 2010); see also Paulo
Sotero & Leslie Elliott Armijo, Brazil: To Be or Not To Be A BRIC?, 31 Asian Perspective 43, 51–55
(2007). For a discussion of India’s effective cultivation of soft power in the SAARC, see Christian Wag-
ner, India’s Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations, 66 India Q. 333 (2010).
131. Haass, supra note 75, at 44.
132. Such asymmetries are not, themselves, new. See David Vital, The Inequality of States
(1967). What is new here is that asymmetries are flexible and issue-specific.
133. See Fareed Zakaria, Future of American Power—How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest, 87
Foreign Aff. 18 (May–June 2008). For a discussion of the role of weak states in the international
system, see Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (1990); Robert O. Keo-
hane, Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics, 23 Int’l Org. 291 (1969).
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tem.134 Power asymmetries allow, for example, China to play a leadership
role in its relations in South East Asia,135 Russia to lead in the former Soviet
space,136 India to act as a leader among states in the Indian Ocean basin and
within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (“SAARC”),
and Brazil to assume a leadership role among many South American
states.137
While asymmetries are common to many structures of power, three par-
ticular features of power asymmetries in the emerging structure differentiate
it from multipolar orders. First, power asymmetries operate in multiple
tiers. While the United States, EU, and BRICs may benefit from power
asymmetries vis-à-vis most other states, a far larger group of states, includ-
ing South Korea, Japan, Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Af-
rica, enjoy asymmetric power relationships vis-à-vis a third tier of states.138
As a result, they too can often act as hubs within the system, particularly
where that leadership is not challenged by a stronger state. Moving still
further down the power hierarchy, this third tier of states, including more
minor regional powers, has beneficial power asymmetries that facilitate lead-
ership vis-à-vis yet a fourth tier of states.
Second, power asymmetries are often issue-specific. The disaggregation of
power discussed above means that states with favorable asymmetries in eco-
nomic power may not have similar advantages in military or soft power.
States with economic power disadvantages may nonetheless have soft power
advantages. Given the differential effectiveness of the conversion of the dif-
ferent types of power into legal influence, the disaggregation of power al-
lows a wide range of states to benefit from issue-specific power asymmetries.
In other words, even if a state is at an absolute power disadvantage vis-à-vis
its partners, it may nonetheless enjoy an issue-specific power advantage that
allows it to act as a hub with respect to a particular issue of international
law.
Finally, in the emerging structure even states that have both absolute and
comparative power disadvantages can cultivate issue-specific power advan-
tages where they have particularly strong preferences. Comparatively weak
134. In political science literature, these states would often be called regional hegemons, though such
hegemony suggests a far more rigid, inflexible system-structure than is the case here. See Mearsheimer,
supra note 46.
135. See, e.g., David Shambaugh, China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order, 29 Int’l Sec. 64
(2004).
136. See, e.g., Bertil Nygren, The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin’s Foreign Policy
Towards the CIS Countries (2007).
137. See Maria Regina Soares de Lima & Monica Hirst, Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional
Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities, 82 Int’l Aff. 21 (2006).
138. For discussions of the emerging power of states beyond the BRICs, see generally Khanna, supra
note 110; Mahbubani, supra note 78; O’Neill, supra note 6. For other examples, see Adekeye Adebajo
& Christopher Landsberg, South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons, in From Cape to Congo:
Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges 171 (Mwesiga Laurent Baregu & Christopher
Landsberg, eds., 2003); F. Stephen Larrabee, Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East, 86 Foreign Aff. 103
(July–Aug. 2007).
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states with strong preferences on a particular issue may choose to channel
available resources toward that issue. To the degree stronger states do not
have similarly intense preferences in the same issue area, weak states that
concentrate power narrowly can create asymmetries that allow them to lead
on that issue. For example, Lichtenstein has evidenced a strong preference
for the development of international criminal law and, despite relative weak-
ness of power vis-à-vis almost all other states, has concentrated available
military, economic, and soft power resources, serving as a driving force in
the Rome negotiations of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), playing
an extremely active role within the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC,
providing significant funding to the Court, and situating itself at the center
of a range of international criminal law networks.139 Its particular prefer-
ences have allowed it to cultivate a power asymmetry that fosters issue-spe-
cific leadership.
III. The Structure of a Multi-hub International Legal System
This Part makes a structural argument that the diffusion and disaggrega-
tion of power, along with issue-specific asymmetries in the distribution of
power, give rise to a multi-hub structure of international law. This distinct
structure has two broad implications for the international legal system.
First, it is generating a new form of international legal pluralism through a
more diverse set of ideas and substantive norms that arise from the articula-
tion of alternative preferences by a range of states that are coming to serve as
hubs of international legal processes.140 Second, this multi-hub structure
generates downward pressures that are shifting international legal processes
from the global level of the system toward a number of separate, yet flexible,
subsystems. Downward migration of legal processes, in turn, reinforces the
trend toward pluralism.
The multi-hub structure of international law is distinct from past power
structures. It differs from its immediate predecessor, unipolarity, because
there is no single state with the ability to lead the system as a whole.141 It
differs from the bipolarity of the Cold War, notwithstanding the importance
of the United States and China in the current system, because power is suffi-
ciently diffuse that a wide range of other states are both capable of global
influence and often indispensable to international legal processes.142
While the multi-hub system may appear to resemble traditional multipo-
larity, it is different in at least three critical regards. First, in a multipolar
139. See Liechtenstein Geht International Voran [Lichtenstein Leads the Way Internationally], Vater-
land (Vaduz), May 5, 2012, http://www.vaterland.li/importe/altdaten/politik/Liechtenstein-geht-inter-
national-voran;art433,77840 (describing Lichtenstein’s efforts).
140. For a discussion of pluralism, see Burke-White, supra note 23.
141. See Jervis, supra note 25, at 191 (on the characteristics of a unipolar system).
142. See Waltz, supra note 24 (on the nature of bipolar systems).
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system, the number of poles is relatively small. During the Concert of Eu-
rope, for example, there were five “Great Powers”: the Austrian Empire,
France, Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom.143 In the multi-hub sys-
tem, in contrast, far more states are capable of playing leadership roles in
international legal processes, ranging from the United States and Europe to
the BRICs, the remaining members of the G20, and even the still emerging
N-11. Second, in a multipolar system, the poles of the system are fixed and
embedded into the system structure. During the Concert of Europe, for ex-
ample, “the Great Power system institutionalize[d] the position of the pow-
erful state in a web of rights and obligations” flowing out of the Congress of
Vienna.144 In the multi-hub structure, in contrast, the ability of states to
lead international legal processes is based on issue-specific power asymme-
tries backed by a desire for leadership and, hence, varies from issue to issue.
Third, in a multipolar structure, each pole has one or more states in its
respective sphere of influence that are, essentially, subordinate to it.145 In the
multi-hub system, the subsystems that may develop are flexible, not fixed.
In order to lead, hubs must attract other states toward their subsystems on
particular issues.
A. Structural Pressures Toward Pluralism
During the period of unipolarity, the United States and Europe, indepen-
dently and collectively, were sufficiently powerful that their preferences
dominated the system and were, ultimately, embedded into its most funda-
mental rules.146 There were, of course, times when alternative views gained
traction, such as the New International Economic Order advanced by some
developing states in the 1970s.147 Yet, the transatlantic consensus generally
marginalized competing preferences, at least where they presented funda-
mental challenges to the views of dominant powers.148 In contrast, the
multi-hub system incentivizes preference competition in international law.
143. On the Concert of Europe, see Kissinger, supra note 28; see also George Modelski, Princi-
ples of World Politics 141 (1972).
144. Modelski, supra note 143.
145. See Edy Kaufman, The Superpowers and their Spheres of Influence: The United
States and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Latin America 11 (1976) (defining a
sphere of influence as “a geographic region characterised by the high penetration of one superpower to
the exclusion of other powers . . .”).
146. For example, the U.N. Charter strongly reflects the post-war preferences of the United States. See
G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding
of Order After Major Wars 1–10 (2000).
147. See Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201
(S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201, (May 1, 1974); Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 Am. Soc’y
Int’l L. Proc. 31 (2000).
148. See David Kennedy, My Talk at the ASIL: What is New Thinking in International Law, 94 Am.
Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 104, 121 (2000) (discussing the dominance of particular ideas in international
law). Even during the bipolar era, the United States was largely able to minimize the impact of Soviet
views of international law through the control of key institutions. See Edward McWhinney, “Peaceful Co-
Existence” and the Soviet-Western International Law, 56 Am. J. Int’l L. 951, 960 (1962).
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1. Proliferation of Hubs as Leaders of International Legal Processes
Despite the formal equality of states in the international legal system, for
most international legal processes, such as rulemaking, interpretation, or
enforcement, a single state or small group of states often plays a catalytic
role.  For example, such states may convene a treaty negotiation or push an
international institution to do so, articulate a particular interpretation of a
legal rule, or spur compliance through sanctions. Such leadership involves
the translation of military, economic, or soft power into international legal
processes. When a state applies such power asymmetries to exercise leader-
ship of an international legal process, it acts as a hub within the interna-
tional legal system. Hubs serve as legal entrepreneurs with both the power
and preferences to catalyze legal processes.149 Hubs’ relative military, eco-
nomic, and soft power advantages, along with preference-based desires to
lead, allow them to set the agenda for and absorb the transaction costs of
legal processes.150 Power asymmetries and the decision to exploit those
asymmetries facilitate hubs’ influences on the preferences of other states that
can, in turn, increase the likelihood that the complementary interests neces-
sary for rule creation or effective enforcement will be identified.151 Ulti-
mately, hubs can serve as focal points for alternative preferences in the
system.
During the trans-Atlantic period, systemic leadership was largely, though
not exclusively, performed by the United States and some key European
states. In contrast, in the multi-hub structure a far greater number of states
are capable of acting as hubs, including the most powerful states: the United
States, Europe, Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Each has shown leadership
in a wide range of issue areas and legal regimes. For example, to mention
just a few, the United States has drawn on its military (and particularly
nuclear) power to assume leadership in the regime governing non-prolifera-
tion by launching the Proliferation Security Initiative and, more recently,
convening the Nuclear Security Summit in 2010.152 The EU has become an
influential hub for global competition law based both on its market size and
regulatory capacity.153 Similarly, Brazil and India have become hubs on the
law of climate change based on their growing economic power and relevance
149. In order to establish rules or regimes, “[p]olitical entrepreneurs must exist who see a potential
profit in organizing collaboration.” Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 Int’l
Org. 325, 339 (1982).
150. This hub leadership shares some similarities with regional hegemony. See Barry Buzan & Ole
Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security 265, 410 (2003)
(discussing spheres of influence); Mearsheimer, supra note 46; Miriam Prys, Hegemony, Domination, De-
tachment: Differences in Regional Powerhood, 12 Int’l Studies Rev. 479, 482 (2010) (describing the rele-
vance of regional powers post-Cold War).
151. For examples, see Lockwood, supra note 66.
152. See Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 Am. J. Int’l L.
526 (2004); David Jackson, White House: 47 Nations to Attend Obama Nuclear Summit, USA Today, Apr. 6,
2010.
153. See generally Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (2012).
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to the issue.154 China is quickly becoming a hub on issues related to the law
of the sea.155
Leadership is not limited to just these most powerful states. A wider
group including Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, South
Korea, and Turkey can also serve as hubs, though on perhaps a more limited
number of issues. South Korea, for example, has assumed such a role on
issues related to the G20, catalyzing internal G20 debate on the structural
evolution of the organization and leading outreach to non-member states.156
Drawing on its soft power and strong issue-specific preferences, Canada
serves as a hub on the development of legal rules governing landmines and
small arms.157 Turkey and Brazil have both sought—though with limited
success—to assume leadership on the issues regarding Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram and related sanctions.158 South Africa, and particularly the South Afri-
can Constitutional Court, has done so with respect to the interpretation and
implementation of economic and social rights.159
Leadership also extends beyond this second tier of states when less power-
ful states have strong preferences in a particular issue area and build the
asymmetric power advantages necessary for leadership on that issue. Lichten-
stein’s activism in international criminal law, noted above, is a case in point.
Similarly, the importance of British and Swiss banking and financial sectors
allow both states to play leadership roles in the development of international
banking regulation.160 Kenya has emerged as a hub in the prosecution of
international maritime piracy due to its geographic positioning and strong
154. See, e.g., Sonali P. Chitre, India’s Role in an International Legal Solution to the Global Climate
Change Problem, Apr. 4, 2011, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1802862; Eduardo Viola, Brazilian
Climate Policy Since 2005: Continuity, Change, and Prospective (Centre for European Policy Studies, Working
Document No. 373, 2013), available at http://www.ceps.eu/book/brazilian-climate-policy-2005-con-
tinuity-change-and-prospective.
155. For China’s interactions with the law of the sea, see generally Jonathan G. Odom, A China in the
Bull Shop? Comparing the Rhetoric of a Rising China with the Reality of the International Law of the Sea, 17
Ocean & Coastal L.J. 201, 213 (2012).
156. Cf. Kim Sung-han, Global Governance and Middle Powers: South Korea’s Role in the G20, Council
on Foreign Rel., Feb. 2013, available at http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/global-governance-middle-
powers-south-koreas-role-g20/p30062.
157. See Lloyd Axworthy, Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future 125–55
(2003); Matthew Bolton & Thomas Nash, The Role of Middle Power–NGO Coalitions in Global Policy: The
Case of the Cluster Munitions Ban, 1 Global Policy 172 (2010).
158. See, e.g., Joint Declaration, Braz.-Iran-Turk., May 17, 2010, available at http://www.theguardian
.com/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2010/may/17/iran-brazil-turkey-nuclear; Alexei Bar-
rionuevo & Sebnem Arsu, Brazil and Turkey Near Nuclear Deal with Iran, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2010,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/world/middleeast/17iran.html?_r=0.
159. See, e.g., S. Afr. Const., ch. 2 § 26–27, 1996; Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal
1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. Afr.)); Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa, 11
Const. F. 123, 123–24 (2000).
160. On Swiss banking, see Haig Simonian, Swiss Finish for Big Banks Wins Over Some Converts, Fin.
Times, Oct. 7, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b2a376c0-d232-11df-8fbe-00144feab
dc0.html#axzz3ItHQtkph.
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interests in the issue.161 Even the tiny Maldives is emerging as a climate-
change hub based on its own vulnerability and particularly strong
preferences.162
The multi-hub structure diversifies leadership, allowing states that previ-
ously were subjected to international rule creation by more powerful states
to become leaders themselves. The negotiation of bilateral investment trea-
ties (“BITs”) is illustrative. Historically, rich, capital-exporting states devel-
oped model BITs that effectively imposed their preferred terms on capital-
importing states through the take-it-or-leave it fixed terms of model trea-
ties.163 From 1959 to present, the United States and Germany, for example,
entered into more than 200 BITs based on their respective models with
capital-importing states.164 In the multi-hub system, however, many more
states have developed their own model BITs and structured their treaty ne-
gotiations around these new models. India, Russia, China, South Africa,
South Korea, and Turkey, to name just a few, have recently developed their
own model BITs165 and have used them to lead and shape treaty negotia-
tions, usually with still less powerful states.166 As a result, BIT negotiations
are reorienting from a historic “north-south” orientation to a new “south-
south” orientation. By 2010, about 40% of BITs were between two develop-
ing countries, often between hubs and other states in their subsystem.167
161. See James Thuo Gathii, Kenya’s Piracy Prosecutions, 104 Am. J. Int’l L. 416 (2010); Ryan P.
Kelly, UNCLOS, But No Cigar: Overcoming Obstacles to the Prosecution of Maritime Piracy, 95 Minn. L. Rev.
2285, 2300 (2011).
162. The Maldives championed the Male’ Declaration on the Human Dimensions of Global Climate
Change and has played a growing role in UNFCCC processes. See Male’ Declaration on the Human
Dimension of Global Climate Change, Republic of Maldives, Nov. 14, 2007, available at http://
www.ciel.org/Publications/Male_Declaration_Nov07.pdf; Ryan Jarvis, Sinking Nations and Climate
Change Adaptation Strategies, 9 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 447, 447 (2010–2011).
163. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs, 11 Int’l Tax
& Bus. Law 159, 170 (1993).
164. See BITs & Other IIAs – search results, Investment Policy Hub, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/IIA/AdvancedSearchBITResults (add “Germany” and “United States of America”
from “Economies” section and change “Agreement filters” for “Type of agreement” to “Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties (BITs)” then follow “Show Agreements”).
165. See Indian Model Text of Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, available at
http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/icsection/Indian%20Model%20ext%20BIPA.asp;
Axel Berger, Ger. Dev. Inst., China’s New Bilateral Investment Treaty Program: Substance, Rational
[sic], and Implications for International Investment Law Making (Nov. 2008), available at http://www
.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/Berger_ChineseBITs.pdf.
166. India, for example, has relied on its model BIT in treaty negotiations with Brunei (2009), Indo-
nesia (2004), Laos (2003), Libya (2009), Myanmar (2009), Philippines (2001), Turkey (2007), Turkmen-
istan (2006), and Yemen (2004). See Gov’t of India, List of Countries with Which Bilateral Investment
Promotion and Protection Agreements are in Force, available at http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/
dept_eco_affairs/icsection/List%20of%20countries.asp.
167. See Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, The Significance of South-South BITs for the International Investment
Regime: A Quantitative Analysis, 30 Nw. J. Int’l & Bus. 101, 101 (2010).
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China, for example, has now entered into more BITs than any other coun-
try.168 In short, leadership in the multi-hub system has diversified.
2. Variable Geometry Among Flexible Subsystems
In the multi-hub structure, hubs will often be at the center of subsystems
that include a number of follower states on an issue-specific basis. At times,
hubs will intentionally seek to build such subsystems through formal insti-
tutions so as to advance their particular preferences, solidify their leadership
positions, or reduce transaction costs of cooperation. At other times, subsys-
tems will emerge organically as hubs attract followers to the particular pref-
erences they advance.
Subsystems—generally described as spheres of influence—were a hall-
mark of traditional bipolar or multipolar orders. Those spheres of influence
were embedded into the system structure based largely on the coercive mili-
tary power of a pole state.169 During the Cold War, for example, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) and the Warsaw Pact effectively
locked in U.S. and Soviet spheres of influence, respectively. Contestation of
spheres of influence, such as in Korea and Vietnam, was the currency of
great power rivalry.170 In contrast, in the multi-hub structure, subsystems
are issue-specific, flexible, and subject to change independent of great power
rivalry. Only rarely in this system will any single hub have such a prepon-
derance of military, economic, and soft power to demand that weaker or
geographically proximate states follow.171 Instead, when hubs seek to lead,
they tend to cultivate dense, issue-specific, international legal networks ra-
diating out from themselves.172 These networks constitute the subsystems of
the multi-hub structure. The scope and reach of these subsystems shift on
different issues. Non-hubs may be part of different hubs’ subsystems on dis-
tinct issues in what can be termed variable geometry.173
China, Russia, and Brazil have all been extremely active in building such
subsystems. China, for example, led the establishment of the Shanghai Co-
168. China has signed 125 BITs to date. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Full List of Bilateral
Investment Agreements concluded, 1 June 2013, available at http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/
bits_china.pdf.
169. See Kaufman, supra note 145.
170. Cf. Glenn H. Snyder & Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision
Making, and System Structure in International Crises 419–20 (1977) (“In a multipolar system
there are . . . .  In addition [to a few great powers] . . . a number of smaller states who do not play
significant roles except as they serve as objects of the Great Power competition . . .”).
171. See Bremmer & Roubini, supra note 75 (describing the emerging world as “one in which no
single country or bloc of countries has the political and economic leverage—or the will—to drive a truly
international agenda”).
172. For a discussion of the role of networks in international law, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A
New World Order (2004). As used in this paper, “network” is broader and refers more generally to
the intersecting and overlapping legal relationships among states in the system.
173. See generally Haass, supra note 75. On variable geometry, see Stewart Patrick, Shifting Coalitions of
Consensus Rather than Blocs, in The New Dynamics of Summitry: Institutional, Policy and Politi-
cal Innovations for G20 Summits 38 (Colin Bradford & Wonhyuk Lim, eds., 2010).
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operation Organization (“SCO”) in 2002. The SCO includes China, Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan174 and performs
functions related to Eurasian economic and military security. It gives China
a platform for regional—and perhaps global—leadership, notably excluding
the United States.175 China has also sought a greater role within the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) by shifting the organization’s
activities to broader formats, such as ASEAN-Plus 3, in which it can play a
leadership role.176 Similarly, Russia has developed a dense network of bilat-
eral and regional relationships with the states of the former Soviet Union to
solidify its hub status in the region. Such regional agreements include the
Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Or-
ganization, the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation, the Eurasian Ec-
onomic Community, the Common Economic Space, and the Customs Union
of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan.177 Brazil, too, has been active in cultivat-
ing an international legal subsystem through networked legal relationships.
It hosted the first IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) meeting in 2006.178 It
led the development of the Union of South American Nations
(“UNASUR”), a broadly inclusive South American regional organization.179
It convened the first summit of Latin American and Caribbean States on
Integration and Development in 2010.180  Brazil has also sought to revitalize
Mercosur, the Southern Common Market, building it into both an economic
and political network under Brazilian leadership.181
Hubs that construct such subsystems may hope to establish a stable set of
legal relationships that might operate like a more classical sphere of influ-
174. Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization June 7, 2002, available at http://
www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=69.
175. Member states have, at times, advocated a larger role in regional and global security for the SCO,
perhaps in a more direct challenge to U.S.-dominated institutions. See Charles Tannock, Backing Kazakh-
stan’s ‘Great Game,’ The Guardian, Feb. 18, 2008 (“There is little doubt that the SCO is an instrument
for Russia and China to make the case for a multi-polar world . . . that counterbalance[s] American
strategic hegemony.”). In 2006, the United States was denied observer status.
176. See Kuik Cheng-Chwee, Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and
Aspiration, 27 Contemp. Southeast Asia 102 (2005).
177. See Stephen Aris, Russia’s Approach to Multilateral Cooperation in the Post-Soviet Space: CSTO,
EurAsEC and SCO, 76/10 Russian Analytical Digest, Apr. 15, 2010, available at http://www
.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-76.pdf.
178. The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa, India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Fo-
rum Fifth Summit of Heads of State and Government Tshwane Declaration (hereinafter “Tshwane Decla-
ration”) (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=5053. For a
Brazil-based view of the significance of IBSA, see Oliver Stuenkel, Does IBSA Matter?, Post-Western
World 9 (Oct. 23, 2011), available at http://www.postwesternworld.com/2011/10/23/does-ibsa-matter/.
179. South America Nations Found Union, BBC News, May 23, 2008, available at http://news.bbc
.co.uk/nol/ukfs_news/hi/newsid_7410000/newsid_7417800/7417896.stm.
180. Salvador Camarena, América Latina crea una OEA sin Estados Unidos, El Paı́s, Feb. 23, 2010, at
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2010/02/23/actualidad/1266879601_850215.html. See also
L. American Leaders Officially Sign CELAC into Effect as New Bloc, China Daily, Dec. 4, 2011, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/xinhua/2011-12-04/content_4571120.html.
181. See Mahrukh Doctor, Prospects for Deepening Mercosur Integration: Economic Asymmetry and Institu-
tional Deficits, 20 Rev. Int’l Pol. Ec. 515 (2013).
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ence.182 Yet, the diffuse nature of power in the multi-hub system ensures
that subsystems generally remain both flexible and issue specific. Other
hubs may offer up their own issue-specific institutions or legal relationships
as an alternative to those created by the first hub. Non-hubs may be able to
navigate between different subsystems, perhaps being part of many simulta-
neously. Unlike traditional spheres of influence that were generally geo-
graphically bounded, non-hubs may be able to follow even physically distant
hubs outside their immediate geographic regions where interests align. The
result is soft competition among hubs through issue-specific variable
geometry.
This variable geometry is evident in the current negotiation of regional
trade arrangements in the Asia-Pacific. Both the United States and China
have backed different negotiating structures that frame the trade subsystem
differently. The United States has championed the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(“TPP”), whose membership crisscrosses the Pacific, including Australia,
Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the
United States. Notably, this excludes China.183 In contrast, China has
backed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”),
which includes all ten ASEAN states as well as Australia, China, India, Ja-
pan, South Korea, and New Zealand.184 While the RCEP format includes
multiple hubs, it specifically excludes the United States, thereby increasing
China’s negotiating leverage. These two different frameworks in the region
generate a soft and non-exclusive legal competition among hub-based
subsystems.
The shifting boundaries and flexibility of subsystems are also evident in
Russia’s experiences in the Eurasian space. Russia sought to redefine the
subsystems in Europe through a 2008 proposal for a European Security
Treaty that would have shifted the locus of Europe’s security architecture
from NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(“OSCE”) to a broader format that includes Russia as an equal.185 While the
effort was unsuccessful, it signals that, at times, Russia will see itself as part
182. See Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Power and Alliances in the 21st Century, 30 Politics 43 (2010)
(on Russia’s ambitions in the former Soviet space).
183. See Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., The United States in the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/united-states-
trans-pacific-partnership. For discussion of the geostrategic consequences, see David Pilling and Shawn
Donnan, Transpacific Partnership: Ocean’s Twelve, Fin. Times (Sept. 22, 2013).
184. See Murray Hiebert & Liam Hanlon, ASEAN and Partners Launch Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership, Ctr. For Strategic and Int’l Studies (Dec. 7, 2012), available at http://csis.org/publica-
tion/asean-and-partners-launch-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.
185. See Richard Weitz, The Rise and Fall of Medvedev’s European Security Treaty, The German Marshall
Fund of the United States (May 29, 2012), available at http://www.gmfus.org/archives/the-rise-and-fall-
of-medvedevs-european-security-treaty/; Dmitry Medvedev, Berlin Speech at Meeting with German Po-
litical, Parliamentary, and Civic Leaders, June 5, 2008, available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/
speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml.
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of a broader European subsystem and, at times, a distinct hub itself.186 On
its Asian border, Russia recognizes the benefits of flexible subsystems. It
addresses military and security issues in this subsystem through the Mos-
cow-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (“CSTO”).187 In
contrast, on many economic issues where China’s participation is necessary
and helpful, Russia draws the boundaries more broadly and works within
the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization.188 Despite recent mili-
tary efforts in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has not been able to lock in a
fixed sphere of influence, and actually benefits from the flexibility of the
subsystems in Eurasia.
Critically, competition among hubs and variable geometry among subsys-
tems empowers non-hubs with choices as to which hub to follow on any given
issue. For example, despite China’s significant economic power advantage,
Singapore can decide whether to be part of the U.S.-led TPP, the Chinese-
led RCEP, or both. Peru may choose among Mercosur, the TPP, or both.
Kazakhstan, notwithstanding its relative weakness compared to both Russia
and China, may be part of both the Chinese-led SCO and the Russian-led
CSTO. Even where one state, such as China, may have a significant power
advantage in a relevant issue area, weaker states still have the possibility of
reaching across subsystems in their legal relations. For example, in recent
years Vietnam has sought to join more closely with the U.S. hub by means
of trade, investment, maritime-transport, and air-transport agreements,189
presumably to balance against Chinese regional dominance.190
Similarly, smaller states may be empowered to shift the framing of an
international legal process outside any particular hub’s subsystem. In Janu-
ary 2013, the Philippines initiated a case before the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea in an effort to institutionalize maritime disputes with
186. See Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, State Depart-
ment, Briefing on Transatlantic Meetings and NATO-Russia Council Meeting (Sept. 22, 2010), available
at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2010/147600.htm.
187. See Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Oct. 7, 2002, available at http://www
.odkb-csto.org/documents/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=1896. The Collective Security Treaty Organiza-
tion, largely an intergovernmental military alliance, includes Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. See Alexander Frost, The Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, and Russia’s Strategic Goals in Central Asia, 7 China & Eurasia Forum Q. 83, 86
(2009) (describing Russia’s strategic goal in the CSTO as “creating dependency in Central Asian govern-
ments”); Aris, supra note 177, at 2 (“Moscow has successfully managed to keep . . . strategic areas of
cooperation within CSTO . . . while at the same time benefiting from tying itself to the resources and
international standing of China in SCO.”).
188. For a discussion of simultaneous Sino-Russian cooperation and competition, including institu-
tional forum shopping, see Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience 112 (2008) (describing Russian preferences
to develop security ties in Eurasia via the CSTO); Aris, supra note 177; Richard Weitz, Superpower Symbio-
sis: The Russia-China Axis, 175 World Aff. 71 (2012).
189. See U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Embassy of the United States in Hanoi, Vietnam, http://viet-
nam.usembassy.gov/usvnrelations.html (last modified Feb. 14, 2014).
190. See generally Munir Majid, Southeast Asia Between China and the United States, in The New Geo-
politics of Southeast Asia 21, 33 (Nicholas Kitchen, ed. 2012) (“Hanoi sees its new naval association
with the US as a help . . . . [T]he idea is to increase the number of nations with a stake in a peaceful
Southeast Asia.”).
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China, thereby stepping outside of China’s subsystem.191 Similarly, Vietnam
has proposed a multinational process to develop a “code of conduct” among
territorial claimants in the region that would allow weaker states to more
effectively balance against China.192 In international trade law, smaller or
weaker states have become more willing to bring cases to the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”), even against more powerful hubs, presumably in an
effort to redress power asymmetries in a global institutional context outside
any particular subsystem.193
3. The Increasing Salience of Leadership Through Preference Attraction
In order for hubs to advance their preferences in the international legal
system, they need followers. Hubs must create incentives for other states to
follow them. Successful conclusion of international legal processes generally
requires agreement by two or more states. Multilateral or plurilateral treaty
negotiations or the application of multilateral sanctions may require the
consent of a significantly larger group.194 Hubs must, therefore, bring other
states along with them. For example, if the United States seeks a trans-
Pacific trade agreement, it must attract states on the Pacific Rim to negoti-
ate such an agreement. When Canada sought an international legal rule
prohibiting landmines, it needed other states to come to Ottawa to negoti-
ate and ratify the Ottawa Convention.195 Historically, leading states have
used military coercion, economic compulsion, and interest compatibility to
cultivate such followers. All of these mechanisms remain available in the
multi-hub structure, but this new structure alters their relative weight and
effectiveness in ways that promote pluralism.
In traditional bipolar or multipolar structures, coercion—usually through
military force or security guarantees—was often critical to the ability of
poles to recruit and maintain followers.196 For example, the United States
led the creation of the NATO alliance and the international legal treaty that
191. See China Rejects U.N. Arbitration of Maritime Dispute, Associated Press, Feb. 19, 2013. For a
discussion of the dispute, see generally Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South
China Sea: History, Status and Implications, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 98 (2013).
192. See Vietnam Urges S. China Sea Code of Conduct to Benefit “Entire World,” Kyodo News Int’l, Sept.
28, 2013, available at http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/130928/viet-
nam-urges-s-china-sea-code-conduct-benefit-entire-.
193. See generally Christina L. Davis & Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, Who Files? Developing Country Participa-
tion in GATT/WTO Adjudication, 71 J. of Politics 1033, 1033 (2009); Keohane, Lilliputians’ Dilemmas,
supra note 133.
194. On the different dynamics of bilateral and multilateral treaties and the universal aspirations of
multilateral treaties, see Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International
Law, 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. 323, 332–34 (2008).
195. See Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm Entrepre-
neurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty, 20 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 561,
588 (2003) (noting “Canada presented a striking example of middle power leadership . . .”).
196. See Kaufman, supra note 145, at 10–11. Such guarantees were provided through the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, among other legal arrangements.
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undergirds it by offering military protection.197 So too did the Soviet Union
through the Warsaw Pact, at times applying force as well as offering protec-
tion to bring states into a military alliance through an international legal
agreement.198 In the multi-hub structure, however, in light of the declining
role of military power generally, coercion is likely to be a less effective strat-
egy.199 Security guarantees may remain salient, but the circumstances in
which military force will be used or threatened in order to maintain an
international legal subsystem are few.
The use of economic inducements, rents, or side payments has long been,
and will continue to be, a strategy used by leading states to compel follow-
ers.200 Historically, as particularly evident during the Cold War, smaller
states have extracted rents in exchange for loyalty.201 Economic compulsion,
however, becomes more challenging and has increasing coordination costs in
the multi-hub structure. In a traditional multipolar order, the rigidity of the
structure and the relatively small number of states on the boundaries of fixed
spheres of influence that could credibly shift alliances meant that only a few
such side deals needed to be cut to result in comprehensive, committed
followers.202 In contrast, in the multi-hub structure, almost all non-hubs can
shift their loyalties to follow a number of different hubs. For economic com-
pulsion to be effective, side payments must be made to a much larger num-
ber of states, each of which has more choices and, hence, may be able to
extract higher rents. Moreover, in the multi-hub system, alliances are rarely
comprehensive and leadership is often issue-specific. Instead of being able to
cut a single, comprehensive deal with a potential follower, hubs must nego-
tiate numerous side payments on individual issues. As a result, while eco-
nomic compulsion and side payments will still be relevant, particularly for
states with significant economic power advantages,203 they will be more
costly to negotiate, implement, and monitor.
In contrast with the declining utility of military coercion and the in-
creased costs of economic compulsion, the compatibility of preferences be-
197. Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization 3–4 (Greenwood Press 1981).
198. Douglas A. MacGregor, Uncertain Allies? East European Forces in the Warsaw Pact, 38 Soviet
Studies 227 (1986).
199. See generally Mueller, supra note 65.
200. See Randall L. Schweller, Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In, 19 Int’l
Sec. 72, 88–92 (1994).
201. Id. (documenting such behavior over the past 500 years). On general dynamics, see Stephen M.
Walt, Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, 9 Int’l Sec. 3, 29–31 (1985). Examples abound,
ranging from payments by the UK to Malta for the use of military bases after a Maltese threat to switch
allegiances to the USSR, or U.S. military assistance to Jordan after a similar threat in 1963. See, e.g., John
Dowdall, The Political Economy of Malta: The Economics of Mr. Mintoff’s Independence, 62 Round Table:
Commonwealth J. Int’l Aff. 465 (1972); Anne Mariel Peters & Pete W. Moore, Beyond Boom and
Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jor-
dan, 44 Stud. Comp. Int’l Dev. 256 (2009).
202. See generally Kaufman, supra note 145.
203. For a discussion, see Lockwood, supra note 66.
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tween hubs and potential followers has increased salience in the multi-hub
structure. In bipolar and multipolar orders, there were relatively few sets of
competing preferences that were, usually, linked in crosscutting ideological
camps.204 In the multi-hub structure, the far larger number of hubs and the
variable geometry of subsystems allow non-hubs to make issue-specific
choices among the preferences being articulated by different hubs. With
more choices and greater freedom, non-hubs can choose to follow hubs
whose preferences more closely align with their own. For hubs seeking to
attract followers, articulating an attractive set of preferences becomes more
important to leadership. On net, the articulation of compatible preferences
will often be far less costly to hubs than would be economic compulsion, at
least to the degree that the hub does not have to change its own preferences
to attract followers.
In the multi-hub structure, choices as to which hub to follow will often
reflect distinct preferences. In the Asia-Pacific trade context, for example,
the TPP and the RCEP represent two distinct substantive visions of free
trade: “The TPP aims to be a high quality preferential trade agreement with
few exemptions and extensive regulatory alignment. . . . The RCEP, on the
other hand . . . makes limited demands for regulatory harmonisation.”205
The result is “geopolitical competition between the ASEAN and US propos-
als” that gives non-hubs some degree of choice as to the preferred normative
content of their trade relations.206 It is, presumably, in Vietnam’s economic
interests to be part of the Chinese-led RCEP, but Vietnam may simultane-
ously be attracted to the U.S.-led TPP because the deeper commitments of
that agreement may better reflect its preferences.
The choice among such preferences is also illustrated by the current inter-
pretative conflict between the United States and China over a key provision
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).207
The United States maintains that UNCLOS allows non-aggressive foreign
military presence within another state’s Exclusive Economic Zone
(“EEZ”),208  whereas China interprets UNCLOS as barring such activities.209
204. For a discussion of past ideological conflicts and choices among the relevant ideologies, see
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992).
205. Mark Thomson, Trade Partnership Competition: TPP vs RCEP, The Strategist (Apr. 16, 2013),
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/trade-partnership-competition-tpp-vs-rcep/.
206. Id.
207. UNCLOS gives coastal states “sovereign rights for the purpose of . . . managing the natural
resources” within the EEZ, but requires them to “have due regard to the rights and duties of other
States.” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 56, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. The Convention gives coastal and non-coastal states rights to freedom of naviga-
tion and over-flight within other states’ EEZs. Id. at art. 58.
208. The United States recognizes UNCLOS as customary international law, though it has refused to
ratify the agreement. See Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 1 Public Papers of the Presi-
dents 378 (Mar. 10, 1983). The United States asserts a broad right for foreign military activities in
other states’ EEZs, rooted in the idea of freedom of navigation. See Stephen Groves, Accession to the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea Is Unnecessary to Secure U.S. Navigational Rights and Freedoms, Heritage
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While both interpretations are plausible,210 the U.S. interpretation has long
been supported by scholarly and judicial opinion.211 China, however, is ad-
vancing an alternative interpretation and its position is attracting followers.
In 2009, a U.S. Navy ocean surveillance vessel was challenged by Chinese
warships while conducting mapping exercises in China’s EEZ.212 Both the
United States and China justified their actions under UNCLOS.213 While
historically the United States would have likely prevailed in such a dispute,
today other states are weighing in, precisely because China’s interpretation
better suits their own preferences. For example, Brazil, India, and Malaysia
have made public statements or formal declarations siding, at least in part,
with China.214 Each of these states has interests in the protection of its (usu-
ally quite extensive) EEZ that makes China’s narrower interpretation of al-
lowable foreign military activities more compatible with its own interests.
In contrast, several European states, with fewer concerns about foreign mili-
tary activities in their (generally much smaller and more protected) EEZs,
have backed the U.S. interpretation.215
Even in the multi-hub structure, economic compulsion and preference
attractiveness will be interconnected, but the growing diversity of prefer-
ences being articulated and the choices non-hubs have amongst the prefer-
ences of different hubs makes preference attractiveness more significant. The
recent effort by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)
to establish a new development bank and reserve fund is illustrative, even
within the economic sphere itself. Due in part to frustration at the slow pace
of IMF and World Bank reform,216 at their March 2013 summit the BRICS
committed to the creation of a BRICS development bank and reserve fund217
Found. (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/accession-to-un-convention-
law-of-the-sea-is-unnecessary-to-secure-us-navigational-rights-freedoms.
209. For an official Chinese interpretation, see Ma Zhaoxu, Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the People’s Republic of China, Press Conference (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/
eng/fyrth/t541713.htm (“[By] engaging in activities in China’s exclusive economic zone in the South
China Sea without China’s permission, [the U.S. ship] broke relevant international law . . . .”). See also
Michael Carr, China and the Law of the Sea Convention, 9 Austl. J. Chinese Aff. 35, 35-36 (1983).
210. See Jing Geng, The Legality of Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone Under UN-
CLOS, 28 Merkourios 22, 25 (2012).
211. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (recognizing that the peaceful passage of
warships was a “general and well-recognized principle”); Odom, supra note 155, at 213.
212. See Geng, supra note 210, at 21, 23.
213. See Vaudine England, Who’s Right in South China Sea Spat?, BBC News (Mar. 13, 2009), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7941425.stm.
214. See generally Declarations and Statements, Oceans and Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/depts/
los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm (last modified Oct. 29, 2013). The Brazilian
declaration provides: “[T]he provisions of the Convention do not authorize other States to carry out . . .
military exercises or manoeuvers . . . [in the exclusive economic zone] without the consent of the coastal
State.” Id.
215. These include Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. See Geng, supra note 210, at 26.
216. Cf. Robert Wade, Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the
World Bank, and the IMF, 39 Pol. & Soc’y, 347, 359 (2011).
217. See Andrew England, BRICS Agree to Create Development Bank, Fin. Times (Mar. 27, 2013).
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“in direct challenge to the World Bank and the IMF respectively.”218 While
the BRIC Summit Communiqué frames these efforts as “complement[ing]”
and “supplement[ing]” existing institutions, the pledged $100 billion re-
serve fund would offer a viable alternative to the IMF and the World
Bank.219 For non-hubs, particularly in Africa, the new development bank
and reserve fund could offer significant financial benefits. China certainly
had the economic ability to offer such benefits and secure followers unilater-
ally. But, by establishing the bank and fund under the auspices of the
BRICS, China could make its efforts less threatening to potential followers
by placing it within the frame of an alternative, collective preference set for
reduced conditionality in development assistance. For many non-hubs, these
compatible preferences, along with potential economic benefits, are powerful
motivation to follow.
Ultimately, in the multi-hub structure of international law, the increas-
ing number of hubs and potential hubs, the variable geometry among flexi-
ble and overlapping subsystems, and the increasing salience of attracting
followers through compatible preferences promote a particular version of in-
ternational legal pluralism. Specifically, multiple hubs have both the oppor-
tunity and incentives to articulate and advance distinct preferences in the
international legal system that further their own interests and attract follow-
ers. These preferences can no longer be frozen out or marginalized by a sin-
gle hegemon or small group of pole states. As a result, the number and
range of preferences—perhaps even normative visions—being expressed in
international legal processes and shaping international legal norms is in-
creasing. In contrast with suggestions that we have reached the “end of
history”220 or the beginning of a “post-ontological era,”221 the multi-hub
structure suggests instead the beginning of a new era of international legal
pluralism. Part IV tracks the development of this pluralism at three key
tension points.
B. Downward Structural Pressures in the Multi-hub System
Beyond the promotion of pluralism, the multi-hub structure also gener-
ates structural pressures that favor international legal processes that take
place within the confines of specific subsystems. In the multi-hub system,
processes such as treaty negotiation and rule interpretation will often be
more difficult to undertake on a truly multilateral or global basis where they
seek to include all or most states. In contrast, such processes are becoming
218. Sonia Rolland, The BRIC Contributions to the Architecture and Norms of International Economic Law,
107 Amer. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc.  164, 167 (2013).
219. See Fifth BRICS Summit Declaration and Action Plan, BRICS 2013, at paras. 9, 10 (Mar. 27,
2013); Interview with Sanjaya Baru, in New Delhi, India, (Aug. 27, 2013).
220. See Fukuyama, supra note 204, passim.
221. See Thomas M. Franck, Fairness In International Law And Institutions 6 (1995) (sug-
gesting that international law was entering a “post-ontological era”).
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easier when confined within specific subsystems. These new structural pres-
sures pull legal processes down toward the sub-systemic level, in turn, rein-
forcing the emergence of pluralism in and across subsystems.
1. Solving the Coordination Problem in the Multi-hub System
Many international legal processes require solving a coordination problem
so that states can cooperate around mutual interests.222 To solve the coordi-
nation problem, whether in the conclusion of an international treaty, the
interpretation of a legal rule, or the imposition of multilateral sanctions,
states need to gain information about one another’s interests and, subse-
quently, identify common interests. Where they are successful, they will
cooperate, because they “receive higher payoffs if they engage in identical or
symmetrical actions than if they do not.”223 On net, the diffusion, disaggre-
gation, and asymmetric distribution of power in the multi-hub system make
solving this coordination problem far more difficult for international legal
processes undertaken at the global level. Yet, these same power shifts often
decrease the costs of cooperation within particular subsystems.
The increasing difficulty of the coordination game at the global level has
many causes, some of which preexist the emergence of a multi-hub structure
of international law. For example, the sheer number of states in the system
has increased. U.N. membership is illustrative. In 1945 there were only 51
original members of the U.N.; by 2011 there were 193.224 More players, on
net, increase the challenge of the coordination game.225 In addition, many
institutions and rule-making processes have moved toward consensus re-
quirements, beyond simple majority voting, again increasing coordination
costs.226
Two particular features of the multi-hub structure further exacerbate the
challenges associated with global legal processes, while making those that
take place at the sub-system level easier to achieve. First, power diffusion has
increased the number of states whose participation in the coordination game
is necessary for global legal processes to be effective. Historically, regardless
222. On international law as a coordination game, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory
of Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory of International Law, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1823, 1857 (2002) (discussing how “states cooperate to
resolve . . . coordination games”).
223. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 18, at 12.
224. Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/
members/growth.shtml.
225. See Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (1965). When the relevant group
of actors grows, “the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal supply of a collective good,” id. at
48. “[U]nless the number of individuals in a group is quite small . . . rational, self-interested individuals
will not act to achieve their common or group interests.” Id. at 2. See also Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 222
(suggesting that with large numbers of players, the prisoners’ dilemma game becomes more difficult to
solve); cf. George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 Am. J. Int’l
L. 541, 554–55 (2005).
226. See Blum, supra note 194, at 340–41.
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of the total number of states, a small—though not always consistent—
group of states has had disproportionate influence.227 Power diffusion makes
more states relevant to global international legal processes. Today, for al-
most any issue of global salience, the United States, Europe, BRICs, mem-
bers of the N-11, and the remaining G-20 states will likely have to be
included. On some issues, such as climate change, the number of indispensa-
ble states is even higher. This increase in the number of relevant states—not
just the absolute number of states—increases the transaction costs of sharing
information about state preferences and, hence, achieving cooperation at the
global level.
The increasing number of necessary states often leads to gridlock as the
probability that relevant states will have overlapping or compatible interests
decreases.228 In contrast, within particular subsystems, the overall number of
states is smaller, decreasing the transaction costs of international legal pro-
cess. Moreover, such subsystems often exist precisely because of prior inter-
est compatibility, which increases the likelihood that overlapping interests
can be easily identified and acted upon. As a result, the costs of legal
processes confined within such subsystems will often be far lower than the
costs of global alternatives.
A second feature of the multi-hub system that exacerbates the challenges
of global level legal processes is the changing nature of leadership. In the
prior unipolar structure, the hegemon facilitated global international legal
processes by absorbing the costs of rule creation, providing side payments or
benefits to states that accepted a rule, or imposing costs on states that did
not.229 In the multi-hub structure, the lack of a global hegemon makes it
less likely that any state will be able and willing to assume the rising coordi-
nation costs of global international legal processes.230 In contrast, within
227. In the creation of customary rules these are termed “specifically affected” states. See North Sea
Continental Shelf (Fed. Repub. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 72 (Feb. 20, 1969); see also
Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law 155 (1968) (“Among
the users are always some who mark the soil more deeply with their footprints than others, either because
of their weight, which is to say their power in this world, or because their interests bring them more
frequently this way.”).
228. See, e.g., Thomas Hale, David Held & Kevin Young, Gridlock: Why Global Coopera-
tion is Failing When We Need it Most 1 (2013); Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under
Anarchy, in Cooperation Under Anarchy 1, 18 (Kenneth Oye ed., 1986) (explaining that “the pros-
pects for cooperation diminish as the number of players increases”); Michael Taylor, The Possibility
of Cooperation 12 (1987) (on “the increased [challenges] of conditional cooperation”).
229. See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 Int’l Org. 175, 183 (1993)
(“Treaty making is not purely consensual . . . . Negotiations are heavily affected by the structure of the
international system, in which some states are much more powerful than others.”). On the role played by
a hegemon or regional hegemon, see Robert O. Keohane, The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in
International Economic Regimes, 1967–77, in Changes in the International System 131 (Ole R. Hol-
sti, et. al., eds., 1980). Moreover, the hegemon may have incentives to create rules in an effort to decrease
the long-term costs of hegemony or to legitimate its position. See G. John Ikenberry, After Victory:
Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (2001);
Krisch, supra note 7.
230. See Keohane, supra note 149, at 326 (“[F]ragmentation of power is associated with regime
collapse.”).
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particular subsystems, a hub often has the capacity, wealth, and power to set
the agendas for international legal processes and absorb the far lower trans-
action costs of subsystem-level legal processes.231  The hub may also be able
to expand the coalition beyond those states that would join organically
based on common interests through side payments that result in broader
win-sets. Finally, the growing number of hubs and the subsystems they are
creating increases the availability of subsystemic alternatives to global
cooperation.
While structural pressures in the multi-hub system favor cooperation at
the subsystem level,232 whether any particular international legal process re-
mains global or migrates toward separate subsystems depends on an issue-
specific calculation of the marginal costs and benefits of a single global solu-
tion as opposed to multiple, subsystemic ones. Where the marginal costs
associated with a global level legal process outweigh the marginal benefits of
a global solution, international legal processes are likely to shift toward sep-
arate subsystems. In contrast, where the marginal costs of a global legal
process remain low or where the benefits of global cooperation significantly
outweigh those of cooperation within subsystems, international legal
processes may remain at the global level, but face new challenges.
Table 2: Structural Shifts in International Legal Processes
Marginal benefits of global processes
Low High
Marginal costs High Box 1: International trade Box 2: Climate change
of global legal Shifts toward subsystems. Remains global.
processes Number of cases increasing. Possibility of success declines.
Low Box 3: Human rights Box 4: Financial regulation
Shifts toward subsystems. Remains global.
Possibility of success remains.
The variable impact of these structural pressures on different legal re-
gimes is illustrated in Table 2. In Box 1, the costs of truly global legal
processes have increased more than the benefits, shifting legal processes to-
ward separate subsystems. The failure of the Doha round of international
trade negotiations and the rapid expansion of regional trade agreements are
illustrative. The participation of 142 states in the Fourth Ministerial Confer-
231. See Miriam Prys, Hegemony, Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional Powerhood, 12 Int’l
Studies Rev. 479, 482 (2010) (describing the relevance of regional powers in the post-Cold War era).
232. There are, of course, some countervailing forces in the multi-hub system that might improve the
prospects for global cooperation. For example, the development of new technologies may decrease the
costs of preference identification, and hubs themselves may be able to serve a coordination function, such
that where they agree with one another each can bring along a larger group of follower states.
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ence of the Doha Round was unwieldy.233 On key issues, interests of power-
ful states were divided and hubs served as foci for distinct interests.234
Moreover, declining U.S. hegemony exacerbated by ineffective negotiation
formats undermined U.S. leadership.235 In contrast, trade negotiations at the
subsystem level—ranging from Mercosur and North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”) to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (“COMISA”) and the South Asian Association for Regional Coopera-
tion (“SAARC”)236—have been far easier to conclude. While there might be
greater benefits from a global agreement, the marginal costs of achieving
that agreement have proved too high,237 resulting in the stagnation of global
level trade negotiation and a pronounced shift toward subsystemic trade
negotiation.238
In Box 2, the benefits of global cooperation are significantly greater than
the benefits of cooperation at the subsystem level, but the costs of global
cooperation are high. The result is that international legal processes likely
remain global, but prospects for success decline. International climate
change negotiations are illustrative. Given the collective action problems
associated with global warming, reaping the benefits of cooperation requires
near-universal participation by the major emitting states, yet coordination
among those states has become extremely difficult. The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) process has been
complicated by the involvement of an extremely large number of states with
divergent interests.239 In order for any deal to be reached, the negotiating
structure had to shift from the plenary format to a small back-room discus-
sion among the United States, China, Brazil, India, and South Africa.240
Even this smaller group, however, had divergent interests, resulting in the
imprecision of the Copenhagen Accord itself.241 Small island states with
233. See Raj Bhala, Doha Round Schisms: Numerous, Technical, and Deep, 6 Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev. 5,
168–69 (2008) (according to the American Trade Representative, “the complexity of the cathedral that
was built for the Doha Round was its own worst enemy”).
234. On irreconcilable interests of negotiating states, see generally id.
235. Id. at 158 (noting the United States was effectively “outmaneuvered”).
236. SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services was signed at the Sixteenth SAARC Summit held in
Thimphu in April 2010. S. Asian Ass’n for Regional Cooperation [SAARC], Thimphu Siler Jubilee Declara-
tion (Apr. 28–29, 2010), available at http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/16thSummit-Declaration29April
10.pdf.
237. See Robert Howse & Michael Trebilcock, The Regulation of International Trade
(2005); Songjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New Perspective on
Trade Regionalism, 42 Harv. Int’l L.J. 419 (2001); James Thuo Gathii, The Neoliberal Turn in Regional
Trade Agreements, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 421 (2011).
238. See Christina L. Davis, Overlapping Institutions in Trade Policy, 7.1 Persp. on Pol. 25 (2009)
(arguing that enforcement may remain global at the WTO with respect to trade disputes).
239. See Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem, 104 Am. J. Int’l L.
230, 234 (2010).
240. See id.
241. See id. at 240. For a perspective on China’s more vocal role in Copenhagen and its distinct
preferences, see Paul G. Harris, China and Climate Change: From Copenhagen to Cancun, 40 Envtl. L. Rep.
10858, 10858 (2010). The Copenhagen Accord exhibits extremely low levels of precision. See Copenha-
gen Accord, supra note 3.
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unique and strongly held preferences, which historically played relatively
minor roles in international rule creation, ended up blocking the UNFCCC’s
“adoption” of the Accord.242 Ultimately, despite efforts to find consensus,
the international legal processes of climate change are likely to remain
global, but, quite possibly, fail.
In Box 3, the relative costs of global processes are extremely high and the
unique benefits of global cooperation relatively low. Much of the enforce-
ment of international human rights law falls into this category. Regional
enforcement mechanisms have provided adequate benefits and are signifi-
cantly easier to establish than are global alternatives.243 Given concerns
about relativism, there are perhaps sufficient benefits to universal human
rights rulemaking, that efforts have continued at the global level but have
been supplemented by easier to conclude regional agreements.244
Finally, in Box 4, global cooperation provides unique and highly valued
benefits that significantly outweigh the marginal costs thereof. This is per-
haps best illustrated by global financial regulation after the 2008 financial
crisis.245 In that case, the marginal benefits of a global response were ex-
tremely high. Moreover, because of common interests and the ability of a
relatively small number of states (the G20) to effectively make rules and
policy other states would follow, the marginal costs of global action were
relatively low.246 As a result, international legal processes remained global
and successful global outcomes were achieved. This category is, however,
likely to shrink given the structural dynamics of the multi-hub system, as
illustrated by the greater difficulties the G20 has faced as the common inter-
ests immediately following the 2008 crisis have diminished.247
These structural pressures will have differential impact within particular
issues and legal regimes based on the relative costs and benefits of global
and subsystemic legal processes. As a general matter, however, the multi-
hub system favors international legal processes that are confined within par-
ticular flexible subsystems. Over time, it is likely that more rulemaking,
interpretation, and enforcement will migrate toward these subsystems, com-
plementing and reinforcing the trend toward international legal pluralism.
242. See generally Bodansky, supra note 239.
243. For examples of such regional enforcement and discussion of the regionalization of human rights
regimes, see Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 285 (1999);
Christof Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter, 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 679
(2004).
244. Compare Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2013), with
Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa (2012).
245. See Andrew F. Cooper, The G20 as an Improvised Crisis Committee and/or a Contested ‘Steering Com-
mittee’ for the World, 86 Int’l Aff. 741 (2010).
246. For other examples in monetary and financial law, see Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the
Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (2012).
247. See Gabriel Goodliffe & Stéphan Sberro, The G20 after Los Cabos: Illusions of Global Economic
Governance, 47 Int’l Spectator 1 (2012).
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2. Substantive Implications for Rule Making, Interpretation, and Compliance
While the pressure for international legal processes to migrate from the
global level toward particular subsystems is constant across various interna-
tional legal processes, it has specific implications for rule making, interpre-
tation, and compliance. This section briefly notes some of these
implications, including a likely decline in the “legalization” of global rules
where they do emerge, a growing potential for interpretative indeterminacy,
and the possibility for compliance improvements within subsystems.
The multi-hub structure suggests a decrease in legalization—the preci-
sion, obligation, and delegation—of newly created global rules as compared
to subsystem level alternatives.248 Due to the need to accommodate a larger
number of states with distinct preferences, rules will often be relatively shal-
low and narrow, provided that the common interests necessary for the rule
can be found.249 As a result, the global legal rules they consent to will likely
be less precise in the nature of the obligations they impose. Similarly, such
rules are likely to exhibit less frequent delegation to external enforcement
mechanisms, so that states whose preferences may not be directly accommo-
dated might still accept the rule, knowing that it cannot readily be enforced.
The aforementioned Copenhagen Accord is a clear example. It is imprecise
in that it merely recognizes the need to “hold the increase in global temper-
ature below 2 degrees Celsius,” rather than creating any specific obligations
for states to achieve this goal.250  Furthermore, the Accord creates no en-
forcement mechanism.251
In contrast, within subsystems, the existence of overlapping interests and
the ability of the hub to expand substantive agreement increases the possi-
bility for more precise rules and more significant delegation to enforcement
mechanisms. For example, the original Kyoto Protocol, which never truly
sought nor achieved global participation, is far more specific than the Co-
penhagen Accord.252 Similar developments can be seen in the international
trade regime, where more recent agreements at the regional level, such as
the aforementioned TPP and the RCEP are often more specific than earlier
global agreements, including, for example, specific investment protections.
While newly established global rules are likely to exhibit less precision in
the multi-hub system, the interpretation of existing rules may fragment,
leading to indeterminacy. Interpretation involves the coordination of multi-
248. See Kenneth W. Abbott, et. al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 Int’l Org. 401 (2000).
249. See Olson, supra note 225.
250. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 3.
251. Id.
252. See generally Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(2008), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. Fifty-five states have ratified the Kyoto Proto-
col. Similarly, the proposed EU-led 2015 Protocol thereto will likely be far more specific. See The 2015
International Agreement, Eur. Comm’n, Climate Action (Oct. 28, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/clima/poli-
cies/international/negotiations/future/index_en.htm.
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ple states’ understandings of a term’s meaning.253 In the past, the United
States, as global hegemon, was engaged in almost all significant interpreta-
tive processes and helped ensure a degree of interpretative consistency across
the system.254 In contrast, without a hegemon, many hubs can articulate
alternative interpretations that better reflect their respective preferences.255
Hubs may also be able to attract other states to their preferred interpretation
or impose their preferred interpretation on them.256 Separate interpretations
advanced by different hubs, such as the conflicting U.S. and Chinese inter-
pretations of permissible military activities within a foreign state’s EEZ,
discussed above, result in interpretative fragmentation across subsystems.
Where there is no authoritative body or process to reconcile those frag-
mented interpretations, the prospect of interpretative indeterminacy
increases.257
Finally, in the multi-hub system there is at least a potential for improved
compliance with some legal rules. Rationalist accounts of compliance as-
sume that, when deciding whether or not to comply with a legal rule, states
consider the immediate value of compliance or defection as well as the po-
tential costs of sanctions that may follow violation.258 Asymmetric power
253. See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement: State Behavior
Under Regulatory Treaties, 7 Negotiation J. 311, 318 (1991); Chayes & Chayes, supra note 232, at
189–90 (“The broader and more general the language, the wider the ambit of permissible interpretations
to which it gives rise . . . . [I]t remains open to a state, in the absence of bad faith, to maintain its
[interpretive] position and try to convince the others.”).
254. For a discussion of the role of the hegemon in interpretation, see Krisch, supra note 7. See also,
Pierre Klein, The Effects of US Predominance on the Elaboration of Treaty Regimes and the Evolution of the Law of
Treaties, in United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law 363 (Michael
Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2008).
255. By virtue of their wealth and larger bureaucratic apparatus, more powerful states may have first-
mover advantages that allow them to lay down interpretive markers that frame the debate. For an exam-
ple in judicial interpretation, see Lewis v. Great Britain (David J. Adams Case) (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), 6
R.I.A.A., 85–91 (1921)  (demonstrating the ability of the UK to frame the debate even before the
arbitral tribunal). The U.S. Senate and Executive routinely lay such interpretative markers. See Michael J.
Glennon, Interpreting Interpretation: The President, the Senate, and When Treaty Interpretation Becomes Treaty
Making, 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 913 (1986). In addition, interpretations by powerful states may be
better-articulated and supported by legal analysis. On the power of quality legal reasoning, see Thomas
M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM . J. INT ’L L. 705 (1988) (arguing that the compli-
ance pull of legitimacy flows from determinacy, pedigree, coherence, and adherence); Lawrence Helfer &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward A Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273, 318
(1997) (on the “quality of legal reasoning”).
256. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 229, at 191.
257. Most international legal disputes never reach a neutral arbiter of meaning and, as a result, the
interpretive process is often a contestation of interpretations outside formal judicial process. See Chayes &
Chayes, supra note 253, at 318. On indeterminacy, see Prosper Weil, Toward Relative Normativity in
International Law?, 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 413, 426–33 (1983).
258. George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 319, 324
(1998) (“the level of threatened punishment needed to dissuade a State from violating an agreement
depends on the benefits that the State would gain from defection”). See also George W. Downs, David M.
Rocke, & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 Int’l
Org. 379 (1996). Sanctions here are used broadly to include any formal or informal costs that may be
imposed on a state which violates a legal rule. See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An
Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469, 492 (2005) (describing the role of “collat-
eral consequences”).
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distributions allow more powerful states to impose costs on target states,
potentially improving compliance.259 While the decline of U.S. hegemony
makes the United States less able to effectively impose sanctions, new hubs
are becoming ever more capable of and willing to do so.
Within subsystems, the threat of newly available potential sanctions im-
posed by hubs will, on the margin, increase the compliance propensity of
non-hubs. Examples of such compliance-inducing enforcement efforts by
hubs are becoming more frequent, but are limited to the circumstances in
which those hubs have an interest in other states’ compliance with the par-
ticular rule.260 For example, in 2005 India cut off all military aid to Nepal
after deposed King Gynendra Shah assumed absolute powers through emer-
gency rule.261 Similarly, at the Human Rights Council in 2013 India de-
manded “an independent and credible investigation into allegations of
human rights violations and loss of civilian lives” in Sri Lanka and sug-
gested that continued impunity would be detrimental to Sri Lanka.262 Rus-
sia has taken an active role in enforcing anti-drug trafficking rules in Central
Asia and Afghanistan, including conditional economic development and the
imposition of punitive measures on non-cooperating states.263 It has used the
threat of gas pipeline shutoffs to enforce what it deemed to be breaches of
international law by Ukraine.264 After the coup in Honduras in 2009, Brazil
259. See Downs, Rocke, & Barsoom, supra note 258; William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg,
The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach, 78 Am. Ec. Rev. 786, 786 (1988)
(“It is generally pointed out that sanctions are costly to the sanctioning country as well as the target.”);
Lisa L. Martin, Credibility, Costs and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions, 45 World Pol. 406
(1993). For an example, see generally Robert L. Freidheim, Toward a Sustainable Whaling Re-
gime (2001) (demonstrating U.S. use of trade sanctions to alter other states’ whaling behavior).
260. Some hubs with particularly strong views of sovereignty may be unlikely to impose direct sanc-
tions, yet, they may still generate “collateral consequences.” See Hathaway, supra note 258, at 492.
261. See Military Aid to Nepal Ended on February 1: India, Times of India, Feb. 22, 2005, available at
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2005-02-22/rest-of-world/27846146_1_military-aid-ramesh-
nath-pandey-indian-ambassador.
262. Meenkashi Ganguly, Can India Be a Human Rights Leader?, Global Rts., June 21, 2013, https:/
/www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/meenakshi-ganguly/can-india-be-international-human-
rights-leader.
263. See Ivan Nechepurenko, Russia Fights Addiction to Afghan Heroin, Moscow Times, May 27, 2013,
available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-fights-addiction-to-afghan-heroin/
480593.html; Yelena Chernenko,  [If We
Don’t Go Into Central Asia, It Will Come to Us], Kommers. Apr. 29, 2013, available at http://kommer-
sant.ru/doc/2181531 (interviewing a senior Russian official on a developmental program to combat
proliferation of narcoticsnarcotics shipments in Central Asia). See also
 [Agreement between the Russian Federation and
the Republic of Tajikistan on Cooperation in Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances and Their Abuse] Russ.-Taj., Dec.3, 2009, http://webcache.googleusercontent
.com/search?q=cache:g6ol6YGajWoJ:www.mid.ru/BDOMP/spd_md.nsf/0/8835C1C9A943909144257
D51004290BE+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us; Russia-Tajikistan Bilateral Agreement on Combat-
ing Illegal Narcotics Trade and Use, 3 Dec. 2009.
264. See, e.g., “  [Russian
Federation May Adopt Sanctions against Ukraine in Case of a Revision of the Gas Contract], RIA
Novosti (Oct. 10, 2013), http://ria.ru/economy/20131010/969155152.html (containing a statement by
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sheltered ousted Honduran President, Manuel Zelaya, in what it termed an
effort to restore democracy and sought to prevent Honduras’ return to the
Organization of American States until the goal was achieved.265 Similarly,
Russia, India, and China have all become far more active in the enforcement
of international counter-terrorism rules.266 Ultimately, such efforts may pro-
mote compliance, but only where hubs have a preference for rule
enforcement.
A second rationalist account of compliance is based on the value of repu-
tation and also suggests possible compliance improvements within subsys-
tems. Reputations are valuable because they facilitate credible commitments
to other states.267 The ability of hubs to attract followers will, in part, turn
on the credibility of their commitments.268 In a system where attraction
plays an enhanced role, so too should reputation, possibly resulting in com-
pliance improvements by hubs that seek to attract followers through a posi-
tive reputation for compliance. China, for example, has recently sought to
improve its reputation, precisely to avoid repelling frightened neighbors,
such as Vietnam and Myanmar.269 Given that reputations are often issue-
specific, this effect will be limited to issue areas in which hubs seek to make
credible commitments.270 Again, the net impact on compliance will depend
on hubs’ particular interests.
As it evolves, the multi-hub structure will have a range of specific impli-
cations for various international legal processes beyond those sketched here.
As a general matter, the multi-hub structure will increase pluralism in the
international legal system and generate pressures for many international le-
gal processes to migrate toward separate, flexible subsystems. While inter-
pretations of international law will diversify and may fragment, compliance
the Press-Secretary of Russia’s Prime Minister stating that Ukraine’s actions will lead to legal conse-
quences), http://www.kommersant.ru/news/2316542/rubric/3.
265. See Jens Glüsing, South America’s Gentle Giant: Brazil Flexes Muscles over Honduras Crisis, Spiegel
(Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/south-america-s-gentle-giant-brazil-flexes-
muscles-over-honduras-crisis-a-653753.html (emphasizing that Brazil saw its role in the Honduras crisis
as reflective of “a new political order”); Hillary Clinton Urges the OAS to Readmit Honduras, BBC News
(June 7, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10256459. Honduras was eventually readmitted to the OAS
with Brazilian support in June 2011.
266. For a U.N. report covering the efforts of a number of hubs, see U.N. Comm. on Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice, Assistance in Implementing the International Conventions and Protocols Re-
lated to Terrorism, U.N. Doc. E/CN.15/2009/5 (Jan. 16, 2009). See also Global Anti-terrorism Law
and Policy (Victor V.  Ramra et al. eds., 2012).
267. See Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 Harv. Int’l L.J. 231, 235 (2009) (defin-
ing reputation as “a belief about the state’s future actions based on its past actions”).
268. See Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory 35
(2006) (assuming “that states . . . are concerned with maintaining good standing . . . to the extent that
changing one’s . . . reputation affects payoffs”); Hathaway, supra note 258, at 500–07.
269. See generally Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Trans-
forming the World (2007).
270. Because reputations are issue-specific, strategic hubs may engage in reputation management, by
cultivating positive reputations on issues for which they value credibility, but violating rules in other
areas without reputational cross-contamination. See George Downs & Michael Jones, Reputation, Compli-
ance, and International Law, 31 J. Legal Stud. 95, 113 (2002).
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may actually increase within subsystems. The next Part turns from structure
to substance, illustrating growing pluralism where rising powers are articu-
lating and advancing distinct preferences within the international legal
system.
IV. The Preferences of Rising Powers: Pluralism, Emerging
Tensions, and the Return of the State
This Part moves from structure to substance. It examines the preferences
several new hubs, notably Brazil, Russia, India and China, are articulating in
the international legal system to show that the pluralism anticipated in the
structural analysis above is, in fact, emerging. This new pluralism is evident
at three key tension points: (1) understandings of sovereignty, (2) approaches
to legitimacy, and (3) the role of the state in economic development. Based
on their respective preferences, rising powers are not challenging or re-
jecting international law as such. Instead, at each of these three tension
points, one or more rising powers is becoming a new hub within the system,
articulating distinct preferences that are, to varying degrees, in tension with
those embedded into international law during the trans-Atlantic moment.
As rising powers are advancing these preferences within the international
legal system some non-hubs are choosing to follow.
While the power shifts that informed the structural analysis in Parts II
and III relate to the potential of states to influence the international legal
system, it is the preferences of these states, not their power, that determine
the direction and intensity of their newfound influence. Preferences govern
the willingness of states to expend power and the purposes to which that
power will be applied.271 To conduct a country and issue-specific preference
analysis thoroughly requires detailed examination of individual country
preferences across multiple issue areas272 and a country-specific account of
preference change over time.273 Such an analysis is beyond the scope of an
article-length treatment. Instead, this Part focuses on the ways rising powers
are articulating underlying preferences in legal terms through the processes
of international law. The argument here does not turn on the underlying
origins of state preferences, which may include domestic interests, govern-
271. See supra text accompanying notes 36–47.
272. See Moravcsik supra note 17, at 516–19. Rising powers cannot be treated as a block due to their
distinct, at times contradictory, interests and unique domestic challenges. For a discussion of their differ-
ences, despite desires for cooperation, see Christian Brutsch & Mihaela Papa, Deconstructing the BRICS:
Bargaining Coalition, Imagined Community, or Geopolitical Fad?, 6 Chinese J. Int’l Pol 299 (2013);
Michael Emerson, Do the BRICS Make a Bloc?, CEPS Commentary, Apr. 30, 2012; Michael Glosny,
China and the BRICs: A Real (but Limited) Partnership in a Unipolar World, 42 Polity 100 (2010).
273. For a discussion of “the difficulty of divining future intentions” of a rising power, see Jeffrey W.
Legro, What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power, 5 Perspectives on Pol. 515
(2007). Constructivist international relations scholars might frame these interests instead as state “iden-
tities.” See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in
International Relations and Comparative Politics, 2001 Annual Rev. Polit. Sci. 391, 396 (2001).
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mental structures, or even the distribution of power itself.274  Rather, this
paper uses the translation of preferences into international legal discourse as
a proxy for underlying preferences. For example, the argument is not that
Russia or China has a preference for sovereignty as such, but rather, that
Russia and China are articulating underlying preferences through a particu-
lar legal rhetoric of sovereignty that is in tension with aspects of sovereignty
as advanced by some traditional powers.
Collectively, the preferences being expressed by some rising powers at
these tension points suggest a far more state-centric version of international
law that is, at times, incompatible with the expanding role of the individual
and the Lockean international legal norms championed largely by the
United States and Europe during the past half century.275 The ultimate
evolution of international law at these tension points remains to be seen, but
it is likely to involve a reassertion of the state and, quite likely, both a
fragmentation among distinct subsystems and a new global equilibrium
closer to the Westphalian origins of international law. However this evolu-
tion proceeds, rising powers’ articulation of their preferences is increasing
pluralism and putting new emphasis on subsystemic legal processes.
A. Sovereignty: Absolute or Permeable
Sovereignty is a grundnorm of international law, albeit one with a number
of distinct meanings.276 As used here, sovereignty refers to international le-
gal sovereignty or the authority of the state to control and exclude others
from its territory. The question of when sovereignty does or should give way
to other legal rules or values remains debated. Over the past sixty-five years
sovereignty in international law has become more permeable. This trend has
been gradual and taken many forms, ranging from a greater willingness of
the U.N. Security Council to determine that events within a state’s borders
constitute threats to international peace and security,277 the creation of in-
ternational human rights tribunals,278 the establishment of the ICC,279 and
the development of a legal framework for investor-state arbitration.280 This
274. On different sources of preferences, see Moravcsik, supra note 17.
275. For a view of sovereignty in which individual rights trump those of states, see Helen Stacy,
Relational Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2029, 2034 (2003) (“[T]he international community has become
a party to the social contract between citizens and their government.”).
276. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, 7. For a discussion of the various meanings of sovereignty, see
Krasner, supra note 35.
277. See, e.g., Jared Genser & Bruno Ugarte, Evolution of the Security Council’s Engagement on Human
Rights, in The UN Security Council in the Age of Human Rights (Jared Genser & Bruno Ugarte
eds., 2013).
278. On invocations of Chapter VII by the Council, see Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving Interna-
tional Human Rights System, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 783, 790 (2006).
279. For the text, see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/
0/rome_statute_english.pdf.
280. See William Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The
Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 283, 288–90 (2009).
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move towards more permeable sovereignty is perhaps most dramatically il-
lustrated by the efforts of some western states, notably Canada and the UK,
to promote a version of sovereignty that gives way where liberal conceptions
of individual rights are in jeopardy.281 Under the auspices of the Canadian
government, Gareth Evans, a former Australian Foreign Minister, drafted
the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sov-
ereignty (“ICISS”), which concluded: “[w]here a population is suffering se-
rious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure,
and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the
principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to
protect.”282
The United States has been, at times, supportive and, at other times,
ambivalent to these changes. It has often supported greater permeability of
sovereignty when authorized by the U.N. Security Council and has advo-
cated a somewhat hypocritical position of absolute sovereignty for itself, but
more permeable sovereignty for other states.283 Permeable sovereignty
abroad implies that individual states, groups of states, or international orga-
nizations may have a legal right to intervene in the domestic affairs of other
states when certain conditions are met, even without Security Council au-
thorization.284 Examples of U.S. application of this more permeable sover-
eignty include the 1999 NATO air strikes in Serbia in response to the
commission of crimes against humanity by Slobodan Milosevic and the 2003
invasion of Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein’s suspected development of
weapons of mass destruction.285 In the 2010 National Security Strategy, the
281. See Prime Minister Tony Blair, Address to the Chicago Economic Club, Apr. 22, 1999, available
at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international-jan-june99-blair_doctrine4-23/ (laying out permissible
criteria for international intervention). For similar approaches, see Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty,
Economist 49 (Sept. 18, 1999) (“State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined . . . .
States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa.”);
Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 31, 40 (1995).
282. Int’l Comm. on Intervention & State Sovereignty, Report of The International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect 2
(2001).
283. See Stephen Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama 98 (2012)
(“[T]here is little doubt that national sovereignty has more and fiercer defenders in the United States.”);
G. John Ikenberry, Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order, 83 Foreign Affairs 144, 145–46
(2004) (highlighting the “unbundling” of the traditional “Westphalian” international norm of state
sovereignty by the U.S. invocation of “contingent sovereignty” and its claimed right to intervene
abroad); cf. Krasner, supra note 35 (attributing “hypocrisy” to the observance of sovereignty in interna-
tional relations generally). For a suggestion that this exceptionalism reaches well beyond the United
States, see Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 Harv. Int’l
L. J. 1 (2011).
284. See Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, 79 Foreign
Aff. 9 (2000) (noting the “growing” movement that “has developed a coherent blueprint for defending
American institutions against the alleged encroachment of international ones” while allowing “the
United States [to] pick and choose the international conventions and laws that serve its purpose and
reject those that do not.”).
285. On Kosovo, see Bill Clinton, Statement on Kosovo, Mar. 24, 1999, available at http://mil-
lercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3932. On Iraq, see George W. Bush, Address on the Start of War,
(Mar. 19, 2003), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/20/iraq.georgebush.
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Obama administration appeared to embrace the position that the interna-
tional community might have a right of intervention, even absent Security
Council authorization, where a national government failed to protect its own
people: “responsibility passes to the broader international community when
sovereign governments themselves commit genocide or mass atrocities . . . .
In the event that prevention fails, the United States will work both multi-
laterally and bilaterally to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian, financial,
and—in certain instances—military means to prevent and respond to geno-
cide and mass atrocities.”286
Notwithstanding an at times inconsistent U.S. position, voices in the
trans-Atlantic coalition have advocated more expansive exceptions to state
sovereignty.287 In response thereto, rising powers, particularly Russia and
China, are articulating a different preference for a more absolutist sover-
eignty. As they have done so, they are establishing themselves as alternative
hubs on this issue, attracting followers, generating new pluralism, and, per-
haps, shifting the rules of international law back toward a more classic,
Westphalian version of sovereignty.
1. Russia and China’s Preferences for Absolutist Sovereignty
Sovereignty ( ), framed in absolute terms, is at the heart of
Russia’s foreign policy.288 The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian
Federation—Russia’s equivalent to the U.S. National Security Strategy—
articulates the centrality of sovereignty to Russian foreign policy: “At-
tempts to belittle the role of a sovereign state as the fundamental element of
international relations generate a threat of arbitrary interference in internal
affairs.”289 Among the “priorities of the Russian Federation” are “enhancing
the efficiency of political, legal, foreign economic, and other instruments for
protecting the state sovereignty of Russia.”290 The Concept Paper makes
clear that “[a]ttempts to introduce into the international parlance such con-
cepts as ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘limited sovereignty’ in order to
justify unilateral power actions bypassing the U.N. Security Council are not
acceptable.”291 Russia’s updated 2013 Concept Paper puts forward an even
286. President Barack Obama, National Security 48 (2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
287. See Address of Prime Minister Blair, supra note 281.
288. For a discussion of Russian views on sovereignty, see generally Mikhail Antonov, Theoretical Issues
of Sovereignty in Russia and Russian Law, 37 Rev. Cent. & E. Eur. L. 95–113 (2012); Gordon B. Smith,
Russian Exceptionalism? Putin’s Assertion of Sovereignty at Home and Abroad, Conference paper presented at
Sovereignty and the New Executive Authority Conference, University of Pennsylvania Law School (Apr.
20, 2013), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1882-gordon-smith-russian-exceptionalism
.pdf.
289.  [Foreign Policy Concept of the
Russian Federation, 2000], Jun. 28, 2000, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/4e5fa867101effb44
32569fa003a705a/d2658119bbb357ecc325748800375061!OpenDocument.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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more absolute version, referring to the importance of sovereignty thirteen
times and positing one of Russia’s most basic foreign policy goals as “pro-
tecting and strengthening its sovereignty.”292 The contrast between this ap-
proach to sovereignty and that contained in the 2010 U.S. National Security
Strategy, quoted above, is striking.293
The Russian conception of sovereignty is not only strongly held, but also
far more absolute than that advanced by many states over the past twenty
years. Russia’s “sovereignty is rooted in cultural traditions that emphasize
statism, collectivism, [and] strong leadership.”294 For Russia, the sovereign
state is Weberian and Hobbesian, not Lockean: “[C]itizens obtain freedom,
justice, and security from the state’s exercise of control and power, rather
than the state and its leaders deriving authority from its citizens.”295 Due to
the unique Soviet legacy, “sovereignty was perceived . . . as the authorities’
mechanism of control over the population.”296 Russian President Putin ex-
plains: “Russia will decide itself how it can implement the principles of
freedom and democracy, taking into account its historical, geopolitical and
other specificities. As a sovereign state, Russia can and will independently
establish for itself the timeframe and conditions for moving along this
path.”297 The Russian Constitutional Court has upheld this absolutist vision
of national sovereignty in decisions limiting assertions of sovereignty by re-
gional entities within the Russian Federation.298
Perhaps due to the legacy of the USSR, Russia has a preference for a
version of sovereignty that can legitimate intervention within its perceived
sphere of influence. For example, Russia claims a duty to protect citizens
abroad, particularly in the post-Soviet space.299 Russia has also sought to
expand its extraterritorial rights in what then-President Medvedev referred
292.  [Foreign Policy Concept of the
Russian Federation, 2013], Feb. 12, 2013, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/e2f289bea62097f9c
325787a0034c255/c32577ca0017434944257b160051bf7f!OpenDocument. Article 15 of the 2013 Con-
cept Paper decries efforts aimed at “overthrowing legitimate authorities in sovereign states under the
pretext of protecting civilian population.” Id.
293. See National Security Strategy, supra note 286, at 48.
294. Smith, supra note 288, at 5.
295. Id. at 6; Mikhail Marchenko, 
 [State Sovereignty: Problems of Identifying Understanding and Content], 1 
[Prav.] 186, 190–96 (2003).
296. Antonov, supra note 288, at 100. But cf.
 [Ruling of the Constitutional
Court of RSFSR of Mar. 13, 1992],
[On the Verification of the Constitutionality of the Declaration of State Sovereignty by the Republic of
Tatarstan], http://russia.bestpravo.ru/fed1992/data03/tex14580.htm (analyzing the nature and implica-
tions of sovereignty in the Russian federal system).
297. Vladimir Ryzhkov, Sovereignty vs. Democracy?, 3 Russ. in Global Aff. 101, 102 (2005).
298. See Antonov, supra note 288, at 103–05.
299. See
 [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on the State Policy in Regard to the Fellow Citizens
Residing Abroad], Sobranie zakonodatel’stva rossiiskoi federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 1999, No. 22, Item 2670 (providing that “if a foreign state violates recognized
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to as a “privileged interests”300 established by regional agreements that au-
thorize Russian influence or intervention.301 For Russia, sovereignty is the
international legal articulation of underlying preferences for freedom of ac-
tion within its own territory and its expanding regional influence.
China also articulates a relatively absolutist version of sovereignty (zhu-
quan) that generally trumps competing values. China’s approach to sover-
eignty likely has roots in underlying domestic and international interests,
including the preservation of the regime,302 the need for “political secur-
ity,”303 and threats to territorial integrity,304 all framed by a history of for-
eign interference.305 As Wang Jisi explains: “[a] unique feature of Chinese
leaders’ understanding of their country’s history is their persistent sensitiv-
ity to domestic disorder caused by foreign threats.”306 While there is a
growing spectrum of discourse in Chinese foreign policy debate, sovereignty
dominates. Chinese realists “uphold the principle of state sovereignty above
all else, rejecting arguments that transnational issues penetrate across bor-
ders.”307 Even more liberal thinkers, such as Yan Xuetong, recognize China
is just beginning to move beyond being “a self-absorbed power obsessed
with sovereignty.”308 While some Chinese policy-makers recognize the need
to engage internationally, they seek to do so on terms that affirm China’s
sovereignty.309
The Chinese articulation of sovereignty can be traced back to the 1954
“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,”310 which embody core elements of
norms of international law and human rights in regard to Russian expatriates, the Russian Federation
shall undertake efforts authorized by international law to defend their interests”).
300. Interview by Television Channel One, Rossia, NTV with Dmitri Medvedev, President, Russian
Federation, in Sochi, Russia (Aug. 31, 2008), available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/
08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.shtml.
301. These include the Commonwealth of Independent States, The Collective Security Treaty Organi-
zation, and the Eurasian Economic Community, which give Russia extraterritorial authority.
302. See Shambaugh, supra note 76, at 56–57 (the goal of keeping the regime in power leads to a
defensive nationalism that is about maintaining face and sovereignty).
303. Id. at 59–60. For discussion of work by Chinese scholars prioritizing sovereignty, see Chengqui
Wu, Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Responsibility: Changes in China’s Response to International Humanitarian
Crises, 15 J. Chinese Pol. Sci. 71, 78 (2010).
304. See Xia Liping, Asian Security: China’s Perspective, in Crux of Asia: China, India, and the
Emerging Global Order 105, 107 (Ashley Tellis & Sean Mirski, eds., 2013).
305. Historical threats lead to an unusually strong interest in “maintaining territorial integrity” and
preserving “cultural integrity.” Shambaugh, supra note 76, at 53–54.  For an historical perspective see
generally Suzanne Ogden, Sovereignty and International Law: The Perspective of the People’s Republic of China,
7 N.Y.U. Int’l J. L. & Pol. 1 (1974).
306. Wang Jisi, China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Power Finds its Way, 90 Foreign Aff. 68,
69 (2011).
307. Shambaugh, supra note 76 at 32. Only for a relatively small portion of the Chinese elite—the so
called “globalists”—does sovereignty not have pride of place. Id. at 41–42.
308. Yan Xuetong, How Assertive Should a Great Power Be? N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 2011, http://www
.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/opinion/01iht-edyan01.html.
309. See Shambaugh, supra note 76, at 34–36.
310. China Ministry of Foreign Aff., China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence (2000), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm. For discussion, see
Chang-fa Lo, Values to Be Added to an ‘Eastphalia Order’ by the Emerging China, 17 Ind. J. Global Legal
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the modern, absolutist conception: “mutual respect for territorial integrity
and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual non-interference in internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, [and] peaceful coexistence.”311 In a
2008 speech China’s then President Hu Jintao observed: “We should always
put the nation’s sovereignty and security above anything else.”312 This ap-
proach has informed China’s modern engagement with international law.313
Like Russia, China’s emphasis on an absolutist approach to sovereignty
challenges the more permeable trans-Atlantic vision.314 As a leading
Taiwanese observer comments: “Chinese reemphasis on the Five Principles
. . . will challenge Western-led interventionist practices and principles in
. . . international law.”315 There is, however, recent evidence that China’s
approach to sovereignty is becoming more pragmatic, recognizing compet-
ing considerations.316 For example, China abstained in the Security Council
votes on resolutions referring the situations in Sudan and Libya to the ICC
and authorizing the use of force in Libya. As Yan Xuetong notes: “China’s
policy on Libya is clearly a break” and there is “increased recognition of the
fact that China must exercise positive influence on international affairs.”317
2. Sovereignty as Tension Point: The Responsibility to Protect
Russia and China are articulating their more absolutist versions of sover-
eignty in the international legal system and, in the process, are becoming
hubs on this issue. They are offering a credible alternative to the growing
permeability of sovereignty championed by some Western states and are
attracting followers. The tension over sovereignty is perhaps most evident in
Stud. 13, 17–18 (2010). For their continued relevance till the modern era, see also Wen Jiabao, Premier,
State Council China, Address Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence (Jun. 28, 2004).
311. Chang-fa Lo, supra note 310, at 17.
312. Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Speech at the Meeting Marking
the 30th Anniversary of Reform and Opening Up (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.china.org.cn/archive/
2009-05/11/content_17753659.htm. See also Dai Bingguo, Chinese State Councilor, Closing Remarks at
the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (Jul. 28, 2009) (on the need to uphold sovereignty and
territorial integrity), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126599.htm.
313. See Wang Tieya, International Law in China: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 221 Recuiel
Des Cours 195, 288 (1990) (“Strict adherence to the principle of the inviolability of sovereignty has
become a distinctive feature of . . . the People’s Republic of China.”).
314. One discourse analysis found that between 1990 and 2009, the China Foreign Ministry spokes-
person answered questions on human rights 125 times, of which 87 referenced the protection of sover-
eignty. See Wu, supra note 303, at 84.
315. Chang-fa Lo, supra note 310, at 19.
316. The early edges of this softening were evident in a 2005 article by Wang Yizhou: “[M]ore and
more phenomena prove that non-interference (buganshe) has preconditions (you qiantide).” Wang Yizhou,
Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu Ruogan Wenti’ [‘Several issues in the study of international relations’], 3 Ouzhou
Yanjiu [European Research] 131 (2006), cited in Allen Carlson, Moving Beyond Sovereignty? A Brief Con-
sideration of Recent Changes in China’s Approach to International Order and the Emergence of the tianxia Concept,
20 J. Contemp. China 89, 94 (2011). For an argument on Chinese pragmatism see Jonathan E. Davis,
From Ideology to Pragmatism: China’s Position on Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 44
Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 217, 217 (2011).
317. See Yan Xuetong, supra note 308.
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the recent evolution of the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”), an asserted
norm and, in the view of some, emerging rule of customary international
law that generates secondary obligations on the international community to
act where national governments fail in their primary obligations to prevent
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.318
Despite their strong preferences for an absolutist version of sovereignty,
China and Russia both participated in 2005 World Summit, which led to
the codification of R2P in the World Summit Outcome Document that was,
subsequently, adopted by the General Assembly.319 Perhaps they assumed
that the reference to R2P was merely rhetorical, posing no new challenge to
their versions of sovereignty. After all, the Outcome Document merely reaf-
firmed the responsibility of the territorial state to prevent serious crimes and
limited any possible right of international intervention to be “on a case-by-
case basis” and “in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII.”320
Yet, as the development of R2P gained momentum and some states, schol-
ars, and NGOs began to suggest R2P might provide independent grounds
for the use of force without Security Council approval or that there might be
an obligation for Security Council members to authorize such action, Russia
and China’s versions of sovereignty came under threat.321 Since then, they
have sought to limit the scope, legal status, and applicability of R2P.322
Specifically, in the debates leading up to the first reference to R2P in a
Security Council resolution in 2006, China and Russia argued persuasively
for the Council to merely “acknowledge,” rather than formally “adopt,” the
relevant language of the World Summit Outcome Document.323
The Libya crisis of 2011 arose at a time when all four BRICs were on the
Security Council (India and Brazil as non-permanent members). While all
abstained in the vote on Resolution 1973, thereby tacitly allowing action in
Libya,324 their behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts ensured that the resolu-
tion did not mention the “Responsibility to Protect” as such, did not refer
318. For the origins of the norm, see Int’l Comm., supra note 285, at 11–18; William Burke-White,
Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, in The Responsibility to Protect 17, 17–36  (Jared Genser &
Irwin Cotler, eds., 2011).
319. See GA Res.  60/1, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. DocA/60/L.1 (Oct. 24, 2005). For discussions
of the role played by rising powers in the World Summit, see Alex Bellamy, Realizing the Responsibility to
Protect, 10 International Studies Perspectives 111 (2009).
320. See G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 319 at para. 139.
321. On the suggestion that the Council has a duty to authorize Chapter VII action when peaceful
efforts have failed, see generally Anne Peters, The Security Council’s Responsibility to Protect, 8 Int’l Org. L.
Rev. 1, 20 (2011). For an example of inter-governmental organization advocacy, see the work of the
Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect that, while recognizing the authority of the Council, calls
for more robust Council action. See About R2P, Global Ctr. for the Responsibility to Protect,
http://www.globalr2p.org/about_r2p.
322. See Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On, 24 Ethics in Int’l Aff. 143,
145 (2010); SCOR, Update Report No. 1: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Mar. 8,
2006), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-282
1453.php.
323. S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
324. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
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back to Resolution 1674 that previously “acknowledged” R2P, and limited
operative paragraph 4 to the use of “all necessary measures . . . to protect
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”325 At most,
Russia and China assumed they were authorizing a narrow intervention ap-
proved by the Security Council rather than establishing a more expansive
precedent for R2P. While China and Russia could have vetoed the Libya
resolution, doing so might have been counterproductive to their efforts to
limit R2P, particularly if they believed the United States, France, and U.K.
might act even without Security Council authorization, which would have
thereby established a much broader precedent for R2P without Council ap-
proval.326  Moreover, both Russia and China laid down clear markers that
Resolution 1973 should not be read as having precedential value for future
invocations of R2P.327
Russia and China deemed U.S. and European efforts at regime change in
Libya to exceed the mandate of Resolution 1973.328 In the wake of Gaddafi’s
fall, both Russia and China have become vocal hubs, articulating their alter-
native preferences on sovereignty and advancing them in the international
legal system. As Russia’s 2013 Foreign Policy Concept Paper notes: “It is
unacceptable that military interventions and other forms of interference . . .
which undermine the foundations of international law based on the principle
of sovereign equality of states, be carried out on the pretext of . . . responsi-
bility to protect.”329 The official Chinese interpretation suggests that R2P
merely makes “massive humanitarian cris[es] . . . a legitimate concern of the
international community,” but that international action is limited to efforts
“to ease and defuse the crisis.”330 To avoid any possible interpretation that
Security Council action on Syria might provide grounds for intervention,
Russia and China have affirmatively vetoed any resolution that references
R2P or authorizes the use of force in Syria.331 And they have sought to
preserve the Security Council as the sole source of authority for such inter-
ventions. As Putin wrote in the New York Times: “Under current interna-
325. See id.  ¶ 4. On efforts to constrain the doctrine, see Oliver Stuenkel, Brazil as Norm Entrepreneur:
The Responsibility While Protecting, Post-Western World, Mar. 4, 2013, http://www.postwesternworld
.com/2013/03/04/brazil-as-a-norm-entrepreneur-the-responsibility-while-protecting/.
326. This assumes that the United States and Europe would have acted even without Security Council
authorization, which by March 17th, when Resolution 1973 was adopted, seemed at least plausible. See
Clock is Ticking on Libya, Cameron Warns, The Times (London), Mar. 15, 2011.
327. For such markers, see SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498 (Mar. 17, 2011) (Chinese and Russian Am-
bassadors’ speeches), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6498/.
328. For statements by China and Russia suggesting that NATO action exceeded authorities under
Resolution 1973, see Ben Smith and Arabella Thorp, Interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1973 on
Libya, Int’l Aff. and Def. Sec. of the U.K. Foreign Aff. and Commonw. Off., (2011), http://
www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn05916.pdf (quoting Chinese and Russian official condemnations).
329.  (2013), supra note 292.
330. China Ministry of Foreign Aff., Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the
United Nations Reforms (June 7, 2005).
331. See Rick Gladstone, Friction at the UN as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syria Sanc-
tions, N.Y. Times, July 19, 2012.
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tional law, force is permitted only in self-defense or by the decision of the
Security Council.”332
As Russia and China have become hubs for a more absolutist version of
sovereignty, even if still subordinate to the Security Council, they have at-
tracted followers. Brazil has joined Russia and China, offering a restrictive
interpretation of R2P in a concept note entitled “Responsibility while pro-
tecting,” that echoes Russia and China in emphasizing the importance of
sovereignty and the centrality of both Security Council approval and contin-
uing oversight of any authorized action.333 Like China and Russia, Brazil too
has preferences for a stronger version of sovereignty, based in part on its
colonial history and more recent efforts by President Lula to reengage with
the world in a way that “affirms Brazil’s sovereignty.”334  India too has
joined this subsystem, with Indian government officials expressing concerns
that “an expansive version of R2P is inconsistent with sovereignty and the
Charter.”335 Again, India likely finds Russia and China’s preferences for sov-
ereignty attractive. A leading Indian foreign policy observer notes: “India is
deeply committed to state sovereignty as the most important principle in
international relations.”336  While South Africa initially voted in favor of
Resolution 1973, it has subsequently expressed serious concerns about how
the resolution was implemented in Libya and has moved toward the Russian
and Chinese positions. It issued a formal clarification that articulates a far
narrower view of R2P, and has championed this view in multilateral fora.337
As hubs in the system, Russia and China have, in Michael Ignatieff’s words
“put down a marker. This is not your world, they want us to know. . . . You
will have to reckon with us.”338
332. See Vladimir Putin, Op-Ed., A Plea for Caution from Russia, N.Y. Times (Sept. 11, 2013), availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html.
333. See Permanent Rep. of Brazil to the U.N., Letter dated Nov. 9, 2011 from the Permanent Repre-
sentative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/551-S/
2011/701 (Nov. 11, 2011). Brazil has effectively infused this interpretation into global debate. See
Thomas Wright, Brazil Hosts Workshop on “Responsibility While Protecting,” Foreign Pol’y (Aug. 29,
2012, 11:29 AM), http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/29/brazil_backs_responsibility_while_
protecting.
334. Hurrell, infra note 357 (on Lula’s efforts to secure Brazil’s “sovereign presence”). This approach
is consistent with Chayes & Chayes’ vision of sovereignty as inclusion. See Abram Chayes & Antonia
Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty 68 (1995).
335. Interview with Shyam Saran, former Indian Foreign Secretary, in New Delhi, India (Aug. 24,
2013).
336. Interview with C. Raja Mohan, in New Delhi, India (Aug. 28, 2013).
337. See Statement by Ambassador Baso Sangqu, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the
United Nations at the Informal Meeting Hosted by the Minister of External Relations of Brazil (Feb. 21,
2012), available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/S%20Africa.pdf; see also Chris Landsberg, Pax
South Africana and the Responsibility to Protect, 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 436, 439–41
(2010); Stanley Foundation, Policy Dialogue Brief: The Roles of South Africa and the
United States for the 21st Century International Agenda (2012), available at http://www
.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/RoleUSandSouthAfrica412.pdf.
338. Michael Ignatieff, How Syria Divided the World, New York Rev. Blog (July 11, 2012, 9:20
AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/jul/11/syria-proxy-war-russia-china.
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The future development of R2P will turn on the resolution of this tension
over sovereignty between and among hubs in the system. It has been sug-
gested that R2P is “on trial” as these versions of sovereignty clash. Perhaps
distinct versions of sovereignty and R2P will be championed by competing
hubs and applied differently within their respective subsystems. Perhaps
Russia, China, and their followers will retard the future development of the
norm or at least circumscribe it more narrowly than some traditional powers
might prefer.339 Either way, the debate over R2P is illustrative of growing
pluralism, as hubs articulate and advance their own distinct preferences.
The tension over sovereignty has implications well beyond R2P. Russia’s
practice is illustrative. It is seeking to ratchet back a number of interna-
tional legal rules that it deems to infringe its sovereignty. For example,
while Russia generally pays damages awarded by the European Court of
Human Rights, it refuses to undertake domestic legal reforms in response
thereto.340 Russia interprets the “public policy” exception in the enforce-
ment of internal arbitral awards341 and the “political offence” exception in
extradition treaties342 broadly, allowing it to protect domestic interests. Be-
yond Russia, the tension over sovereignty is relevant to the refusal of any
rising powers to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC,343 Brazil’s refusal to
ratify any BITs,344 and China’s expansive interpretation of coast-state sover-
eignty in the EEZ,345 just to name a few. The pluralism that emerges from
Russia and China’s more absolutist versions of sovereignty may well push
understandings of sovereignty back toward their more absolutist roots of the
339. See Prime Minister Blair, supra note 281.
340. See Ole Solvang, Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Price of Non-Cooperation, 15
Hum. Rts. Brief 14 (2008).
341.
 [Ruling of the Fed. Arbitration Ct. of Volga-Vyatka Cnty., of 17 Feb. 2003, Case No. A43-
10716/02-27-10ISP],  [regarding United World
Ltd. v. Krasnii Yakor] (2003), http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=AVV;n=
5103. See also Diana Tapola, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Application of the Public Policy Rule in
Russia, 22 Arb. Int’l. 151 (2006).
342. See, e.g., Rus.-Braz. Extradition Treaty, Jan. 14, 2002 (“The request for extradition may be
denied . . . if the act is a political offence . . . if the Country from whom extradition is requested has
reason to believe that the extradition request is presented with the goal of a criminal prosecution of a
person . . . due to his political convictions.”).
343. For a list of states parties to the Rome Statute, see Coal. for the Int’l Crim. Ct., States
Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC 121 Ratifications as of 02 April 2012, http://www.coali-
tionfortheicc.org/documents/RATIFICATIONSbyRegion_2Arpil2012_eng.pdf.
344. See, e.g., Leany Lemos & Daniela Campello, The Non-Ratification of Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties in Brazil: A Story of Conflict in a Land of Cooperation (Apr. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243120.
345. See Odom, supra note 155.
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18th and 19th centuries346 and, perhaps, toward greater consistency with the
U.N. Charter, in which exceptions to sovereignty are rare.347
B. Legitimacy: Input- or Output-Oriented
A second tension point emerges where new hubs are articulating prefer-
ences for a distinct form of legitimacy in international institutions and legal
processes. Whereas the United States and, to a lesser degree, Europe tend to
judge legitimacy based on outcomes, many rising powers focus on inputs
and process.348 Input legitimacy turns on what Thomas Franck describes as
the “quality of a rule which derives from a perception on the part of those to
whom it is addressed that it has come into being in accordance with the
right process.”349 Input legitimacy is based on the states involved in and the
procedures applicable to an international legal process. Output legitimacy,
in contrast, refers to the “effectiveness of an institution’s decisions and ac-
tions”350 and whether they are welfare-enhancing.351 Both approaches to le-
gitimacy are relative and subjective, ultimately resting on the perception of
the addressee.352
346. For a discussion of the historical development of sovereignty, see David Kennedy, International
Law in the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion, 17 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 99, 119 (1997) (“By century’s
end, international law would countenance but one form of political authority, absolute within its terri-
tory and equal in its relations with other sovereigns.”). Whether the Westphalian order actually reflected
such a strong version of sovereignty is open to debate. Krasner, among others, has argued that such a
vision of sovereignty was never achieved. See Krasner, supra note 35, at 155 (“In both the nineteenth
and the late twentieth centuries violations of the Westphalian model were endemic, but the model
endured.”).
347. See U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 1, 4, 7. For discussion of the vision of sovereignty in the U.N.
Charter, see Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 529, 581–84 (1998); Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as
a Basis for International Organization, 53 Yale L.J. 207, 207–08 (1944) (“We may justifiably assume that
in this declaration ‘sovereignty,’ usually defined as ‘supreme authority,’ has a meaning not incompatible
with the existence of an international law which imposes duties and confers rights upon States. . . .  [T]he
sovereignty of States as subjects of international law can mean, not an absolutely but only a relatively
supreme authority.”).
348. For a discussion, see Michael Zurn & Matthew Stephen, The View of Old and New Powers on the
Legitimacy of International Institutions, 30 Pol. 91, 94 (2010).  There are a range of other approaches to
legitimacy that may be relevant but are not the focus of this inquiry, for example democratic legitimacy.
See John McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1175,
1192–1210 (discussing the democracy deficit).
349. Franck, supra note 255, at 705–06. See also Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy
Among Nations (1990) (analyzing legitimacy in light of rule determinacy, symbolic validation through
authority, coherence, and adherence to rule hierarchy); David Held, Models of Democracy (1996).
Robert Keohane and Allen Buchanan frame a similar version of input legitimacy as turning on the
perceived “right” or authority “to rule.” See Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global
Governance Institutions, 20 Ethics & Int’l Aff. 405, 408 (2006).
350. For a discussion of output legitimacy, see F.W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective
and Democratic 21–28 (1999); Kenneth W. Abbott & David Gartner, Reimaging Participation in Inter-
national Institutions, 8 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Rel. 1, 25–26 (2012).
351. See 2 Harold Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society 142,
217 (1992) (on the nature of authoritative decisions).
352. See Franck, supra note 349, at 41–44.
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For the United States, decisions about whether to use a legal process or
institution are often based on the ability of that process or institution to
deliver results.353 Participation and process are secondary concerns. As the
2010 U.S. National Security Strategy states with respect to institutional
reform: “We need to assist existing institutions to perform effectively.
When they come up short, we must . . . develop alternative mechanisms.”354
When it is expedient, the United States is generally willing to work outside
of inclusive, participatory institutions as illustrated by the historic role of
the G-7/8,355 calls to establish a Concert of Democracies,356 the expanding
use of selective “contact groups,” and the frequent reliance on ad hoc coali-
tions of the willing.357 As some rising powers, notably Brazil and India, have
articulated quite different versions of legitimacy, they have become alterna-
tive hubs and are attracting followers. These tensions over legitimacy have
real ramifications for the international legal system, including, for example,
the design and membership of international organizations and the emer-
gence of a “south-south” alternative architecture of international legal
agreements.
1. Brazil and India’s Preferences for Input Legitimacy
Brazil places significant emphasis on input legitimacy in its foreign pol-
icy. Brazil’s articulation of legitimacy based on inputs likely flows from un-
derlying preferences rooted in past geographic exclusion, historical U.S.
dominance in Latin America, and perhaps its status toward the bottom of
the hierarchy of rising powers.358 Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Relations has
described the country’s top foreign policy priority as the “reconfiguration of
the world’s commercial and diplomatic geography” to hasten the transition
to a multipolar order in which international norms and institutions no
353. See National Security Strategy, supra note 286, at 40, 46; Andrew Hurrell, There Are No
Rules (George W. Bush): International Order After September 11, 16 Int’l Rel. 185 (2002). For descriptions
of U.S. visions of legitimacy, see Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing
Administrative Law, 115 Yale L.J. 1490, 1517 (2006) (“The modern American administrative state . . .
reflects this expertise- and results-based orientation to policymaking legitimacy.”). For description of
European approaches, particularly within the OECD context, see Claire R. Kelly, Institutional Alliances
and Derivative Legitimacy, 29 Mich. J. Int’l L. 605, 620–21 (2008).
354. See National Security Strategy, supra note 286, at 46.
355. See, e.g., John Kirton, United States Foreign Policy and the G8 Summit, Lecture Given at the
Faculty of Law, Chuo University (July 6, 2000) (on the role of the G7 and G8); see also Peter I. Hajnal,
The G7/G8 System: Evolution, Role and Documentation (1999).
356. See Ivo Daalder & James Lindsay, Democracies of the World, Unite, Am. Int., Jan. 1, 2007; see also
Anne-Marie Slaughter & G. John Ikenberry, Forging a World Of Liberty Under Law: U.S.
National Security in the 21st Century 61 (2006) (proposing a concert of democracies).
357. See Andrew Hurrell, Power and Legitimacy in Global Governance (Feb. 2006) (unpublished
manuscript) (noting the “growing importance [to the United States] of informal groupings of states—
contact groups, core groups, groups of friends.”).
358. See Gabriel Cepaluni, et. al., Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times: A Quest
for Autonomy from Sarney to Lula (2009); Sean William Burges, Brazilian Foreign Policy
After the Cold War (2009).
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longer favor the developed world at Brazil’s expense.359 Its efforts are aimed
at creating a modicum of equality in the international system that elevates
Brazil’s own status and provides an alternative to U.S.-dominated legal
structures.360
Brazil’s assessment of legitimacy is based on inputs into the process or
institution, such as the states participating in an institution and its formal
sources of authority.361 The current “global order still strikes many
Brazilians as inequitable.”362 A senior Brazilian official said that “we have a
major concern that the new organizations [of global governance] do not rep-
licate the unrepresentativeness of the past.”363 The U.S. National Intelli-
gence Council found that “[f]or Brazilians, the governance gap is really a
legitimacy gap. Effectiveness is not just about fast decision-making but in-
corporating a broader range of voices.”364 While Brazil’s goal—achieving a
“seat at the table [in] multilateral institutions”365—may be self-interested,
it fosters Brazil’s emergence as a hub that both offers a distinct preference
for legitimacy and champions that vision in the international system.
India, too, emphasizes input legitimacy.366 Again, underlying interests
including its colonial legacy,367 the regional shadow of China,368 and long-
standing relationship with the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77369 are
likely drivers thereof. India’s approach to legitimacy may also be an interna-
tional manifestation of what Amartya Sen describes as a “public reasoning”
of “democracy and inequality.”370 India’s self-identity has been “shaped by
three central ideals: the importance of morality in foreign affairs, a belief in
India’s great-power potential, and anti-colonial solidarity with developing
nations.”371 One former Indian Foreign Secretary has called on “governance
359. Lecture by Ambassador Celso Amorim, Foreign Minister, Brazil (Mar. 17, 2004), cited in Hal
Brands, Dilemmas of Brazil’s Grand Strategy 12 (2010). For a general discussion of Brazil’s for-
eign agenda, see Julia E Sweig, A New Global Player: Brazil’s Far-Flung Agenda, 89 Foreign Aff. 174
(2010).
360. See Hurrell, supra note 357 (“Countries such as . . . Brazil [argue] that the current order fails to
represent the global range of cultural, racial, religious, and political values.”).
361. For a discussion of Brazil’s perceptions of international inequality, see Brands, supra note 363,
at 10.
362. Id.
363. National Intelligence Council, Global Governance, supra note 78, at 28.
364. Id. at 43.
365. Stephanie Hanson, Backgrounder: Brazil on the International Stage, Council on Foreign Rel.
(last updated July 2, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/brazil/brazil-international-stage/p19883.
366. See Hurrell, supra note 357.
367. Amrita Narlikar, Reforming Institutions, Unreformed India?, in Rising States, Rising Institu-
tions, supra note 25, at 125 (“[T]he ideational peculiarities that one associates with India’s world view
. . . are very much the product of a colonial past and post colonial reassertion.”).
368. See, e.g., Interview with C. Raja Mohan, at New Delhi, India (Aug. 28, 2013).
369. See I. Abraham, From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–1965, 46
Commonwealth and Comparative Pol. 195, 211 (2008).
370. Jean Dreze & Amartya Sen, An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions 243
(2013).
371. C. Raja Mohan, Changing Global Order, in Crux of Asia, supra note 304, at 53. For a typology of
Indian foreign policy thinking, see Deepa M. Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagoplan, India: Foreign Policy Per-
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structures . . . [to] devolve more decision-making authority to emerging
economics” and has noted the importance of “voting power” being “more
evenly distributed,” including both rising powers and other under-repre-
sented states.372 Beyond inclusivity, India also prioritizes process and legal
authority. Prominent Indian international lawyers underscore India’s goals
of “ensuring proper procedures are followed” and working within “institu-
tions with valid sources of authority.”373 In short, India emphasizes the need
to “play by the rules,”374 giving “greater attention to participatory and ac-
countability legitimacy.”375
Brazil and India’s articulation of strong preferences for input legitimacy
may simply be a self-interested means of ensuring their own seats at the
table in the reform of the Security Council. It may also be that their claims
are largely rhetorical, giving way to greater pragmatism when key national
interests are at stake. But, the fact that Brazil and India are articulating this
far more input-oriented legitimacy in international legal processes is gener-
ating new pluralism.
2. Legitimacy as Tension Point: The Reform of the Global Institutional
Architecture
While the emerging tension over legitimacy cuts across a range of legal
issues, it is most evident in present efforts to reform the international insti-
tutional architecture. In particular, in current debates around the reform of
the Security Council, the appropriate role of the G20, and the establishment
of “south-south” institutions, Brazil and India have become hubs for an
alternative view of the structure of institutions and legal processes that pri-
oritizes input legitimacy. In so doing, they have begun to attract followers
that share preferences for more participatory institutions not dominated by
traditional powers.
It is not surprising that India and Brazil have been among the loudest
champions of Security Council reform. They have grounded their advocacy
in terms of input legitimacy and the “democratization” of the Council.376
spectives of an Ambiguous Power, in Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy De-
bates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia 73 (Henry R. Nau & Deepa M. Ollapally, eds.,
2012).
372. Shyam Saran, The Evolving Role of Emerging Economies in Global Governance: An Indian Perspective 35
(Working Paper, June 7, 2012), available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/aboutkings/worldwide/initiatives/
global/indiainstitute/EmergingEconomiesPaper—final.pdf.
373. Interview with Amit Prakash, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru Univeristy, at New Delhi, India
(Aug. 24, 2013); Interview with Manimuthu Gandhi, Faculty Member, Jindal Global Law School, at
New Delhi, India (Aug. 28, 2013).
374. Christian Wagner, India’s Gradual Rise, 30 Politics 63, 69 (2010).
375. See Zurn & Stephan, supra note 348, at 99.
376. In advance of summits with President Obama in 2010 and 2011, both Brazil and India re-
quested support for their aspirations for permanent membership. See Joe Leahy, Obama Acknowledges Bra-
zil’s UN Hopes, Fin. Times, Mar. 19, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1f518fec-5257-11e0-8a31-
00144feab49a.html#axzz3I3O61PSa; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jim Yardley, Countering China, Obama Backs
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Brazil and India were the driving force behind the New Delhi Declaration of
the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) leaders, which noted that: “the U.N.
Security Council, as configured today is not representative of present-day
realities. [Reform must lead to] greater balance and representativeness.”377
Former Brazilian President Lula was a vocal champion of an “international
order that is sustainable, multilateral, and less asymmetric, free of hegemo-
nies, and ruled by democratic institutions.”378 Even the G4 group (Ger-
many, Brazil, India and Japan), generally thought to be most likely to
achieve permanent membership, has advocated for Council expansion be-
yond itself, demanding “increased representation of developing coun-
tries.”379 This articulation of legitimacy based on participation and
democratization, even if purely strategic, contrasts starkly with the U.S. po-
sition, informed by output legitimacy, which seeks fewer new members380 so
as “not to diminish [the Council’s] effectiveness or efficiency.”381
Brazil and India’s particular versions of legitimacy also manifest in de-
bates over the evolution of the G20. It is not surprising that they have
welcomed the elevation of the G20 and the relative decline of the G8.382
What is surprising is that India and Brazil have noted the legitimacy deficit
of the G20 due to its lack of formal legal authority.383 For Brazil and India,
neither of the G20’s claims to legitimacy—its effectiveness in responding to
the 2008 economic crisis and the economic power of its members384—satis-
fies the requirements for input legitimacy. As a result, they have resisted
efforts to expand the G20 agenda beyond pure economic coordination to
issues such as climate finance and development.385 They have particularly
India for UN Council, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/world/asia/
09prexy.html.
377. IBSA (India, Braz., S. Afr.) Dialogue Forum, New Delhi Agenda for Cooperation, at art. 6 (Mar. 5,
2004). Similar themes have been reiterated at each IBSA meeting. See also Tshwane Declaration, supra
note 181.
378. Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil, Speech at the Plenary Meetings of the 64th
General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/pdf/BR_en.pdf.
379. See Joint Press Statement, Ministerial Meeting of the G4 Countries (Braz., Ger., India, Japan) in
the Margins of the 67th Session of the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.mofa.go.jp/
policy/un/pko/joint_1209.html.
380. See Ambassador John R. Bolton, Statement in the U.N. General Assembly (Nov. 10, 2005)
(noting the need to limit expansion so as not to “weaken” its “ability to act”).
381. Ambassador Susan E. Rice, Statement at an Informal Meeting of the General Assembly on Secur-
ity Council Reform (Feb. 19, 2009).
382. See Andrew F. Cooper, Squeezed or Revitalized, Middle Powers, the G20, and the Evolution of Global
Governance, 34 Third World Q. 963 (2013).
383. For a discussion of the legitimacy deficit, see Paola Subacchi & Stephen Pickford, Legitimacy vs.
Effectiveness for the G20: A Dynamic Approach to Global Economic Governance (2011); Nat’l Intelligence
Council, Global Governance, supra note 78, at 44.
384. See Robert Wade and Jakob Vestergaard, Overhaul of the G20 for the Sake of the G172, Fin. Times,
Oct. 21, 2010 (noting critiques of the G20 as “a self-appointed and barely legitimate body that has no
authority to assume its current role”), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a2ab4716-dd45-11dj-
9236-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3EEMdtZJcI.
385. For example, while the G20 has established a Climate Finance Study Group, that group merely
reaffirmed the preeminence of the UNFCCC in addressing climate change, so as to avoid “duplication
with UNFCCC processes.” G20 Climate Finance Study Group, Progress Report to G20 Leaders. See also
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sought to prevent its move into political issues. As Indian Prime Minister
Singh stated at the 2012 summit: “I believe that the G20 agenda is getting
overburdened. We need to refocus on a few goals rather than dissipating
energies on too many fronts.”386 Brazilian officials, too, have expressed skep-
ticism over the G20’s expanding role and argued that there is a real need to
enhance its legitimacy by narrowing its focus.387
Brazil and India’s concerns about the G20’s legitimacy deficit are at-
tracting followers even among G20 members. For example, when the
United States has raised political issues, such as sanctions on Iran or the use
of chemical weapons by Syria, on the sidelines of the G20, India and Brazil
have distanced themselves and other states have followed.388 Only the U.K.,
France, and Germany joined Obama in his statement on Iran in 2009 and
none of the BRICs joined his 2013 Syria statement.389 South Africa has
found Brazil and India’s concerns compelling.  In the words of one South
African official, “[i]nstead of looking at what the G-20 will look like in
2025, we should ask what will make it credible and legitimate . . . how do
you ensure that voices outside the G-20 are heard . . . ?”390 While South
Korea and Mexico have been active G20 participants, each hosting a sum-
mit, they too have joined Brazil and India in raising legitimacy concerns due
to the G20’s limited membership391 and have focused their respective pre-
sidencies on outreach to non-members.392
The preference for input based legitimacy articulated by Brazil and India
is also a factor in the establishment of new “south-south” legal relation-
ships. Such “south-south” structures are often perceived by participating
Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, The G20 after Eight Years: How Effective a Vehicle for Developing-Country Influence?
16 (Brookings Inst. Working Paper No. 12, 2007) (noting developed and developing countries’ diver-
gent goals for the G20).
386. Prime Minister Singh, Address to the Plenary Session of the G20 Summit (June 19, 2012),
available at http://www.g20india.gov.in/pdfs/loscabos-link2.pdf.
387. See Stanley Foundation Policy Dialogue Brief, supra note 337; Hurrell, supra note 130, at 62.
388. For example, on Syria, see the statement on the sidelines of the 2013 G20 meeting, which was
joined by eleven G20 members. Press Release, Joint Statement on Syria, The White House (Sept. 6,
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pres-office/2013/09/06/joint-statement-syria. Note,
however, that other G20 members resisted. See Peter Baker and Steven Lee Myers, Obama Falls Short on
Wider Backing for Syria Attack, N.Y. Times (Sept. 6, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
09/07/world/middleeast/obama-syria-strike.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
389. N.Y. Times (Sept. 6, 2013), supra note 388. During the Pittsburgh G20 meeting in 2010,
President Obama sought to issue a side statement on Iran’s nuclear program, which the BRICs refused to
join. See Leaders React to Iran’s Nuclear Facility, Wall St. J. Blog (Sept. 25, 2009, 9:53 AM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/g20/2009/09/25/leaders-react-to-irans-nuclear-facility/.
390. Nat’l Intelligence Council, Global Governance, supra note 78, at 21.
391. Interview with Shyam Saran in Delhi, India (Aug. 24, 2013).
392. See Gerardo Rodrı́guez Regordosa, Presidencia de México del G-20: labores de diálogo y consulta
rumbo a la cumbre de Los Cabos, El Economista (Apr. 11, 2012), http://eleconomista.com.mx/
columnas/columna-invitada-valores/2012/04/10/presidencia-mexico-g-20-labores-dialogo-consulta-
rumbo; Wongi Choe, The Role of Korea in the G20 Process and the Seoul Summit (May 20, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (discussing “outreach to nonmember countries”), available at http://www
.g8.utoronto.ca/g20/biblio/choe-kans.pdf. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has called for consul-
tations that are “as inclusive as possible.” Lee Myung-bak, President of the Republic of Korea, Seoul
G20 Summit: Priorities and Challenges, Address at the Davos Forum (Jan. 28, 2010).
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states as more legitimate than the predominantly “north-north” and
“north-south” orientation of existing structures393 due to leadership, mem-
bership, processes, and, in some cases, ideology.394 Brazil and India have
both been active in convening the now annual BRICS summit and used the
forum to champion what they viewed to be a more legitimate international
architecture.395 At their first summit meeting in 2009, the BRICS articu-
lated the goal of advancing “a more democratic and just multi-polar world
order based on the rule of international law, equality, mutual respect, coop-
eration . . . and collective decision-making of all states.”396 At the 5th  Sum-
mit in 2013, the BRICS (then including South Africa) called for an
“inclusive approach [to the international system based on] shared solidarity
and cooperation towards all nations and peoples” that would be “more equi-
table.”397 Rhetorically, this vision also lies behind the 2013 agreement to
establish a BRICS development bank and a reserve fund, which are framed
as more legitimate than existing institutions.398
As discussed earlier, Brazil has been particularly active in cultivating a
range of “south-south” alternative institutions and legal relationships, in-
cluding IBSA, UNASUR and Mercosur.399 For then-President Lula, the pur-
pose of these “south-south” relations was to move “beyond old conformist
alignments with traditional centers [of power]” by “designing a multipolar
world,” complemented by Brazil’s own “solidarity initiatives with poorer
countries.”400 Not only have these efforts been aimed at building a legal
subsystem with Brazil at the center, but they have also been intended to
advance Brazil’s preferences for legitimacy. When it hosted the first IBSA
meeting in 2006, Brazil touted the unique “shared vision of the three coun-
tries.”401 Similarly, Lula sought to revitalize Mercosur based on what might
393. See Chris Alden & Marco Antonio Vieira, The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil,
India and Trilateralism, 26 Third World Q. 1077, 1088–92 (2005).
394. See Oliver Stuenkel, Institutionalizing South-South Cooperation: Towards a New Paradigm,
(May 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/05/Stuenkel_Institutionalizing-South-South-Cooperation-Towards-a-New-Paradigm.pdf.
395. For example, Russia seeks to maximize engagement with institutions that are “representative in
geographical and civilizational terms,” including “the Group of Twenty, BRICS . . . the Group of Eight,
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the RIC (Russia, India and China)”. See
 2013, supra note 292.
396. Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders (June 16, 2009), available at http://
archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2009/06/217963.shtml.
397. Declaration at Fifth BRICS Summit in Durban, S. Afr., arts. 1–2 (Mar. 27, 2013), available at
http://www.brics5.co.za/about-brics/summit-declaration/fifth-summit/.
398. Andrew England, BRICS Agree to Create Development Bank, Fin. Times (Mar. 27, 2013), http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2bcbd6e0-96e5-11e2-a77c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3I3O61PSa.
399. See Brands, supra note 359, at 23 (“Brazilian officials have worked to formalize South-South
cooperation.”).
400. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil, Address at the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 23,
2008).
401. Tshwane Declaration, supra note 178.
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be described as a “Mercosur identity” (identidade mercosulina) grounded in
norms of legitimacy and equality.402
Brazil has attracted followers in the process. Venezuela has actively
sought to join Mercosur with Brazil’s help403 and numerous Latin American
and Caribbean states welcomed Brazil’s invitation to the first Summit of
Latin American and Caribbean States in 2010.404 Bolivian President Evo
Morales described this new grouping as “the weapon against imperialism”
and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa referenced its legitimacy, sug-
gesting that, compared to other forums, it can be much more effective “to
solve by ourselves our own problems, with our own strengths and our own
visions.”405 Chilean, Cuban, and Venezuelan officials traveled to another hub
sharing this view of legitimacy, India, to discuss closer cooperation between
the BRICS and the new Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
based on a shared vision for a new international architecture.406
This tension over legitimacy has ramifications beyond just institutional
reform. In international environmental law, for example, President Obama
convened the Major Economies Forum (MEF), representing the seventeen
largest economies of the world to “facilitate a candid dialogue among major
developed and developing economies.”407 In so doing, he sought both to
move beyond the climate impasse and beyond a vision of legitimacy based
either on participation or democracy.408 India, Brazil and other rising pow-
ers, despite being MEF participants, have questioned the MEF’s legitimacy
and urged action instead at the 193-member UNFCCC.409  In the trade con-
text, rising powers have questioned the use of informal negotiations of
402. Tiago Luiz Koeche, Discurso do Presidente Lula na X Cúpula Social do Mercosul Foz do Iguaço, You-
Tube (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Y_l-ageDsM; see also Maria Angélica
Oliveira, Em despedida do Mercosul, Lula defende identidade regional, GGN (Dec. 17, 2010), http://jornalggn
.com.br/blog/luisnassif/a-despedida-de-lula-no-mercosul.
403. Simon Romero, With Brazil as Advocate, Venezuela Joins Trade Bloc, N.Y. Times (July 31, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/world/americas/mercosur-trade-bloc-admits-venezuela-as-full-mem
ber.html.
404. Camarena, supra note 180. See also Xinhua News (Dec. 4, 2011), supra note 180.
405. South America to Create New EU-Type Bloc to Defy US, Deutsche Welle (Feb. 26, 2010), http://
dw.de/p/MD7j; Correa confı́a en la recién creada Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, TeleSUR
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://exwebserv.telesurtv.net/secciones/noticias/67340-NN/correa-confia-en-la-recien-
creada-comunidad-de-estados-latinoamericanos-y-caribenos/#%A0.
406. See Sandeep Dikshit, Latin American Bloc for Working Closely with BRICS, The Hindu (May 28,
2013), http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/latin-american-bloc-for-working-closely-with-brics/
article4757194.ece.
407. Major Economies Forum Fact Sheet, Major Economies Forum (Apr. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/images/stories/documents/
the%20major%20economies%20forum%20april%202010.pdf.
408. Timmons Roberts, Beyond the Climate Impasse: How the Major Economies Forum Can Lead the Way,
Brookings UpFront (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/04/08-cli-
mate-economies-robertst.
409. See Daniel Bodansky & Lavanya Rajamani, The Evolution and Governance Architecture of the Climate
Change Regime (Oct. 28, 2012) (unpublished manuscript); Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, Policy
Brief: Institutions for International Climate Governance, Belfer Center (2010) (stressing the UNFCCC’s
“international legitimacy, particularly among developing countries”).
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smaller groups of states in the WTO “Green Room,” arguing for more open
and transparent negotiations that reflect the broad membership of the
organization.410
In human rights, legitimacy tensions underscore debates over the univer-
sality of human rights norms and the appropriateness of foreign institutions
judging domestic human rights practices.411 Ultimately, to borrow the
words of one Indian critic: “If new powers . . . are to be accommodated
effectively in international institutions, considerably more attention will
have to be devoted to how their notions of fairness and legitimacy differ”
from those currently embedded in the rules of international law and
institutions.412
The distinct preference for legitimacy based on inclusivity advanced by
hubs such as Brazil and India tracks the traditional sovereign equality of
states that has long been fundamental to the international legal system.413
These preferences for legitimacy, like those for more absolutist versions of
sovereignty, reassert the role and centrality of the state in international law.
This version of participatory legitimacy and sovereign equality is, however,
in tension with the structural pressures identified in Part III that are driving
legal processes toward separate subsystems based on variable geometry. Such
subsystems, by their nature, are not inclusive. It may be that, overtime,
rising powers’ preferences for legitimacy will manifest themselves differently
at the global and subsystem levels. Globally, these hubs may demand more
inclusive, participatory processes, which, in turn, make global level legal
processes more difficult. At the subsystem level, in contrast, they may focus
their legitimacy demands instead on alternative ideological preferences
shared with potential followers.
C. Economic Development: Neo-Liberal or Neo-Statist
A third emerging tension point where the preferences of some rising pow-
ers conflict with those embedded in the present international legal system is
the role of the state in economic development. To a large degree, modern
international economic law reflects the norms of the so-called Washington
Consensus: liberalization of trade and foreign direct investment, fiscal disci-
410. See Sonia Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support, 48 Harv.
Int’l L.J. 483, 525 (2007) (noting criticism of the unrepresentative “Green Room”). For formal criti-
cisms of the Green Room process, see General Council, Minutes of the Meeting held in the Centre William
Rappard on 17 and 19 July 2000, WT/GC/M/57, at para. 159 (Sept. 14, 2000). For discussion of Brazil’s
and India’s positions, see Andrew Hurrell & Amrita Narlikar, A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and
India in Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 20 Global Society 415 (2006). Those efforts have in part suc-
ceeded with the transformation of the Green Room into a somewhat more representative “Chairman’s
Consultative Group.”
411. For legitimacy criticism of the universality of human rights, see Jack Donnelly, The Relative
Universality of Human Rights, 29 Hum. Rts. Q. 281 (2007).
412. Narlikar, supra note 367, at 125.
413. See Vattel, supra note 10, at § 18 (on the “equality of nations”).
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pline, privatization, and deregulation.414 Over time, the contour of that con-
sensus has shifted415 and both the trade and investment law regimes have
adapted along with it.416 These fields of international law nonetheless gener-
ally seek to limit the role of the state and state interventions in the market.
Some rising powers have begun to challenge more directly aspects of the
Washington Consensus embedded in the trade and investment regimes as
they advance their own development strategies.417 Specifically, they view the
state as a more central actor in economic development and prioritize poverty
reduction through inclusive growth, even where market intervention is re-
quired. Some observers have termed this approach a neo-statist418 develop-
ment strategy, distinct from both the Washington Consensus and historical
statism.419 Brazil, India, and China have become hubs for these new prefer-
ences, advancing them in international legal regimes and attracting follow-
ers. Specifically, some of these hubs have begun shifting the substantive
norms of international investment law in a more protectionist direction and
creating alternative trade norms that are both more interventionist and pri-
oritize inclusive development.
1. Brazil, India, and China’s New State Activism
While Brazil, India, and China have all embarked on different paths of
economic reform and development, their strategies emphasize inclusive
growth and new state activism. Brazil has designed a development policy in
which “the government plays an active role mobilizing resources, stimulat-
ing investment, and promoting innovation, but does not command or con-
trol the economy.”420 There are structural and domestic political
explanations for this approach—poverty remains a serious problem in a large
414. See John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in Latin American Adjust-
ment:  How Much has Happened? (John Williamson ed., 1990).
415. See Moises Naim, Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?, 118 Foreign Pol’y 87, 103
(2000) (tracing changes to the consensus); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Is There a Post-Washington Consensus Consen-
sus?, in The Washington Consensus reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance 41
(Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008).
416. See Sonia E. Rolland, Development at the WTO 12 (2012) (on trade); Jeswald Salacuse,
The Treatification of International Investment Law, 13 Am. Law & Bus. Rev. 155 (2007) (on investment).
417. See Rolland, supra note 218, at 165 (noting that the BRICs “have come to view themselves as an
alternative voice to the traditional Washington consensus”).
418. See David M. Trubek, Developmental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New Political Economy of
Development and Law (University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1075, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1349163.
419. See generally The State After Statism: New State Activities in the Age of Liberaliza-
tion (Jonah D. Levy ed., 2006); David M. Trubek, Diogo R. Coutinho & Mario G. Schapiro, Toward a
New Law and Development: New State Activism in Brazil and the Challenge for Legal Institutions, in World
Bank Legal Review 281 (Hassane Cisse, Daniel Bradlow, & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2011).
420. See Trubek et al., supra note 419, at 281–82; see also Glauco Arbix & Scott Martin, Beyond
Developmentalism and Market Fundamentalism in Brazil: Inclusionary State Activism Without Statism (Work-
shop on “States, Development, and Global Governance,” unpublished working paper, 2010), available at
http://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_360/mq4fw/paper_arbix.pdf.
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democratic polity.421 Under President Lula, Brazil’s state activism led to
industrial policies, subsidies, and tax incentives to advance Brazil’s “com-
petitive edge.”422 In 2011, President Rousseff, launched the Brazil Maior
program, intended further to increase competitiveness in select sectors,
through tax relief, special financing, legal reform, and public-private coordi-
nation.423 Concurrent with this expanded state activism, Brazil has built
social programs aimed at poverty alleviation and wealth redistribution, such
as Lula’s Bolsa Familia “conditional cash transfer program” and Rousseff’s
Brasil Sem Miseria poverty-alleviation program.424 It may be premature to
term these efforts a truly new development model, but over the past decade
“a new form of industrial policy stressing state assistance for innovation and
competitiveness . . . has been combined with a robust social policy” aimed
at poverty alleviation.425
The Indian economy has undergone significant reforms since 1991, but
growth and wealth distribution remain central goals.426 India’s response to
domestic poverty challenges has been informed by Amartya Sen’s concept of
“Development as Freedom,” leading to an emphasis on human development
and poverty alleviation.427 The central tenet of India’s 11th Five Year Plan is
“broad-based and inclusive growth . . . focus[ing] on poverty reduction.”428
Given India’s “domestic politics [and] . . . the scale and nature of its pov-
erty,”429 the state is seen as “the only social instrument potentially capable
of . . . implementing” its development plan.430 The state is “central to de-
velopment.”431 The Indian government has been extremely active interven-
ing in the domestic market to alleviate poverty and provide food security.432
421. Brazil’s per capita GNI is only $11,690 and as of 2012, more than 9% of the population still
lived below the poverty line. Country Data, Brazil, World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/
brazil (last visited Sep. 27, 2013).
422. On Lula’s first industrial policy, PITCE, see Trubek et al., supra note 419, at 291.
423. Id. at 292–93; see also Lecio Morais & Alfredo Saad-Filho, Neo-Developmentalism and the Challenges
of Economic Policy-Making Under Dilma Rousseff, 38 Crit. Sociology 1 (2012).
424. See Brazil: Happy Families, Economist, Feb. 7, 2008, available at http://www.economist.com/
node/10650663; Brazil launches scheme to lift millions out of poverty, BBC.com, June 2, 2011, available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-13626951.
425. Trubek et al., supra note 419, at 313.
426. See Montek Ahluwalia, Economic Reforms in India Since 1991: Has Gradualism Worked?, 16 J.
Econ. Perspectives 67 (2002).
427. See generally Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (2010).
428. Gov’t of India, Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-2012) 44 (2006), available at http://plan-
ningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/11th/11_v1/11th_vol1.pdf.
429. Narlikar, supra note 370, at 107. India’s per capita GNI is only $1,570; 21.9% of the population
lives below the poverty line. Country Data, India, World Bank (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
430. Barbara Harriss-White & S. Janakarajan, Rural India Facing the 21st Century 451
(2004).
431. Id.
432. Recent examples include the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Act that “guaran-
tee[s] [one] hundred days of wage-employment in a financial year to a rural household” and food security
legislation that provides subsidized food to 2/3 of the country’s population. See Mahatma Gandhi
NREGA, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, available at http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/
home.aspx; Government Notifies Food Security Law, Times of India (Sept. 15, 2013). Both programs in-
volve subsidies that will “widen India’s high fiscal deficit” and are therefore out of alignment with the
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It has embraced the idea that the effective use of state power, including
market interventions, subsidies, and industrialization policies, can signifi-
cantly advance development objectives.433 In Sen’s words, India seeks to
“harness the constructive role of the state for growth and development.”434
While “the Chinese economy has moved unmistakably toward the market
doctrines of neoclassical economics,” its approach also exhibits some of the
dual features of state activism and poverty alleviation.435 Ultimately, China’s
development policy—particularly as manifested in foreign policy—is com-
plex and, at times, inconsistent, driven by multiple domestic power centers
with contradictory agendas.436 To say that China follows a so-called “Beijing
Consensus,” based on innovation-led productivity, sustainable, balanced
growth, and a direct challenge to the Washington Consensus development
model, is inaccurate.437 Yet, “China’s government has routinely intervened
in the economy, using both macro and micro economic tools.”438 From state
banks to state-owned enterprises,439 from energy subsidies440 to state-led re-
source security efforts in Africa,441 the Chinese state pursues national eco-
nomic development. Notwithstanding significant increases in per capita
GDP over the past decades, poverty remains a significant concern in
China.442 Particularly to the degree that the Chinese government depends on
“legitimat[ion] by their socioeconomic performance,” ensuring inclusive
growth and poverty reduction will remain a priority.443 Both of these themes
Washington Consensus. See Rama Lakshmi, India Launches Ambitious Food Subsidy Program, Wash. Post
(Jul. 3, 2013).
433. See Atul Kohli, State-directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization
in the Global Periphery 2, 286–87 (2004); Jørgen Dige Pedersen, Globalization, Develop-
ment and the State: The Performance of India and Brazil Since 1990 26 (2008).
434. Jean Dreze & Amartya Sen, An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions 39
(2013) (emphasis omitted).
435. Yang Yao, The End of The Beijing Consensus: Can China’s Model of Authoritarian Growth Survive?,
Foreign Aff., Feb. 2, 2010, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65947/the-end-of-the-
beijing-consensus.
436. See Shambaugh, supra note 74, at 128 (describing developing world’s “mixed view” of China’s
international development policy).
437. See Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: Legitimizing Authoritarianism in Our
Time (2012); Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of
Chinese Power (2004); Scott Kennedy, The Myth of the Beijing Consensus, 19 J. Contemp. China 461,
470 (2010).
438. Kennedy, supra note 437, at 471.
439. See generally Claustre Bajona & Tianshu Chu, Reforming State Owned Enterprises in China: Effects of
WTO Accession, 13 Rev. Econ. Dynamics 800 (2010); Deepak Lal, China’s Statist Turn II: The ‘Develop-
ment’ Bank, CATO Institute (2013), www.cato.org/publications/commentary/chinas-statist-turn-ii-devel
opment-bank.
440. See generally Boqiang Lin & Zhujun Jiang, Estimates of Energy Subsidies in China and Impact of
Energy Subsidy Reform, 33 Energy Econ. 273 (2011).
441. See generally China returns to Africa, supra note 128.
442. Approximately one hundred million Chinese live on less than $1 a day. See S.C., World-class
Poverty, The Economist (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/02/chinas-
poor.
443. See Stephen White, Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy, 38 World Pol. 462, 463
(1986). For discussion related to China, see Yu Ling & Dingding Chen, Why China Will Democratize, 35
Wash. Q. 41, 42–44 (2012).
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are evident in China’s 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015), which calls for
elevating “the core competitiveness of manufacturing industry [and] im-
proving the new and strategic industries . . . .”444 The plan nonetheless
recognizes that “ ‘fundamental’ end of economic transformation is to im-
prove people’s lives . . . [by] stepping up reform of the income distribution
system.”445
Brazil, India, and China’s preferences for state activism in economic de-
velopment are likely to evolve based on domestic constraints and shifting
roles in the global economy. Despite some similarities in terms of increased
state activism and inclusive growth, the three states’ approaches do not al-
ways align.446 Yet, they are collectively embracing “the primacy of the mar-
ket” while recognizing “a major role for the state,” in “maintaining some
controls on capital flows” and promoting “export industries”447 through
“close government-business cooperation”448 that leads to “growth with eq-
uity.”449 They do not seek to overturn the international economic order it-
self, but they do have common interests in adapting it to their preferences
for state-led economic development.
2. Economic Development as Tension Point: The Role of the State in
Investment and Trade Law
The preferences of Brazil, India, and China for a greater role for the state
in economic development manifest themselves in international investment
law. International investment law is, at its core, a mechanism to provide
enforceable protections to investors that, in turn, limit the ability of states
to discriminate against or otherwise harm foreign investment. Investment
law thereby restricts the possibilities for state intervention in the domestic
economy.450 Since the first BIT was signed between Germany and Pakistan
in 1959, BITs have swept the globe, with more than 3,000 in force today.451
444. National People’s Congress, 12th Five Year Plan (2011), EU translation, available at http://
ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/international/pdf/china_draft_12th_5yearplan17032011.pdf.
445. Id.
446. See Nouriel Roubini, The BRICs: An Analysis, Forbes (Jun. 18, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/
2009/06/17/bric-russia-india-china-renminbi-yekaterinberg-opinions-columnists-roubini.html (“[T]here
are significant differences between the BRICs . . .”).
447. David Trubek, Reversal of Fortune? International Economic Governance, Alternative Develop-
ment Strategies, and the Rise of the BRICs 7 (June 2012) (unpublished paper presented at the European
University Institute), available at htps://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_638/3fwq9/eui_paper_final_june_2012
.pdf.
448. See Charles Gore, The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Coun-
tries, 28 World Development 789, 797 (2000), cited in Trubek, supra note 447, at 7.
449. See James Cyher, Brazil’s Development Strategy: Maintaining the Industrial Base, Side Stepping the
Staples Trap 3 n.4 (2012) (unpublished paper presented at Congress of the Latin American Studies
Association).
450. See generally Kenneth Vandevelde, The Political Economy of A Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 Am. J.
Int’l L. 621, 627-28 (1998) (noting that “BITS present themselves as quintessentially liberal documents
. . . liberalism thus favors limited state intervention”).
451. See Sam Halabi, Efficient Contracting Between Foreign Investors and Host States: Evidence from Stabili-
zation Clauses, 31 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 261, 272 (2011).
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Brazil, India, and China have all, in quite different ways, resisted this devel-
opment, articulating preferences for a version of international investment
law that leaves more room for state action.452
Brazil has long been skeptical of the strong investor protections found in
BITs. While it concluded 14 BITs in the 1990s, none were ratified due to
domestic political concerns that the treaties would limit the ability of the
state to control foreign capital flows.453 Amendments proposed by leftist
parties would have expanded state control over both access to arbitration and
capital flows, but even these amendments failed to secure needed political
support.454 Brazil’s failure to ratify any BITs flowed from a view that “na-
tional regulation was about disciplining foreign investment, and BITs were
about restricting the state’s scope to effectively regulate capitals sic.” 455 As
claims have mounted against states that had ratified BITs and investor-state
arbitral tribunals have offered more expansive interpretations of the treaties’
substantive protections,456 other states have started to follow Brazil’s lead,
renouncing their BITs and exiting from the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), where BIT claims are usually
adjudicated. Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador have each exited or indicated
plans to withdraw from ICSID and renounced some BITs.457 Here Brazil’s
role as a hub is atypical, in that it has not sought to construct legal regimes
that reflect its preferences. Rather its hub status flows from its demonstra-
tion to developing countries that successful development and FDI inflows do
not depend on offering BIT protections to investors.458
Unlike Brazil, China has been a very active participant in the investment
law system, and emerged as an early hub, articulating preferences for treaties
that provided more limited protection for investors and preserving more
state freedom of action than did the agreements promoted by the United
States and most European states. China’s early BITs (negotiated in the 1980s
and 90s) limited national treatment protections so as to facilitate favoritism
452. This resistance is demonstrated in part through non-membership in the ICSID Convention.
While China is a party to ICSID, neither India nor Brazil is: Russia has signed, but not ratified. See List
of Contracting States and Other Signatories to the Convention, Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv.
Disputes (May 20, 2013).
453. See Leany Lemos & Daniela Campello, The Non Ratification of Bilateral Investment Treaties in Brazil:
A Story of Conflict in a Land of Cooperation, 18–19 (UnB, Brazilian Federal Senate, Princeton University
Working Paper, 2013).
454. See id. at 20.
455. Id.
456. See William Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the Legiti-
macy of the ICSID System, 3 Asian J. WTO & Int’l Health L. & Pol’y 199, 200 (2008).
457. See, e.g., Bolivia Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, Int’l Ctr. for Settle-
ment of Inv. Disputes (May 16, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/.html; Ecuador
Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes
(July 9, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/Announcement20.html.
458. See Andrew Guzman, Why LCDs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 639, 643 (1997).
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for state-owned enterprises.459 While second generation BITs (negotiated af-
ter 1998) liberalized investment flows somewhat, they still included clauses
that subjected the national treatment obligation to domestic law and had
extensive non-conforming-measures carve-outs.460 China entered into such
treaties with more than 100 states, becoming a powerful hub for a more
restrictive version of investment law.461 Over the past fifteen years, many
countries with similar state-centric approaches to development have found
this second generation Chinese model attractive. Russia, for example, has
followed. Its 1992 and 2001 model treaties include exemptions from na-
tional treatment, such that the Russian government could likewise provide
subsidies or other benefits to domestic industries and screen foreign capital
flows.462 Moreover, many Russian BITs limit the scope of arbitration to the
“amount or mode of payment of compensation for expropriation,” thereby
restricting international review of domestic regulation.463
The story of hub leadership in investment law is, however, more complex
because, while a number of states have followed the model advanced by
China between 1998 and 2010, China’s own preferences have shifted as it
has become a major capital exporter. China’s most recent BITs are far more
investor-friendly, narrowing the space for government intervention.464 The
current U.S.-China BIT negotiation highlights both China’s changing pref-
erences and the remaining tension over the role of the state in economic
development. China initially resisted U.S. demands for pre-investment pro-
tections, which would preclude governmental screening of FDI flows, and
sought to have all existing non-conforming measures exempted from BIT
protection.465 In July 2013, China appeared to take a significant step in the
direction of liberalization, agreeing with the United States to discuss pre-
459. Axel Berger, China’s New Bilateral Investment Treaty Program: Substance, Rationale and Implications
for International Investment Law Making, 8 (2008) (paper presented at the ASIL International Economic
Law Interest Group).
460. See, e.g., Agreement concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments with
Exchanges of Notes, China-U.K., art. 3.3, May 15, 1986; Agreement Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, China-Japan, art. 3.1, Aug. 1988.
461. China has negotiated at least 131 BITs, of which 102 are in force. See Axel Berger, Investment
Rules in Chinese Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements: Is China following the global trend toward compre-
hensive agreements?, 6 (July 2013) (German Development Institute Discussion Paper).
462. See Noah Rubins & Evgenia Rubinina, Russia: Overview of Investment Treaty Program, Global Arb.
Rev., Sept. 10, 2014, available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/know-how/topics/66/jurisdictions/
26/russia/#ftr_1. At least 15 of Russia’s BITs contain such an exception.
463. See id. See also, e.g., 
 [U.S.S.R. – Austria Bilateral Inv. Treaty], art.
VII, 2 Aug. 1990, , [Bulletin of International Trea-
ties],
 [“Disputes . . . regard-
ing amount or mode of payment of compensation, according to Section 4 of this Agreement [dealing
with expropriation] . . . will be resolved through . . . arbitration”], available at http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/
laws/show/040_014.
464. See Berger, supra note 459.
465. For a discussion of pre-investment screening, see Berger, supra note 459, at 8.
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investment protection and negotiate exceptions on an issue-by-issue basis in
an appendix.466
At the very moment China’s own approaches have shifted in the direction
of the U.S. approach to investment law, other states are emerging as hubs for
a more restrictive approach. As states such as India have seen the interpreta-
tion of investment protections and the costs BITs impose on states increase,
they have begun to revise their model BITs to preserve more freedom for
state action and intervention.467 While India’s early BITs were strongly pro-
investor, it has now paused its BIT program to develop a new model treaty
that, according to the Indian Commerce Minister, will “eliminate the pros-
pects of disputes between the investors and the government in the future”
by allowing Indian courts to have “the last word on commercial disputes”
and ensuring that “sovereign guarantees” are not infringed.468 Similarly, the
Southern African Development Community, an intergovernmental organiza-
tion including most countries in southern Africa, has recently produced per-
haps the most state-friendly model BIT to date, including explicit rights for
states to regulate in pursuit of development objectives.469 A recent genera-
tion of so-called “south-south” BITs between developing states is also mov-
ing in this direction, including far more limited national treatment
provisions and imposing “restrictions to foreign investors’ repatriation of
funds.”470 Whether India, Russia, or some other state emerges as a new hub
expressly advancing this alternative set of preferences in international invest-
ment law remains to be seen. But even as China—the original hub for this
approach—changes its preferences, pluralism continues to increase and a
range of states have the potential for issue-specific leadership.
This tension over the role of the state in economic development is also
evident in aspects of international trade law, where Brazil and India are
emerging as hubs for a more state-centric preference set. In international
intellectual property law, India has asserted the right of the state to inter-
vene by breaking patent protections on pharmaceuticals through a far-reach-
ing interpretation of compulsory licensing under the Agreement on Trade
466. See Betsy Bourassa, US and China Breakthrough Announcement on the Bilateral Investment Treaty
Negotiations, Treasury Notes, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, July 15, 2013, http://www.treasury.gov/con-
nect/blog/Pages/U.S.-and-China-Breakthrough-Announcement-.aspx.
467. These trends are part of a broader rebalancing of international investment law. See Roberts, supra
note 453, at 179. The United States, for example, has sought to limit expansive interpretations of fair
and equitable treatment and to provide labor protections. See U.S. Dept. of State, 2012 U.S. Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
188371.pdf.  For criticism, see Stephen Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty:
an Exercise in the Regressive Development of International Law, 2 Transnat’l Disp. Mgmt. 4 (2006).
468. Anand Sharma, India Puts Conditions for Bilateral Investment Treaty with the US, Econ. Times, July
23, 2013, http://www.articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-07-23/news40749425_1_invest
ment-treaty-protection-agreement-bilateral-investment-promotion.
469. See S. Afr. Dev. Cmty., SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary
art. 20–22, July 2012, available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-
BIT-Template-Final.pdf.
470. See Poulsen, supra note 167, at 130 (based on an empirical analysis of “south-south” BITs).
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Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).471 TRIPS was
intended to harmonize IP protections, whereby developing states would
“adopt IP regimes comparable to those of developed countries.”472 Instead,
India has challenged and adapted the regime to better reflect its preference
for state activism in pursuit of inclusive growth. India was a central force
behind the 2001 Doha Declaration, which affirmed that TRIPS “can and
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
members’ right to protect public health, and, in particular, to promote ac-
cess to medicines for all.”473 After joining TRIPS and establishing pharma-
ceutical patent protections in 2005, India has imposed subject matter
limitations on patents and enacted procedural hurdles for grants of pharma-
ceutical patents. While arguably consistent with TRIPS, these measures re-
duce patent protection in favor of state development goals.474 Similarly,
Indian regulators and domestic courts have granted compulsory licenses for
key cancer drugs to advance domestic public health objectives even in the
face of significant pressure from foreign drug manufacturers and govern-
ments.475 In the 2013 landmark Novartis case, the Indian Supreme Court
interpreted India’s TRIPS implementing legislation narrowly, ensuring the
availability of compulsory licenses and strictly limiting the ability of foreign
manufacturers to extend patent duration.476
As a hub on these issues, India has attracted followers, Brazil foremost
among them. Brazil has enacted similar domestic legislation to increase
TRIPS flexibilities for pharmaceuticals, thereby allowing state intervention
that spreads the benefit of development in healthcare beyond the minority
who could afford patent-protected drugs.477 South Africa has joined this
move, expressing the intent to “amend its patent legislation to allow it to
use the parallel importation and compulsory licensing rights.”478 India’s ef-
471. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 Int’l Legal
Materials 81 (1994).
472. Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in In-
dia’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 1571, 1572 (2009).
473. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/1,
41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
474. For discussion, see Kapczynski, supra note 472, at 1589–1613.
475. In the first 2011 case, the Indian patent controller conferred a Compulsory License on Natco
Pharmaceutical to manufacture a generic version of a patented cancer drug and, thereafter, issued similar
licenses for a variety of other drugs. Natco Pharma Limited v. Bayer Corporation (2012) 1 C.L.A. (India)
(Compulsory License No. 1 of 2011).
476. Novartis AG v. Union of India & Others (2013) Civil Appeal Nos. 2706-2716 of 2013  (Arising
out of SLP(C)) Nos. 20539-20549 of 2009.
477. See Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, Developmental responses to the international trade legal game: cases
of intellectual property and export credit law reforms in Brazil, in Law and the New Developmental
State 278–79 (Trubek et al., eds. 2013) (discussing Brazil’s  TRIPS flexibilities); Sarath K. Ganji,
TRIPS Implementation and Strategic Health Policy in India and Brazil, 3 U. Denver J. Adv. Int’l Stud.
29, 38 (2009).
478. Lynne Taylor, S. Africa Pledges Action on Compulsory Licenses, Parallel Imports, PharmaTimes Digi-
tal (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.pharmatimes.com/Article/13-1107/S_Africa_pledges_action_on_com
pulsory_licenses_parallel_imports.aspx.
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forts to reshape aspects of intellectual property law have led some observers
to suggest that “Patent Law 2.0” may be emerging as an alternative to the
standard interpretation of TRIPS.479
India and Brazil are also serving as hubs for alternative views of other
trade issues where their visions of state-centric and inclusive development
are at stake. India, for example, led recent efforts to negotiate a treaty within
the context of the World Intellectual Property Organization that limits cop-
yright protections to facilitate access to materials for the visually im-
paired.480 India proved the pivotal force behind the treaty, building the
coalition of followers necessary for its conclusion.481 In the wake of this dip-
lomatic success and in response to concerns that India’s new food security
law482 will violate Aggregate Measures of Support commitments under the
WTO Agriculture Agreement,483 India has been engaged in active diplo-
macy to find an ex ante legal solution in the run up to the December 2013
WTO Ministerial meeting.484 Brazil has followed suit, albeit on different
issues. After its efforts to subsidize aircraft manufacturer Embraer were cur-
tailed in a WTO dispute brought by Canada,485 Brazil strategically shifted
the issue of aircraft financing out of the WTO and into a diplomatic negoti-
ation at the OECD, where it had better “bargaining leverage” and could
help develop an alternative legal regime more favorable to state support for
key domestic industries.486
In both investment and trade, India, Brazil, and China have, in different
ways, emerged as hubs for preferences that reassert the role of the state in
economic development and that are in tension with the economic liberalism
inherent in the Washington Consensus. These hubs’ preferences may change
479. See Amy Kapczynski, Engineered in India — Patent Law 2.0, 389 New Eng. J. Med. 497  (Aug.
8, 2013), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1304400.
480. See Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Public Works For Persons Who are Blind, Visually
Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, World Intellectual Property Organization, June 27, 2013; see also
Pankaj Mishra, WIPO Reaches Agreement on Treaty for the Blind, LiveMint (June 26, 2013), http://www
.livemint.com/Politics/zirXp3IC1rTtAFOd2O4fYL/WIPO-reaches-agreement-on-treaty-for-blind.html
(describing the “crucial role” played by India’s negotiators).
481. See, e.g., Government of India, India’s Closing Statement at Marrakesh on the Treaty for the
Blind (June 28, 2013), available at http://cis-india.org.a2k/blogs/india-closing-statement-marrakesh-
treaty-for-the-blind. Enhanced access part is consistent with India’s vision of inclusive development.
482. See supra text accompanying notes 425–426.
483. These commitments limit subsidized agricultural sales in the domestic market. See Agreement
on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410, art. 1.
484. This might include an extension of the so-called “peace clause” that had prohibited challenges
to developing state agricultural policies through 2004. Id., at art. 13 (precluding certain challenges to
developing country’s agricultural policies); see Sujay Mehdudia, WTO Chief Raises Concerns Over India Food
Security Law, The Hindu (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/wto-chief-raises-con
cerns-over-india-food-security-law/article5210505.ece.
485. See Panel Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14,
1999); Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug.
2, 1999) and a series of related complaints.
486. See Trubek, supra note 447, at 9. For a discussion of the ultimate agreement on aircraft financing
reached under the auspices of the OECD, see Angel Gurrı́a, OECD Secretary-General, Remarks at
OECD Aircraft Sector Understanding: Signing Ceremony (Feb. 25, 2011).
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over time, but even if they do, pluralism in international economic law is
increasing. As with sovereignty and legitimacy, it is too early to predict the
future development of trade and investment law. It seems likely, however,
that some subsystem-level legal regimes will come to reflect these more
state-centric views, perhaps through alternative provisions in regional trade
or investment agreements, and that global-level economic rules, where they
emerge or adapt, will “bring the state back in” to international economic
law.487
V. Conclusion
Writing in 1940, Morgenthau predicted that a “fundamental change in
the social forces underlying a system of international law”—such as the
power redistribution of the past decade—would result in “a competitive
contest for power.” He anticipated that “change [in] the existing legal order
will be decided, not through a legal procedure provided for by this same
legal order, but through a conflagration of conflicting social forces which
challenge the legal order as a whole.”488 His prediction has not come to pass.
Instead, over the past decade, the international legal system has accommo-
dated an extraordinary redistribution of power. It has changed in the pro-
cess, but has remained robust and durable. The preferences of states, as well
as the distribution of power amongst them, matter to the processes and
substance of international law. New powers have embraced the system as a
whole because it furthers their interests. They are using their newfound
power to adapt it from within.
Three implications of this redistribution of power have already become
clear. First, international law has transitioned from a unipolar structure to a
multi-hub structure. In this new order, leadership has diversified such that
far more states are capable of acting as hubs and driving international legal
processes. This multi-hub structure is comprised of numerous, flexible sub-
systems that operate in a kind of variable, issue-specific geometry. It is a
structure in which non-hubs often have multiple choices as to which hubs to
follow on any given issue. And it is a structure in which legal processes are
migrating into these subsystems, often at the expense of global-level
alternatives.
Second, this multi-hub structure is promoting pluralism within interna-
tional law. Whereas, during the transatlantic moment, the United States
and Europe were largely able to limit international legal discourse and rule
development in accordance with their preferences, the multi-hub structure
fosters the articulation of alternative preferences. Pluralism has already be-
come evident at three tension points: sovereignty, legitimacy, and economic
487. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State
Back In 1 (1985).
488. See Morgenthau, supra note 12, at 273–274.
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development. Additional points of pluralism are likely to emerge in the
years ahead. Even if these preferences themselves are not new, the new power
of the states that articulate them is altering the substantive development of
international legal rules. The distinct preferences advanced by hubs will
challenge the preferences the United States and Europe have successfully
embedded in many international legal regimes over the past half century.
Overtime, these regimes will adapt to accommodate new preferences, both
within separate subsystems and globally.
Third, while this new pluralism will have distinct implications in specific
areas of the law, a common element emerges from the alternative preferences
for sovereignty, legitimacy, and economic development now being articu-
lated. At each of these tension points rising powers are advancing a far more
state-centric vision of international law. It is a vision of international law
that reaffirms state sovereignty, bases the legitimacy of international legal
processes and institutions on long-standing principles of sovereign equality,
and puts the state back into the center of economic development. This reas-
sertion of the centrality of the state conflicts with the individualization of
international law, a hallmark of the period of U.S. leadership. For legal rules
and regimes that seek to advance this individualization or draw their effec-
tiveness from it—human rights law, the law of investment protection, and
the law of humanitarian intervention, for example—the return of the state
will likely have pronounced negative consequences. Over time these regimes
may be ratcheted back as international law returns closer to its Westphalian
origins as a system of sovereigns, among sovereigns.
It is, however, premature to draw final conclusions. The multi-hub
model, as developed here, depends on two assumptions that, while presently
valid, could shift. First, the model has assumed that the preferences of rising
powers are not consistently aligned489 in a way that would create a stable
coalition to replace U.S. hegemony.490 Second, the model has assumed that
hub leadership and subsystems remain flexible, changing on different issues,
and providing non-hubs with choices as followers of different hubs and sub-
systems. If either of these assumptions proves wrong, the resulting interna-
tional legal system would look quite different and far less appealing from
the U.S. perspective.
Imagine two different versions of the international legal system that
might develop if these assumptions are relaxed. First, should the preferences
of rising powers coalesce such that a collective of new powers replaces the
United States as hegemon, the system itself might look more like a bipolar
one with the United States and Europe on one side, and rising powers on the
489. See generally Brutsch & Papa, Deconstructing the BRICS: Bargaining Coalition, Imagined Community,
or Geopolitical Fad?, 6 Chinese J. Int’l Pol. 299 (2013).
490. Political scientists describe the cooperating states as a K-Group. See Thomas Schelling, The
Strategy of Conflict (1960); Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39 Int’l Org.
579, 621 (1985).
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other. The system might well break down into two larger, relatively rigid
subsystems engaged in a protracted struggle. The preferences of the United
States and Europe might prevail on one side of this competition, while a
largely separate international legal system that reflects the preferences of
rising powers would develop on the other.
Or, should the assumption that hub leadership remains flexible prove in-
correct, a second scenario arises. If several hubs developed such a predomi-
nance of power in their respective regions that non-hubs had no choice but
to follow, leadership would lock in and subsystems would become rigid.
Variable geometry would give way to comprehensive spheres of influence.
The behavior of some new hubs, notably Russia, suggests a desire to move in
this direction. The resulting international legal system would be one of
fixed, fragmented regions. International legal process would devolve into
these subsystems of increasing rigidity, in which the substance of interna-
tional law would develop separately. Substantive norms would divide and
fragment as hubs impose their particular preferences on non-hubs in their
subsystems. In the rare cases where global legal processes would still occur,
outcomes would be determined by great power rivalry. Pluralism would be
transformed into fragmentation and indeterminacy.
The few international lawyers who have considered the implications of the
redistribution of global power have largely agreed that it bodes poorly for
the future of international law as an institution and, particularly, for the
United States.491 Perhaps they have envisioned one of these two negative
scenarios. The good news, however, is that neither of these scenarios seem
likely today. Power and leadership remain diffuse. Preferences are differenti-
ated. Subsystems remain flexible. Pluralism is enriching the normative con-
tent of international law. The multi-hub system appears to be successfully
accommodating both power shifts and substantive change.
Perhaps most surprisingly, the multi-hub structure actually serves United
States interests very well. Admittedly, in this new structure the United
States will not be able to prevail on every issue or in every legal process.
Even during the period of U.S. hegemony, however, it could not do so. Yet,
the United States stands to benefit in the multi-hub system for three rea-
sons. First, the United States has long sought flexibility in international law
so that it could use the system to advance whatever preference or strategic
interest it might have at a given time. As a hegemon, the United States
enjoyed the flexibility that comes with shaping and running the system.492
The greater pluralism of the multi-hub structure allows the United States to
continue to enjoy this flexibility even as its hegemony declines. The United
States can pick and choose among different preferences being articulated by
other hubs or articulate its own preferences when necessary. Pluralism may
491. See, e.g., Posner & Yoo, supra note 8.
492. On these benefits of hegemony, see Krisch, supra note 7.
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mean that international law provides less constraint or certainty, but that is
exactly what the United States has long sought.
Second, in a system in which legal processes migrate downward into flexi-
ble subsystems, the United States can advance its interests through interna-
tional legal processes contained within such subsystems. During the period
of U.S. hegemony, the United States often undertook the arduous and costly
task of building global consensus. Relying on “coalitions of the willing”
was a second best alternative subject to significant criticism. In the multi-
hub system, in contrast, legal processes are occurring within such subsys-
tems with greater regularity. As a result, the United States can work
through smaller, less costly coalitions of states that share its interests on
particular issues. Given the groundwork laid during the period of U.S. he-
gemony, the United States is the beneficiary when variable geometry be-
comes the norm, not the exception, for international legal processes.493
Third, the fact that rising powers have chosen to operate within the inter-
national legal system, rather than challenge the system itself, means that, in
order to advance their own interests, rising powers will share the costs of
leadership. New hubs are beginning to lead legal processes within their own
subsystems, assuming costs of enforcement, and helping bear the burdens
previously carried by the United States alone. The United States may not
always see its preferences articulated in the rules and interpretations other
hubs are advancing. It may not always like the rules that new hubs choose
(or refuse) to enforce. But, if it embraces pluralism, the United States can
share the overall costs of managing a surprisingly robust system.
Despite the seductiveness of prediction, history usually proves such efforts
wrong. Ultimately, this paper seeks to open a conversation and research
agenda on the ways that present power shifts are altering the structure of
international legal processes and the substantive rules of international law.
Future inquiries must be both country- and issue-specific. They must con-
sider both power and preferences. This paper has sought to begin that effort
by providing a first-cut analysis of structural changes that are already under-
way and identifying the substantive tension points at which new pluralism
is emerging. In so doing, it offers a starting point for further analysis. At the
very least, it has sought to reorient the debate from the power of interna-
tional law to the role of power within international law.
493. On the ability of the United States to build coalitions, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, America’s Edge:
Power in the Networked Century, 88 Foreign Aff. 94 (2009).
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